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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Michael Polder; George van Leeuwen; Pierre Mohnen; Wladimir Raymond |
| Abstract: | We propose a model where both R&D and ICT investment feed into a system of three innovation output equations (product, process and organizational innovation), which ultimately feeds into a productivity equation. We find that ICT investment and usage are important drivers of innovation in both manufacturing and services. Doing more R&D has a positive effect on product innovation in manufacturing. The strongest productivity effects are derived from organizational innovation. We find positive effects of product and process innovation when combined with an organizational innovation. There is evidence that organizational innovation is complementary to process innovation. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; ICT; R&D; Productivity |
| JEL: | L25 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aal:abbswp:10-24&r=tid |
| By: | Akio Kawasaki; Ming Hsin Lin; Noriaki Matsushima |
| Abstract: | We investigate a multi-market Cournot model with strategic process R&D investments wherein a multi-market monopolist meets entrants that enter one of the markets. We find that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditure of the incumbent firm. That is, entry can stimulate R&D effort. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entrycan appear. |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0796&r=tid |
| By: | Colombelli Alessandra; von Tunzelmann Nick (University of Turin) |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:201011&r=tid |
| By: | Shane B. Evans |
| Abstract: | In this paper a Developer contracts with a Researcher for the production of a non-drastic innovation. Since effort is non-contractible, the Developer offers an incentive contract dependent on the observed magnitude of the innovation. It is shown that the distribution of intellectual property rights (IPR) ownership does not affect the level of effort exerted for innovations where the Developer would choose to license the innovation to its competitors. This is because the possibility of leakage of the innovation through licensing subsidies the Developer's payment when IPR is delegated to the Researcher, while at the same time eroding its profit. |
| JEL: | D23 L24 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2010-530&r=tid |
| By: | Antonelli Cristiano; Colombelli Alessandra (University of Turin) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at exploring the determinants of the direction of technological change at the firm level of analysis. Following the localized technological change approach, we suggest that firms will respond to change in factor market costs by introducing neutral or biased technological changes according to their innovation and knowledge generation related attributes. In the empirical analysis we use a panel of 1113 companies listed on UK and the main continental Europe financial markets (Germany, France and Italy) for the period 1995-2003. We find that small firms, relying more on tacit knowledge than on formal research and development activities, and less able to appropriate the benefits of their technological innovations are more likely to introduce biased technological change in order to make a more intensive use of the factor that has become more abundant |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:201012&r=tid |