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on Sports and Economics |
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Issue of 2016‒03‒23
three papers chosen by João Carlos Correia Leitão Universidade da Beira Interior |
| By: | Wladimir Andreff (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | The chapter goes as follows. In the first section it is demonstrated how the Tour de France is a high quality product. This is a result from its accurate design, its management, its economic model and its finance structure, both in comparison to other mega-sporting events and with reference to tournament theory. It is not easy to assess the competitive balance in the Tour de France since, as was demonstrated in chapter 10, it is at the same time an individual and a team sport contest. After reviewing some results published in literature so far, a new metrics for evaluating competitive balanced in the Tour de France is presented in section 2. Finally, the Tour de France cannot ignore doping as a potential threat to fan attendance and TV viewing. We therefore discuss the issue of doping and a new procedure to deal with doping in section 3. |
| Keywords: | economics of sport,professional cycling,Tour de France,doping,competitive balance |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01279855&r=spo |
| By: | Wladimir Andreff (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | A typology of sport corruption differentiates petty corruption, barter corruption, corruption at the level of sport governing bodies, betting scandals and point-shaving. A deeper analysis goes further as regards match fixing-related bets and global online fraudulent sport betting networks and suggests new tools for combatting match fixing. |
| Keywords: | Corruption active,Sports economics |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01279785&r=spo |
| By: | Daniel Chen; Tobias J. Moskowitz; Kelly Shue |
| Abstract: | We find consistent evidence of negative autocorrelation in decision-making that is unrelated to the merits of the cases considered in three separate high-stakes field settings: refugee asylum court decisions, loan application reviews, and major league baseball umpire pitch calls. The evidence is most consistent with the law of small numbers and the gambler's fallacy – people underestimating the likelihood of sequential streaks occurring by chance – leading to negatively autocorrelated decisions that result in errors. The negative autocorrelation is stronger among more moderate and less experienced decision-makers, following longer streaks of decisions in one direction, when the current and previous cases share similar characteristics or occur close in time, and when decision-makers face weaker incentives for accuracy. Other explanations for negatively autocorrelated decisions such as quotas, learning, or preferences to treat all parties fairly, are less consistent with the evidence, though we cannot completely rule out sequential contrast effects as an alternative explanation. |
| JEL: | D03 G02 K0 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22026&r=spo |