nep-tur New Economics Papers
on Tourism Economics
Issue of 2007‒04‒28
two papers chosen by
Antonello Scorcu
University of Bologna

  1. Hub Premium, Airport Dominance and Market Power in the European Airline Industry. By Claudio A. Piga; Enrico Bachis
  2. Pricing strategies by European Low Cost Carriers. By Claudio A. Piga; Enrico Bachis

  1. By: Claudio A. Piga (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University); Enrico Bachis (Business School, Nottingham University)
    Abstract: Using evidence from an original dataset of more than 12 million fares, this study sheds light on two issues relating to the pricing behaviour of the main European airlines: 1) the extent to which an airline’s dominant position at the origin airport, at the route and the city-pair level affects the airlines’ market power; 2) whether fares follow a monotonic time path consistent with the pursuing of an inter-temporal price discrimination strategy. Our estimates reveal that enjoying a dominant position within a route is conducive to higher fares, possibly because of the limited size of many “natural monopoly” routes that facilitate the incumbent’s engagement in a limit pricing strategy. On the contrary, a larger share within a city-pair does not seem to facilitate the exercise of market power, thereby suggesting the existence of a large degree of substitutability between the routes in a city-pair.
    Keywords: on-line pricing; price discrimination; dispersion; yield management.
    JEL: L11 L13 L93
    Date: 2007–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2007_11&r=tur
  2. By: Claudio A. Piga (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University); Enrico Bachis (Business School, Nottingham University)
    Abstract: We introduce an on-line pricing tactic where airlines post, at the same time and for the same flight, fares in different currencies that violate the law of One Price. Unexpectedly for an on-line market, we find that price discrimination may be accompanied by arbitrage opportunities and that both tend to persist before a flight’s departure. We find discrimination to be of a competitive type, although arbitrage opportunities are more likely in concentrated routes. Finally, the evidence suggests that discrimination may be used to manage stochastic demand.
    Keywords: on-line pricing; price discrimination; Law of One Price; sample selection; dispersion; airlines, exchange rate.
    JEL: L11 L13 L93
    Date: 2007–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2007_10&r=tur

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