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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Agustín Indaco (Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar); Ira Teqja (Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar) |
| Abstract: | Previous research suggests that professional athletes choke when performing unopposed high-pressure tasks, such as taking penalty kicks. This article extends the literature by studying whether football players choke when they have an opportunity to score in open-play situations. These situations are markedly different because in such instances players do not have time to stop and (over)think. We suggest that these situations closely resemble high-pressure professions and mirror many of the stressful scenarios we regularly experience. We find that players consistently underperform relative to expectations when their team is down by one goal. However, players perform to expectations when the game is tied. This finding is consistent with players being loss averse. |
| Keywords: | Choking, Pressure, Football |
| JEL: | M54 Z13 J24 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:342 |
| By: | Arkadev Ghosh; Prerna Kundu; Matt Lowe; Gareth Nellis; Matthew Lowe |
| Abstract: | Non-family-based institutions for socializing young people may play a vital role in creating close-knit, inclusive communities. We study the potential for youth camps—integrating rituals, sports, and civics training—to strengthen intergroup cohesion. We randomly assigned Hindu and Muslim adolescent boys, from West Bengal, India, to two-week camps or to a pure control arm. To isolate mechanisms, we cross-randomized collective rituals (such as singing the national anthem, wearing uniforms, chanting support during matches, and synchronous dancing) and the intensity of intergroup contact. We find that camps reduce ingroup bias, increase willingness to interact with outgroup members, and enhance psychological well-being. Campers continue to have more than twice as many outgroup friends than control participants one year after the camps ended. Meanwhile, additional camp elements have heterogeneous effects: rituals have more positive impacts for the Hindu majority than the Muslim minority, while higher intergroup contact backfires among Hindus but not Muslims. Our findings demonstrate that inclusive youth camps may be a powerful tool for bridging deep social divides. Yet, we also highlight the conceptual challenges in crafting optimal integrative camps that help all groups. |
| Keywords: | intergroup contact, rituals, curriculum, youth camps, discrimination, ingroup bias, civic values |
| JEL: | J15 C93 D91 I10 Z12 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11352 |
| By: | DeVaro, Jed (California State University, East Bay); Fung, Scott (California State University) |
| Abstract: | We empirically test whether executives' increases in base salary when promoted to CEO result from the wage bids of competing firms (i.e., "market-based tournaments") or from the strategic choices of the firm's board of directors to elicit optimal executive incentives (i.e., "classic tournaments"). Our test emphasizes the effect of the "importance of luck" (i.e., the variance of luck) on the pay raises that accompany promotion. Specifically, we focus on how that effect differs between the two types of tournaments. An estimated negative relationship between the importance of luck and the executive salary spread supports market-based tournaments, whereas a positive relationship supports classic tournaments. The results are non-monotonic in firm size. Executive tournaments in both the bottom 13% of firms (i.e., total assets below $376 million) and the top 2.5% of firms (i.e., total assets above $112 billion) are more consistent with classic tournaments, whereas the nearly 85% in the middle of the distribution of firm size are more consistent with market-based tournaments. Also, controlling for firm size, highly concentrated product markets are more consistent with market-based tournaments. Extending market-based tournament theory to allow executives to choose the luck variance reveals that executives infuse their tournaments with a high luck variance, which lowers the expected pay differential and depresses incentives. |
| Keywords: | executive compensation, promotion tournaments, importance of luck, uncertainty in promotion contests, classic and market-based tournaments, vertical pay disparity, firm size, market structure |
| JEL: | G32 G39 J31 M12 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17327 |