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on Transport Economics |
| By: | Antonio Nicita; Simona Benedettini |
| Abstract: | We empirically investigate the deterrent and offsetting effects of the introduction of a point–record driving license (PDRL) in Italy. We find that the PDRL resulted in a sharp reduction of seat belt offenses, and in a noticeable decrease of road accidents. However, the reduction in occupant fatalities and injuries was associated with an increase in non-occupant ones, suggesting a remarkable “Peltzman effect”. We then discuss whether a given enforcement design, by inducing drivers to make the best use of safety resources already available to them, may generate more external costs than would otherwise occur. |
| Keywords: | offsetting behavior, point - record driving license, seat belts, traffic law enforcement, traffic fatalities |
| JEL: | D02 K32 K42 L51 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:631&r=tre |
| By: | Philippe Gagnepain (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Marc Ivaldi (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics); David Martimort (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | Economic theory claims that contracts renegotiation prevents from reaching the informationally constrained efficient solution that could have been obtained under full commitment. Assessing the cost of renegotiation compared to the full commitment scenario still remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of contracts for urban transport services. The model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice (fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies are greater when a cost-plus contract was signed earlier on than following a fixed-price contract. We then compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators. |
| Date: | 2012–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00710639&r=tre |
| By: | Jonatha Anselmi; Bernardo D'Auria; Neil Walton |
| Abstract: | We analyze the behavior of closed product-form queueing networks when the number of customers grows to infinity and remains proportionate on each route (or class). First, we focus on the stationary behavior and prove the conjecture that the stationary distribution at non-bottleneck queues converges weakly to the stationary distribution of an ergodic, open product-form queueing network. This open network is obtained by replacing bottleneck queues with per-route Poissonian sources whose rates are determined by the solution of a strictly concave optimization problem. Then, we focus on the transient behavior of the network and use fluid limits to prove that the amount of fluid, or customers, on each route eventually concentrates on the bottleneck queues only, and that the long-term proportions of fluid in each route and in each queue solve the dual of the concave optimization problem that determines the throughputs of the previous open network. |
| Keywords: | Closed queueing networks, Product-form, Asymptotic independence, Fluid limit, Large population |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:wsrepe:ws121711&r=tre |
| By: | Marcello Basili; Filippo Belloc; Simona Benedettini; Antonio Nicita |
| Abstract: | In many contexts, warning systems of law enforcement are used to let uninformed individuals learn what is illegal, while sanctions are applied only after a number of repeated violations. Surprisingly no em- pirical evidence is available so far, over the learning impact of warnings. This paper is a first attempt to empirically investigate the warning’s effect on individuals’ behavior employing a unique database on a traffic law enforcement system, which constitutes an extraordinary nat- ural laboratory to test whether experience warning induces learning. Specifically, we use six-year longitudinal data on about 50000 drivers under the Italian point-record system of traffic law. Our statistical re- sults show that warned drivers become more compliant. To the extent individuals learn through their repeated behavior, a warning system makes it possible to apply sanctions only to (presumably) informed violators. |
| Keywords: | warning, law enforcement, mixture models |
| JEL: | K42 C14 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:639&r=tre |