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on Sports and Economics |
By: | Hideo Konishi (Boston College); Chen-Yu Pan (Wuhan University); Dimitar Simeonov (Boston College) |
Abstract: | We consider games in which team leaders strategically choose the order of players sent to the battlefield in majoritarian team contests with multiple pairwise battles as in Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015 American Economic Review). We consider one-shot order choice games and battle-by-battle sequential player choice games. We show that as long as the number of players on each team is the same as the number of battles, the equilibrium winning probability of a team and the ex ante expected effort of each player in a multi-battle contest are independent of whether players' assignments are one-shot or battle-by-battle sequential. This equilibrium winning probability and ex ante expected total effort coincide with those where the player matching is chosen totally randomly with an equal probability lottery by the contest organizer. Finally, we show how player choices add subtleties to the equivalence result by examples. |
Keywords: | group contest, team contest, multi-battle contest, sports economics |
JEL: | C72 D72 D74 D82 |
Date: | 2021–01–22 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:1025&r=all |
By: | L\'aszl\'o Csat\'o |
Abstract: | Scoring rules aggregate individual rankings by assigning some points to each position in each ranking such that the total sum of points provides the overall ranking of the alternatives. They are widely used in sports competitions consisting of multiple contests. We study the tradeoff between two risks in this setting: (1) the threat of early clinch when the title has been clinched before the last contest(s) of the competition take place; (2) the danger of winning the competition without finishing first in any contest. In particular, four historical points scoring systems of the Formula One World Championship are compared with the family of geometric scoring rules that have favourable axiomatic properties. The formers are found to be competitive or even better. The current scheme seems to be a reasonable compromise in optimising the above goals. Our results shed more light on the evolution of the Formula One points scoring systems and contribute to the issue of choosing the set of point values. |
Date: | 2021–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2101.05744&r=all |
By: | Lambert, Thoomas |
Abstract: | Over the last 15 to 20 years or so horse racing has seen declines in wagering and fan attendance throughout the US. Because of this, the number of races, horses per race, the number of thoroughbred farms, and new thoroughbreds bred and born each year for about the last 10 to 12 years have also declined. The decline in wagering has occurred despite simulcasting of races, online betting, and gambling machines which employ films of past races (historical horse racing machines). Those racetracks doing well are usually part of larger casino and entertainment complexes (racinos). Kentucky, which has one of the greatest number of horses and horse farms per capita in the United States, and which is also home to one of the world’s premier racetracks and horse races, Churchill Downs and the Kentucky Derby, has seen declining inflation adjusted horse industry tax revenues since the 1990s. These losses only exacerbate a state budget which has already seen substantial declines in or an almost complete loss of tax revenues from two other major industries of the state, coal and tobacco. This research note explains why the thoroughbred industries are declining and how this is impacting some Kentucky state tax revenues. |
Keywords: | gambling, horse racing, parimutuel wagering, tax revenues, thoroughbred industries |
JEL: | H71 L83 |
Date: | 2020–12–31 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:105077&r=all |