|
on Sports and Economics |
|
Issue of 2017‒07‒16
three papers chosen by João Carlos Correia Leitão Universidade da Beira Interior |
| By: | Siem Jan S.J. Koopman (VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands; CREATES, Aarhus University, Denmark; Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands); Rutger Lit (VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | We develop a new dynamic multivariate model for the analysis and the forecasting of football match results in national league competitions. The proposed dynamic model is based on the score of the predictive observation mass function for a high-dimensional panel of weekly match results. Our main interest is to forecast whether the match result is a win, a loss or a draw for each team. To deliver such forecasts, the dynamic model can be based on three different dependent variables: the pairwise count of the number of goals, the difference between the number of goals, or the category of the match result (win, loss, draw). The different dependent variables require different distributional assumptions. Furthermore, different dynamic model specifications can be considered for generating the forecasts. We empirically investigate which dependent variable and which dynamic model specification yield the best forecasting results. In an extensive forecasting study, we consider match results from six large European football competitions and we validate the precision of the forecasts for a period of seven years for each competition. We conclude that our preferred dynamic model for pairwise counts delivers the most precise forecasts and outperforms benchmark and other competing models. |
| Keywords: | Football; Forecasting; Score-driven models; Bivariate Poisson; Skellam; Ordered probit; Probabilistic loss function |
| JEL: | C32 |
| Date: | 2017–07–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170062&r=spo |
| By: | Ensthaler, Ludwig; Huck, Steffen; Leutgeb, Johannes |
| Abstract: | From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people ("agents") make decisions that affect payoffs of others ("principals") who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003) characterize pure-strategy equilibria of such Games Played Through Agents. Specifically, they predict the equilibrium outcome in pure strategies to be efficient. We test the theory in a series of experimental treatments with human principals and computerized agents. The theory predicts remarkably well which actions, and outcomes are implemented but subjects' transfer offers deviate systematically from equilibrium. We show how quantal response equilibrium accounts for the deviations and test its predictions out of sample. Our results show that quantal response equilibrium is particularly well suited for explaining behavior in such games. |
| Keywords: | games played through agents,experiment,quantal response equilibrium |
| JEL: | D44 C91 D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2016305r&r=spo |
| By: | Candon Johnson (West Virginia University, Department of Economics); Joshua Hall (West Virginia University, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of taxes on the salaries received by National Basketball Association free agents from 2010-2014. High state income tax rates affect the after-tax income received by players from their team as well as on any ancillary income. Using data on 576 free agents, we find statistically significant evidence that free agents signing in high tax states receive higher salaries, ceteris paribus. Our results suggest that a one-unit increase in the average tax rate experienced by a free agent in a state leads to free agent salaries being over $60,000 higher. |
| Keywords: | Tiebout, taxation, National Basketball Association |
| JEL: | H20 H24 H71 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wvu:wpaper:17-11&r=spo |