|
on Sports and Economics |
Issue of 2006‒09‒03
three papers chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao Universidade da Beira Interior |
By: | Victor Matheson (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross); Robert Baade (Department of Economics and Business, Lake Forest College); Mimi Nikolova (Department of Economics and Business, Lake Forest College) |
Abstract: | Supporters of sports stadium construction often defend taxpayer subsidies for stadiums by suggesting that sports infrastructure can serve as an anchor for local economic redevelopment. Have such promises of economic rejuvenation been realized? The City of Chicago provides an interesting case study on how a new stadium, U. S. Cellular Field, has been integrated into its southside neighborhood in a way that may well have limited local economic activity. This economic outcome stands in stark contrast to Wrigley Field in northern Chicago which continues to experience a synergistic commercial relationship with its neighborhood. |
Keywords: | sports, sports, stadiums, development, baseball, Chicago, economic impact |
JEL: | L83 O18 R53 |
Date: | 2006–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hcx:wpaper:0608&r=spo |
By: | R. Antonietti |
Date: | 2006 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:561&r=spo |
By: | Konrad, Kia A.; Kovenock, Dan |
Abstract: | We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players’ abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in the contest, which may explain why they participate. We also show that an increase in the dispersion of a player’s own ability generally benefits this player. It may benefit or harm his rival, but cannot benefit the rival more than it benefits himself. We also explore the role of stochastic ability for sequential contests with the same opponent (multi-battle contests) and with varying opponents (elimination tournaments) and show that it reduces the strong discouragement effects and hold-up problems that may otherwise emerge in such games. High own ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests. |
Keywords: | All-Pay Auctions ; Elimination Tournament ; Contest ; Race ; Conflict ; Multi-Stage ; Random Ability ; Discouragement |
JEL: | D72 D74 |
Date: | 2006–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1192&r=spo |