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on Sports and Economics |
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Issue of 2012‒06‒13
three papers chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon |
| By: | Mongeon, Kevin; Winfree, Jason |
| Abstract: | Although many sports leagues are viewed as monopolies, research suggests that some economic competition exists between teams in dierent sports leagues. If fans make consumption choices based on the quality of all teams that are present in their region, then economic competition and ownership structure can impact an owner's incentive to invest in talent. This article examines dierences between monopolists, duopolists and cross-ownership. Consumer preferences and fan loyalty are allowed to vary across sports, and the winning percentages of teams in other leagues aects demand. Our model shows that economic competition results in an ambiguous level of investment compared to a monopolist. A rm that engages in cross-ownership will invest less in talent compared to a duopolist, but the dierence in prots is ambiguous. League policies are studied and are shown to aect the quality of teams in other leagues. |
| Keywords: | Sports Leagues; Talent Investment; Ownership Structures |
| JEL: | L83 |
| Date: | 2012–01–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39218&r=spo |
| By: | Wladimir Andreff (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | Auction theory, when the bidders do not know the value of what is auctionned, is used to explain how the Olympic Games are allocated to competing bidding cities. It is a centralized allocation process with asymmetric information which usually comes out with a winner's curse. Various indicators of the latter are proposed and exemplified, the major one being the systematic ex ante underestimation of the Olympics costs. |
| Keywords: | auctions, bids, winner's curse, asymmetric information, cost underestimation, mega sporting events, Olympics |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00703466&r=spo |
| By: | Papahristodoulou, Christos |
| Abstract: | Using a Non-Linear Integer Programming (NLIP) model, I examine if wage differences between Super talents and Normal players improve the performance of four teams which participate in a tournament, such as in the UEFA Champions League (UCL) group matches. With ad-hoc wage differences, the optimal solutions of the model show that higher wage equality seems to improve the performance of all teams, irrespectively if the elasticity of substitution between Super- and Normal- players is high or low. In addition to that, a U-type performance exists in two teams with the highest and the second high elasticity of substitution. With team data from the 2011-12 UCL group matches and from the Italian Serie A over 2010-12 seasons, the wage dispersion has no effect on team performances. |
| Keywords: | Players; Teams; Wages; Performance; Tournament |
| JEL: | L83 C60 J30 |
| Date: | 2012–05–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39149&r=spo |