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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Kochanski, Tim |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I develop a hybrid model that contains elements of both agent based simulations (ABS) as well as analytic Cournot models, to study the effects of firm characteristics, market characteristics, and innovation on market concentration, as measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The model accommodates the following components: multiple firms with heterogeneous marginal costs, market entry and exit, barriers to entry, low or high cost industries, changing demand, varying levels of marginal cost reducing returns-to-innovation, varying costs associated with innovation, increased returns to innovation from past experience innovating, and varying propensities to innovate within the market. The components mentioned above are commonly cited as determinants of market concentration. A sensitivity analysis which is robust to high degrees of model complexity demonstrates that the model provides results that are consistent with economic theories of markets. |
| Keywords: | agent based simulation; Cournot; game; innovation; oligopoly |
| JEL: | C79 D43 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:16539&r=tid |
| By: | Jaakko Simonen; Philip McCann |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the role played by the sectoral and geographical mobility of labour in the promotion of industrial innovations. Knowledge can be transferred between firms by inter-firm interactions and interfirm cooperation. In addition, knowledge can also be transferred between firms by labour mobility. In order to examine these issues we employ a unique innovation dataset from Finland which combines firm specific information about the innovation performance of the firms along with their individual characteristics, as well as firm specific information regarding the sectoral and geographical origins of their recent labour acquisitions. Analyzing this data allows us to identify the different roles which the geography of knowledge spillovers and exchanges and the geography of labour markets play in the innovation process. |
| Keywords: | innovation; labour; mobility; R&D; cooperation |
| JEL: | O31 J60 R30 |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2007-29&r=tid |
| By: | Shishir Saxena |
| Abstract: | This paper finds that technology stocks and spillovers, have significantly affected the output of Indian manufacturing firms, over the period 1994 to 2006. The technology of a firm is measured, as embodied in its recent stock of plant & machinery, as well as generated through its own R&D. Moreover, investments in both these types of capital by a firm, also generate learning and level of development effects, for all other firms in that industry. |
| Keywords: | Indian manufacturing, equipment, R&D, spillovers |
| JEL: | L6 E22 D24 D62 O30 |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2007-27&r=tid |
| By: | Gaston Llanes (Harvard Business School, Entrepreneurial Management Unit); Stefano Trento (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Departament d'Economia i Historia Economica,) |
| Abstract: | We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We study the equilibrium innovation activity under three regimes: patents, no-patents and patent pools. Patent pools increase the probability of innovation with respect to patents, but we also find that: (1) their outcome can be replicated by a licensing scheme in which innovators sell complete patent rights, and (2) they are dynamically unstable. We find that none of the above regimes can reach the first or second best. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length. |
| Keywords: | Sequential Innovation, Patent Pools, Anticommons |
| JEL: | L13 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:10-005&r=tid |
| By: | Dyuti S. Banerjee; Teyu Chou |
| Abstract: | This paper uses a strategic entry-deterrence approach to address the effects of anti-commercial piracy policies on a firm’s incentive to innovate. Monitoring increases the firm’s incentive to innovate. However, inclusion of innovation does not necessarily result in monitoring as the socially optimal policy. If monitoring is the socially optimal policy then the commercial pirate’s entry may or may not be deterred. The entry-deterring limit price and quality is less than that in the monopoly case. Only in the extreme situation the monopoly results are restored. |
| Keywords: | Accommodating strategy, aggressive strategy, copyright protection, innovation. |
| JEL: | K42 L11 |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2007-05&r=tid |