nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2011‒04‒30
five papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Taxation, R&D tax incentives and patent application in Europe By Ernst, Christof; Spengel, Christoph
  2. Product innovation and imitation in a duopoly with differentiation by attributes By Reynald-Alexandre Laurent
  3. Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation By Beyer, Mila; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius
  4. The market value of blocking patent citations By Czarnitzki, Dirk; Hussinger, Katrin; Leten, Bart
  5. Patents and the financial performance of firms - An analysis based on stock market data By Neuhäusler, Peter; Frietsch, Rainer; Schubert, Torben; Blind, Knut

  1. By: Ernst, Christof; Spengel, Christoph
    Abstract: The focus of this paper is on effects from tax incentives for research and development inputs (R&D) and corporate income tax on business R&D and patenting behaviour. First, we provide a theoretical discussion of tax planning with R&D and intellectual property (IP) ownership. Further, we employ firm-specific micro-data on patent applications of European corporations at the European Patent Office to test reactions on changes in R&D tax incentives and corporate tax burden. We find a positive impact of R&D tax incentives and a negative impact of the statutory corporate income tax rate on patenting. R&D incentives rather influence the tendency to invest in R&D, whereas the tax burden rather influences the scale of R&D investment and the count of patent applications. --
    Keywords: Patent,R&D,Tax Incentives,Taxation,EU
    JEL: H25 H26 O30
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11024&r=tid
  2. By: Reynald-Alexandre Laurent (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)
    Abstract: This paper considers a probabilistic duopoly in which products are described by their specific attributes, this form of differentiation embodying the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Consumers make discrete choices and follow a random decision rule based on these attributes. A three-stage game is studied in which firms develop new attributes for their products (innovation), then may imitate the attributes of the competing product and finally compete in price. At the equilibrium, the firm selling the less appreciated product is generally incited to imitate its rival. Confronted to a threat of imitation, the benchmark firm sometimes decreases strategically its attribute index in order to diminish its unit cost of innovation and the differentiation on the market, deterring the imitation in this way. This strategy is efficient when imitation costs are sufficiently concave. In the opposite case, it is preferable for the benchmark firm to accept the imitation. Thus, according to the shape of imitation costs, equilibria with "deterrence" or with "accommodation" "accommodation" occur, completing the current typology of strategic responses to a threat of imitation.
    Keywords: quality choices ; differentiation by attributes ; product innovation, product imitation
    Date: 2011–04–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00586867&r=tid
  3. By: Beyer, Mila; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius
    Abstract: Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample of 1,406 Belgian firms, we find, first, that managers holding no company shares under-invest into R&D compared to owners giving rise to the risk argument. Second, we find an inverse u-shaped relationship between the degree of managerial ownership and R&D. Thus, managers become entrenched, i.e. powerful enough to pursue their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career, and hence tend to over-invest into innovation. --
    Keywords: corporate governance,managerial ownership,entrenchment,innovation,R&D investments
    JEL: G32 O31 O32
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11026&r=tid
  4. By: Czarnitzki, Dirk; Hussinger, Katrin; Leten, Bart
    Abstract: There is a growing literature that aims at assessing the private value of knowledge assets and patents. It has been shown that patents and their quality as measured by citations received by future patents contribute significantly to the market value of firms beyond their R&D stocks. This paper goes one step further and distinguishes between different types of forward citations patents can receive at the European Patent Office. While a patent can be cited as non-infringing state of the art, it can also be cited because it threatens the novelty of patent applications ('blocking citations'). Empirical results from a market value model for a sample of large, R&D-intensive U.S., European and Japanese firms show that patents frequently cited as blocking references have a higher economic value for their owners than patents cited for nonblocking reasons. This finding adds to the patent value literature by showing that different types of patent citations carry different information on the economic value of patents. The result further suggests that the total number of forward citations can be an imprecise measure of patent value. --
    Keywords: Market Value,Patents,Citations,Patent Value
    JEL: O31 O34 O38
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11021&r=tid
  5. By: Neuhäusler, Peter; Frietsch, Rainer; Schubert, Torben; Blind, Knut
    Abstract: The following article systematically analyzes the question of how the results of R&D and its protection - or so to say, the technology base of a firm - can influence its market value and profits. Based on theoretical arguments it is hypothesized that large and highly valuable patent portfolios of firms have significant effects on their competitiveness in the long run. For the empirical testing a panel dataset including 479 firms from 1990 to 2007 based on the DTI-Scoreboard is used, which contains data on R&D expenditures, market capitalization, turnover etc. and structural information like firm-size and industry sector. To this database the relevant information on patenting behavior and financial performance are added, so effects of firm characteristics can be calculated. To assess the value of a firm's patent portfolio, different value measures like the number of received patent citations, opposed patents, number of inventors etc. are being applied. The results suggest that at least at the firm level, especially forward citations and family size positively influence market value. Concerning the Return on Investment, especially oppositions and family size show positive effects. This leads to the conclusion that securing international markets has a positive effect on the value of the firm in the home market. --
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fisidp:28&r=tid

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