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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2018‒11‒19
twelve papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Daniel Montolio (Department of Economics, University of Barcelona and Barcelona Institute of Economics.); Ana Tur-Prats (Department of Economics, University of California, Merced.) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the historical determinants and long-term persistence of social capital, as well as its effect on economic development, by looking at the legacy of the commons in a Spanish region. In medieval times, common goods were granted to townships and were managed collectively by local citizens. This enabled the establishment of institutions for collective action and self-government. Common goods persisted until the second half of the nineteenth century. We argue that the experience of cooperation among villagers, repeated over the centuries, increased the social capital in each local community. In 1845, a law forced small villages to merge with others, a fact which generated exogenous variation in the number of mergers (i.e., cooperative networks) that each modern municipality was required to have. We exploit this change in an IV and RD setting and find that current municipalities formed by a greater number of old townships have a denser network of associations. We also find that higher social capital is associated with more economic development. |
| Keywords: | collective action, self-government, long-term persistence, common goods |
| JEL: | N90 P48 Z10 H49 |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrp:wpaper:xreap2018-8&r=soc |
| By: | Diego Torrente (Departament de Sociologia i Anàlisi de les Organitzacions, Universitat de Barcelona.); Jordi Caïs (Departament de Sociologia i Anàlisi de les Organitzacions, Universitat de Barcelona.); Catalina Bolance (Departament d’Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada, Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | The economic crisis of 2008 led to a significant erosion of trust in those countries that were hit hardest. However, whether this fall in trust can best be explained by external economic factors or by the lack of response on the part of the institutions to civic needs and demands is unclear. This study seeks to address this question by examining the specific case of Spain. Its aim is to analyse in comparison with other factors, the effect of increasing socioeconomic precariousness upon levels of interpersonal and institutional trust. The study examines the respective impact of these factors upon different social groups according to their degree of exposure to the effects of the crisis. Our results show that the deterioration suffered by household economies has important consequences in terms of interpersonal trust. Those most severely affected by the recession lose a great deal of trust in others. We also find that a deterioration in socioeconomic conditions has different effects in relation to institutional trust. The perception of the overall state of the economy is important for all types of institutional trust. Without calling into question the importance of institutional performance on levels of institutional trust, our research sheds new light on the importance of different economic factors for social cohesion. |
| Keywords: | Institutional trust, interpersonal trust, inequality, poverty, social capital, Spain |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrp:wpaper:xreap2018-7&r=soc |
| By: | Della Giusta, Marina; Vukadinovic-Greetham, Danica; Jaworska, Sylvia |
| Abstract: | Economists have often been accused of adopting superior and distant attitudes (Fourcade, Ollion and Algan, 2015). This attributed stance has been variously linked to both poor understanding and traction of economics with the general public, the failure to generate realistic predictions and prescriptions (Coyle, 2012; Bresser-Pereira, 2014), and the lack of diversity in the profession (Crawford et al., 2018; Stevenson and Zlotnick, 2018; Bayer and Rouse, 2016). In this piece we focus specifically on Twitter communications by economists to investigate the ability of economists to fruitfully engage with the public in these networks and the attitudes their language use betrays. We compare economists to scientists, gathering data from the Twitter accounts of both the top 25 economists and 25 scientists as identified by IDEAS and sciencemag, who account for the lion’s share of the Twitter following, collecting a total of 127,593 tweets written between December 2008 and April 2017. Using both network and language analysis our paper finds that although both groups communicate mostly with people outside their profession, economists tweet less, mention fewer people and have fewer Twitter conversations with strangers than a comparable group of experts in the sciences, and sentiment analysis shows they are also more distant. The language analysis of differences in register (a higher register is generally less accessible and thus more distanced) finds that economists use a higher number of complex words, specific names and abbreviations than scientists, and differences in pronoun use reveal they are also less inclusive, all of which adds to distancing. |
| Keywords: | social media, communication, language, networks |
| JEL: | A11 A12 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2018–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:89527&r=soc |
| By: | Jeannette Brosig-Koch; Timo Heinrich; Heike Hennig-Schmidt; Claudia Keser; Joachim Weimann |
