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on Sports and Economics |
By: | Thanasis Bouzidis (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia) |
Abstract: | In this paper, we present for the first time the on-field production process of soccer teams as a mixed (serial and parallel) structure two-stage network system. According to this, the first stage consists of two distinct sub-processes (offense and defense) that operate in parallel. These respectively use players’ offensive and defensive actions as inputs to produce two different intermediate measures, namely, goals scored and prevention of goals conceded. These, in turn, are the inputs of the second stage (points’ accumulation sub-process) that produces accumulated points. Furthermore, based on a two-stage network Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model, we estimate the offensive, defensive, and athletic efficiency of soccer teams during a league season. According to our proposed framework, these three different efficiency scores are provided (for each soccer team under evaluation) by a single linear programming problem. For this purpose, aggregate-over-games statistics from the 2013-14 Greek premier soccer league are used. |
Keywords: | Two-stage Network DEA; Soccer Teams; League Season. |
JEL: | Z2 |
Date: | 2019–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2019_05&r=all |
By: | Turner, Christian (University of Georgia) |
Abstract: | Campaign-finance reformers fear that rich donors’ money can be used disproportionately to influence the content of campaign advertising and thus, perhaps, the results of elections. In European football, UEFA has attempted to ban “financial doping,” rich owners’ use of money earned in sectors other than football to pay large sums for the best football players. Campaign-finance reform efforts and “financial fair play” rules in sport may seem like bespoke solutions to different problems. In fact, they are the same solution to the same problem. Both are attempts to ensure that power accumulated in one market is not brought into another market so as to distort and damage its proper functioning. Market segregation, which seeks to bar explicit or implicit trans-market “currency” exchanges, disconnects the markets’ decisionmaking rationales. By understanding the segregation regulatory tool and its characteristic difficulties, including the appearance of black-market currency exchanges and the entrenchment of incumbents, it is possible to see in more general terms the challenges in many other legal settings, including moral rights and so-called “repugnant transactions.” |
Date: | 2019–02–26 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:5ehmy&r=all |