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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Bronwyn H. Hall (University of California, Berkeley); Francesca Lotti (Bank of Italy); Jacques Mairesse (CREST-INSEE) |
| Abstract: | The paper investigates R&D and ICT investment at firm level, assessing their relative importance and the extent to which they are complements or substitutes. We use data on a large unbalanced panel sample from four consecutive waves of a survey of Italian manufacturing firms, together with a version of the model developed by Crepon et al., 1998, modified to include ICT investment and R&D as the two main inputs of innovation and productivity. We find that R&D and ICT are both strongly associated with innovation and productivity, with R&D being more important for innovation and ICT for productivity. We explore their possible complementarity in innovation and production but find none, although there is complementarity between R&D and worker skill in innovation. |
| Keywords: | R&D, ICT, innovation, productivity, complementarity, Italy |
| JEL: | L60 O31 O33 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_874_12&r=tid |
| By: | Arora, Ashish; Fosfuri, Andrea; Rønde, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Over the last decade, companies have paid greater attention to the management of their intellectual assets. We build a model that helps understand how licensing activity should be organized within large corporations. More specifically, we compare decentralization—where the business unit using the technology makes licensing decisions—to centralized licensing. The business unit has superior information about licensing opportunities but may not have the appropriate incentives because its rewards depend upon product market performance. If licensing is decentralized, the business unit forgoes valuable licensing opportunities since the rewards for licensing are (optimally) weaker than those for product market profits. This distortion is stronger when production-based incentives are more powerful, making centralization more attractive. Growth of technology markets favors centralization and drives higher licensing rates. Our model conforms to the existing evidence that reports heterogeneity across firms in both licensing propensity and organization of licensing. |
| Keywords: | Licensing; Markets for technology; Organization design |
| JEL: | L22 L24 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9048&r=tid |
| By: | Giulia Trombini (Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia); Anna Comacchio (Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia) |
| Abstract: | The study departs from the traditional view of licensing as a spot market transaction and investigates license integration with R&D partnerships, introducing the concept of licensing combination. Drawing on licensing and R&D partnership literature and adopting the Òtransactional valueÓ approach, we propose two types of antecedents Ð knowledge and dyad features Ð to investigate licensing combination. Using a dataset combining 441 original license agreements with firmsÕ patenting and market activity in the global biopharmaceutical industry, we find a substantial heterogeneity in the ways licensors and licensees jointly exploit markets for knowledge and the specific role of R&D collaboration and minority equity in inter-organizational exchange through licensing. Results show that licensing combination with R&D collaboration is likely when the licensed innovation is embryonic, the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensorÕs technology and partners have different technological backgrounds. Instead, licensing of highly specific knowledge is likely to be supported by minority equity participation on the part of the licensee. Finally, licensing is combined with both forms of partnership in case of competence distance between partners. In the light of the empirical results, four types of licensing combination are proposed for future research. |
| Keywords: | Markets for technology, Licensing combination, R&D collaboration, Minority equity participation, Knowledge transfer, Joint value |
| JEL: | O32 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpdman:21&r=tid |
| By: | Byeongwoo KANG; MOTOHASHI Kazuyuki |
| Abstract: | Obtaining essential intellectual property rights (IPRs) is important for innovation competition in the network industry, where technical standardization plays a critical role in development. In this study, we empirically investigate the determinants of essential IPRs for wireless communications standards by using the patent database. More specifically, we use the technological capabilities of both the firm and the patent inventor to explain the probability of its selection as an essential IPR. In addition, we compare manufacturing firms' and non-manufacturing patentees' (NMPs) technology strategies for essential IPRs. Our results indicate that manufacturing firms accumulate their technological capability in specific technology fields, whereas NMPs cover broader technology fields to keep their dominant position in the standardization process. |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:12042&r=tid |
| By: | Korkeamäki, Timo (Hanken School of Economics and Bank of Finland); Takalo, Tuomas (Bank of Finland Research) |
| Abstract: | We study the value of innovation in a case study of one of the most visible innovative products in recent years, Apple’s iPhone. The value effects of news announcements, patent publications, and trademarks relating to iPhone are taken into account. Our estimate of the lower bound on the value of iPhone is fairly high, 30 billion U.S. (event-day) dollars or 10% to 13% of the firm’s market cap (at the end of 2009). We find that patentable technology explains about 25% of the total value, which derives from market reactions to publication of patent applications rather than grants. We also observe a weak negative reaction among Apple’s rivals to news about iPhone. Apple appears to capture most of the value within the iPhone supply chain. |
| Keywords: | innovation management; intellectual property rights; valuation; event studies |
| JEL: | G14 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofrdp:2012_024&r=tid |