| Abstract: | Since Mancur Olson's "Logic of collective action" it is common conviction in social sciences that in large groups the prospects of a successful organization of collective actions are rather bad. Following Olson’s logic, the impact of an individual’s costly contribution becomes smaller if the group gets larger and, consequently, the incentive to cooperate decreases with group size. Conducting a series of laboratory experiments with large groups of up to 100 subjects, we demonstrate that Olson's logic does not generally account for observed behavior. Large groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is almost negligible are still able to provide a public good in the same way as small groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is much higher. Nevertheless, we find that small variations of the MPCR in large groups have a strong effect on contributions. We develop a hypothesis concerning the interplay of MPCR and group size, which is based on the assumption that the salience of the advantages of mutual cooperation plays a decisive role. This hypothesis is successfully tested in a second series of experiments. Our result raises hopes that the chance to organize collective action of large groups is much higher than expected so far. Since Mancur Olson's "Logic of collective action" it is common conviction in social sciences that in large groups the prospects of a successful organization of collective actions are rather bad. Following Olson’s logic, the impact of an individual’s costly contribution becomes smaller if the group gets larger and, consequently, the incentive to cooperate decreases with group size. Conducting a series of laboratory experiments with large groups of up to 100 subjects, we demonstrate that Olson's logic does not generally account for observed behavior. Large groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is almost negligible are still able to provide a public good in the same way as small groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is much higher. Nevertheless, we find that small variations of the MPCR in large groups have a strong effect on contributions. We develop a hypothesis concerning the interplay of MPCR and group size, which is based on the assumption that the salience of the advantages of mutual cooperation plays a decisive role. This hypothesis is successfully tested in a second series of experiments. Our result raises hopes that the chance to organize collective action of large groups is much higher than expected so far. |
| Date: | 2018–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2018s-02&r=soc |
| By: | Jia, R.; Lu, Q. |
| Abstract: | Based on the data of rural households in the Loess Plateau of China, this paper uses exploratory factor analysis to measure the degree of participation of farmers in collective action from the information, participation, organization and effect of action. Through Bootstrap mediation effect test, this paper tests the direct impact of land transfer area and period on farmers implementation of soil and water conservation measures, and the indirect impact of transfer area and period on the implementation of soil and water conservation measures by changing the participation of farmers in collective action. The result shows: transfer area has a direct impact on the using of terraced fields, plastic film and afforestation. The transfer period has a direct impact on the implementation of terraced fields, plastic film, afforestation and water-saving irrigation techniques. While collective action plays a mediating role in the process of transfer area affecting farmers use of terraced fields, afforestation and water-saving irrigation techniques, its mediating role in the use of plastic film is not significant. While the mediating role of collective action is significant in the transfer period affecting the implementation of terraced field and water-saving irrigation techniques, it is not significant in using plastic film and afforestation. Acknowledgement : This paper was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project No. 71473197 and 71673223) and the Humanity and Social Science Youth foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Project No. 17YJC790059). |
| Keywords: | Land Economics/Use |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277124&r=soc |
| By: | Ushchev, Philip; Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | Although the linear-in-means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on peer effects, its theoretical properties are understudied. In this paper, we investigate how social norms affect individual effort, aggregate Although the linear-in-means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on effort, and welfare. While individual productivity always positively affects own effort and utility, we show that taste for conformity has an ambiguous effect on individual outcomes and depends on whether an individual is above or below her own social norm. Equilibria are usually inefficient and, to restore the first best, the planner subsidizes (taxes) agents whose neighbors make efforts above (below) the social norms in equilibrium. Thus, provision of more subsidies to more central agents is not necessarily efficient. |
| Keywords: | networks; Social norms; welfare |
| JEL: | D85 J15 Z13 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13250&r=soc |
| By: | Alstadsaeter, Annette; Kopczuk, Wojciech; Telle, Kjetil |
