nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2007‒02‒03
two papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of the Beira Interior

  1. On the Edge of Your Seat: Demand for Football on Television and the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis By Kevin Alavy; Alison Gaskell; Stephanie Leach; Stefan Szymanski
  2. Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution May Benefit the TV Viewers By Stennek, Johan

  1. By: Kevin Alavy (Initiative Futures); Alison Gaskell (Initiative Futures); Stephanie Leach (Tanaka Business School, Imperial College); Stefan Szymanski (Tanaka Business School, Imperial College)
    Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between the demand for English football on television and outcome uncertainty. It tests the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis by using minute-by-minute television viewership figures which avoids the problems encountered when estimating demand using match attendance. We find that although uncertainty matters, it is the progression of the match which drives viewership and as a draw looks increasingly likely, viewers are likely to switch channels. Games that end in victories have a higher average viewership than games that end in stalemates.
    Keywords: competitive balance, sports leagues, football, soccer, television
    JEL: L82 L83
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spe:wpaper:0631&r=spo
  2. By: Stennek, Johan
    Abstract: Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in prices. This paper demonstrates that exclusive distribution may also give providers of contents incentives to invest in higher quality and, as a result, force competitors to reduce their prices. Exclusive distribution may benefit all viewers, including those who are excluded.
    Keywords: advertising; bargaining; exclusive contracts; investment; quality; two-sided market
    JEL: C78 D43 K21 L42
    Date: 2007–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6072&r=spo

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