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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Schmidt, Klaus M. |
| Abstract: | Many high technology goods are based on standards that require access to several patents that are owned by different IP holders. We investigate the royalties chosen by IP holders under different market structures. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders (or a patent pool) solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and innovation. |
| Keywords: | complementary patents; IP rights; licensing; patent pool; standards; vertical integration |
| JEL: | K11 L15 L24 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7005&r=tid |
| By: | Van Beers, Cees; Dekker, Ronald |
| Abstract: | This aim of this paper is twofold. First it examines the determinants of acquisitions and divestitures of Dutch firms in the period 1996-2004. Second, it investigates the impact of acquisitions and divestitures on the firm’s innovative output performance. An econometric model is specified and estimated with Community Innovation Survey data for the Netherlands in the period 1996-2004. The main findings of this study are as follows. First, innovating firms are significantly more involved in acquisition activities than non-innovating firms, which suggests that acquisitions are a strategy to gain access to new technologies or knowledge. Second, lack of knowledge as a barrier to innovate increases the chance of acquiring assets of other firms although not significantly. Lack of finance as a barrier to innovate increases significantly the chance of divesting assets. Third, acquisitions motivated by knowledge barriers in the innovation process affect the probability of positive innovative sales positively while acquisitions motivated by other reasons than innovation barriers affect this probability negatively. No effect of knowledge barriers induced acquisitions on the level of the innovative sales could be found. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; performance; mergers; acquisitions; divestitures; strategy. |
| JEL: | L10 D40 |
| Date: | 2009–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:13464&r=tid |
| By: | Jamasb, T.; Pollitt, M.G. |
| Abstract: | Liberalisation has had a marked effect on innovative activities in the electricity industry. R&D and patenting activities are generally regarded respectively as innovative inputs to and outputs from technological progress. Electricity reforms have resulted in a reduction in R&D spending in the sector. This paper examines the effect of reforms on patenting activity in the UK electricity sector. The results indicate that electricity related patents in non-nuclear and renewable technologies have increased in the post-liberalisation period. We attribute this trend to increased commercialisation of the sector. While this development is positive, we argue that a lasting decline in R&D will in the longer run reduce technological progress in the sector. In order to maintain the pace of innovation, we discuss the need for a framework for innovation systems that is commensurate with the incentive mechanisms of a liberalised sector. |
| Keywords: | Electricity, patent, innovation, technology, liberalisation |
| JEL: | L94 O31 Q32 Q38 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0902&r=tid |
| By: | Andrew Burke (Cranfield University, UK); André van Stel (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | The main contribution of entrepreneurship theory to economics is to provide an account of market performance in disequilibrium but little empirical research has examined firm entry and exit in this context. We redress this by modelling the interrelationship between firm entry and exit in disequilibrium. Introducing a new methodology we investigate whether this interrelationship differs between market ‘undershooting’ (the actual number of firms is below the equilibrium number) and ‘overshooting’ (vice versa). We find that equilibrium-restoring mechanisms are faster in over than in undershoots. The results imply that in undershoots a lack of competition between incumbent firms contributes to restoration of equilibrium (creating room for new-firm entry) while in overshoots competition induced by new firms (in particular strong displacement) helps restore equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | entry; exit; equilibrium; industrial organization; undershooting; overshooting |
| JEL: | B50 J01 L00 L1 L26 |
| Date: | 2009–01–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090005&r=tid |