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on Sports and Economics |
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Issue of 2008‒05‒17
three papers chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao University of the Beira Interior |
| By: | Madalozzo, Regina |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ibm:ibmecp:wpe_104&r=spo |
| By: | Papahristodoulou, Christos |
| Abstract: | We formulate a non-linear integer programming model and use plausible parameters to examine: (i) the effects of wage differences between Super- and Normal- players in the performance of four teams which participate in the UEFA CL group matches; (ii) whether the expected qualification bonus received by UEFA and paid to the players of the non-qualified teams, enhances effort and the teams manage to qualify. When performance is measured by points’ maximization, higher wage equality seems to improve the performance of three teams, irrespectively if the elasticity of substitution between Super- and Normal- players is high or low, while the most efficient team of the tournament is not affected by the wage structure. The U-formed performance for that team is not excluded. When performance is measured by profits’ maximization, the performance depends on both the “production” technology and on wage differences. When all teams operate under increasing returns and all pay the same, but varying relative wages, or when they operate under decreasing returns and pay the marginal value product of their players, the most “balanced” team performs better. The most “unbalanced” team performs best under increasing returns to scale and egalitarian wages. In the last case, the non-qualified teams did not manage to improve their performance and qualify, even if their players should receive the expected qualification bonus that UEFA pays. |
| Keywords: | Players; Teams; Wages; Bonus; Performance; Tournament |
| JEL: | D0 C6 D7 L83 |
| Date: | 2008–05–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:8719&r=spo |
| By: | John P. Haisken-DeNew; Matthias Vorell |
| Abstract: | The level of violence in the National Hockey League (NHL) reached its highest point in 1987 and has reduced somewhat since then, although to levels much larger than before the first team expansions in 1967. Using publicly available information from several databases 1996–2007, the incentives for violence in North American ice hockey are analyzed.We examine the role of penalty minutes and more specifically, fighting, during the regular season in determining wages for professional hockey players and team-level success indicators. There are substantial returns paid not only to goal scoring skills but also to fighting ability, helping teams move higher in the playoffs and showing up as positive wage premia for otherwise observed low-skill wing players. These estimated per-fight premia, depending on fight success ($10,000 to $18,000), are even higher than those for an additional point made. By introducing a “fight fine” of twice the maximum potential gain ($36,000) and adding this amount to salaries paid for the team salary cap (fines would be 6.7% of the team salary cap or the average wage of 2 players), then all involved would have either little or no incentives to allow fighting to continue. |
| Keywords: | Compensating wage differentials, health risk, violence, subjective indicators |
| JEL: | J31 J81 C23 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0047&r=spo |