|
on Social Norms and Social Capital |
Issue of 2019‒06‒17
five papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
By: | Elert, Niklas (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Stam, Erik (Utrecht School of Economics); Stenkula, Mikael (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
Abstract: | Trust and entrepreneurship are seen as key ingredients of long-term prosperity. However, it is not clear how these two are related. Part of the confusion can be traced back to the measurement of entrepreneurship, biased towards independent entrepreneurship (self-employed and new firms), and excluding entrepreneurship within established organizations. We shed new light on the relationship between trust and entrepreneurship, by proposing two mechanisms relating trust to entrepreneurship by employees, so-called intrapreneurship. We hypothesize that generalized trust influences the prevalence of intrapreneurship in an economy, and the allocation of entrepreneurial talents between independent entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship, through two mechanisms. First, generalized trust may substitute for complete contracts as a means of organizing labor in society, enabling a level of job autonomy in organizations necessary for intrapreneurship to flourish. Second, by way of its influence on the size and scope of the welfare state, generalized trust may increase the benefits of employment relative to self-employment, causing entrepreneurial individuals to elect to be intrapreneurs rather than independent entrepreneurs. Using a novel dataset, we find support for these hypotheses in a cross-country regression model covering the time period 2011–2017. |
Keywords: | Trust; Intrapreneurship; Entrepreneurship; Entrepreneurial behavior; Institutions; Job autonomy; Welfare state |
JEL: | H30 J20 J83 L26 M13 O12 O31 O43 O57 |
Date: | 2019–05–24 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1280&r=all |
By: | Calzolari, Giacomo; Felli, Leonardo; Koenen, Johannes; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Stahl, Konrad O |
Abstract: | Based on data from a comprehensive benchmarking study on buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry, we show that more trust in a relationship is associated with higher idiosyncratic investment by suppliers and better part quality|but also with more competition among suppliers. Both associations hold only for parts involving comparatively unsophisticated technology, and disappear for parts involving sophisticated technology. We rationalize all these observations by means of a relational contracting model of repeated procurement with non-contractible, buyer-specific investments. In relationships involving higher trust, buyers are able to induce higher investment and more intense competition among suppliers|but only when the buyer has the bargaining power. This ability disappears when the bargaining power resides with the supplier(s). |
Keywords: | bargaining power; Buyer-Supplier Contracts; hold-up; Relational Contracts |
JEL: | D86 L14 L62 O34 |
Date: | 2019–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13750&r=all |
By: | Sandra Rozo (University of Southern California); Juan Vargas (Universidad del Rosario) |
Abstract: | Can voter’s negative attitudes toward immigration be explained by self-interest or sociotropic motives? Self-interested voters care about their personal economic circumstances. Sociotropic voters display in-group bias and perceive migrants as threats to their culture. We study the voting effects of forced internal and international migration in Colombia and exploit the disproportionate flows of migrants to municipalities with early settlements of individuals from their origin locations. In line with the sociotropic hypothesis, we find that only international migration inflows increase political participation and shift votes from left- to right-wing ideologies. These results are not accounted for by the observed changes caused by migrants in socioeconomic variables. |
Keywords: | Colombia; Economic Development, Political Development, Demographic; Socioeconomic |
JEL: | D72 F2 O15 R23 |
Date: | 2019–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:esocpu:12&r=all |
By: | Bernard Poirine (GDI - Gouvernance et développement insulaire - UPF - Université de la Polynésie Française); Vincent Dropsy (GDI - Gouvernance et développement insulaire - UPF - Université de la Polynésie Française) |
Abstract: | The development gap between countries in tropical and temperate zones has been attributed to a variety of factors. Using data from the World Values Survey, we find that social norms about thrift, as opposed to sharing, vary with the length of the winter season. We also show that this cultural dimension "thrift versus sharing" and institutional quality both have an independent effect on contemporary economic outcomes. This suggests that the tropical development gap might be the consequence of deep-rooted effects of pre-industrial agro-climatic conditions on both the quality of institutions and social norms about thrift versus sharing that fostered development in the industrial era. |
Keywords: | Social norms,Cultural evolution,Time preference,Long-term orientation,Economic development,Comparative development |
Date: | 2018–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02133270&r=all |
By: | Le Coent, Philippe; Preget, Raphaële; Thoyer, Sophie |
Abstract: | The economic literature on Agri-environmental Schemes (AES) largely considers that farmers participate in contracts if the payment offered is superior to their opportunity costs. Psychological and social forces may however be at play in this decision. This article analyses the role played by social norms in farmers’ decisions to enrol into AES. It develops a simple theoretical model highlighting the interplay of descriptive and injunctive norms in farmers’ utility functions. Results of this model lead us to propose few policy recommendations to counter or, in other contexts, to take advantage of the influence of social norms to increase farmers’ participation to AES. |
Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
Date: | 2019–05–29 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaa172:289863&r=all |