| Abstract: | In 2005, over 8% of Norwegian shareholders transferred their shares to new (legal) tax shelters intended to defer taxation of capital gains and dividends that would otherwise be taxable in the aftermath of 2006 reform. Using detailed administrative data we identify family networks and describe how take up of tax avoidance progresses within a network. A feature of the reform was that the ability to set up a tax shelter changed discontinuously with individual shareholding of a firm and we use this fact to estimate the causal effect of availability of tax avoidance for a taxpayer on tax avoidance by others in the network. We find that take up in a social network increases the likelihood that others will take up. This suggests that taxpayers affect each other's decisions about tax avoidance, highlighting the importance of accounting for social interactions in understanding enforcement and tax avoidance behavior, and providing a concrete example of "optimization frictions" in the context of behavioral responses to taxation. |
| JEL: | D22 H25 H26 H32 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13251&r=soc |
| By: | Hahn, Youjin; Islam, Asadul; Patacchini, Eleonora; Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | We randomly assigned 150 primary schools in Bangladesh to one of three settings: children studying individually, children studying in groups with friends, and children studying in groups with peers. The groups consisted of four people with similar average cognitive abilities and household characteristics. While the achievement of male students was not affected by the group assignment, low-ability females in groups with friends outperformed low-ability females working with peers by roughly 0.4 standard deviations of the test score distribution. This is shown not to be due to the fact that friends tend to be of the same gender or to a higher frequency of interactions among friends. |
| Keywords: | education; Gender; learning; Social interactions |
| JEL: | I25 J16 O12 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13221&r=soc |
| By: | Zhang, Peilu; Zhang, Yinjunjie; Palma, Marco |
| Abstract: | Women often respond less favorably to competition than men. In this paper, we test for the effects of social norms on willingness to compete. Subjects compete in two-person teams. In the treatment, one team member is randomly assigned the role of “breadwinner”, and the other person is randomly assigned as the “supporter”. There are no real differences between the roles in our experiment, except for the framing. These two roles have opposite social norms for competitiveness, reminiscent of gender roles in western society. In the baseline, subjects compete in two-person teams without role assignment. We find women’s willingness to compete significantly increases when they are assigned as breadwinners compared to women in the base- line or female supporters. We also find that there is no gender gap in willingness to compete between female breadwinners and males in the baseline. The increase in willingness to compete is mainly contributed by high-ability women. Males are also affected by the role assignment; male supporters are less likely to enter the tournament than male breadwinners. We argue that the changes in willingness to compete are mainly driven by the social norms implied by the two roles. |
| Keywords: | gender gap, gender stereotypes, tournament entry |
| JEL: | A14 B54 C90 |
| Date: | 2018–10–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:89727&r=soc |
| By: | Qinxin Guo (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Japan); Enci Wang (School of Economics, Shanghai University, China); Yongyou Nie (School of Economics, Shanghai University, China); Junyi Shen (Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan) |
| Abstract: | In this study, we implemented a dictator game experiment to examine how the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good affects individuals’ prosocial behavior. A within-subject design was used in the experiment. The dictator game was repeated six times with an impure public good introduced in four of them. We observe that the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good partly crowds out individuals’ subsequent donations, which could be explained by a seemingly “mental accounting” mental process. In addition, we also find that the selfish behavior of individuals in dictator games with impure public goods, to some extent, has an inertia influence on their subsequent donations when the impure public good is removed. |
| Keywords: | Impure public goods, Dictator game, Multiple dictators, Mental accounting |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2018-22&r=soc |
| By: | Adnan Efendic; Alena Ledeneva |
| Abstract: | This is the first study to explore costs of informal networking in the Western Balkans. In a comparative survey, we find that informal networking, or use of personal contacts for getting things done, is common in the region while the economic cost of informal networking is substantial (100 euros against average monthly income of 250 Euros). In the structure of networking costs, the estimated costs of invested time, a proxy for sociability, dominate over money. Higher costs are associated with larger networks built on strong ties. Respondents who perceive networking as important tend to invest more time and money. The informal networking costs are also higher for those with more education and income, and for entrepreneurs. Individuals bear the high costs of informal networking not only for social and culturally determined reasons, but also with an instrumental purpose. Our evidence suggests that both sociability and instrumentality drive informal networking. |
| Keywords: | networking, informal networking, cost of networking, Western Balkans, informal networks |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:see:wpaper:2018:3&r=soc |
| By: | Atanu Sengupta, Atanu Sengupta; De, Sanjoy |
| Abstract: | Credit is very important in the lives of the poor people. The benefits of credit are manifold. Even after more than six and a half decade since independence, the extent and important of informal credit have not diminished to a great degree in India. This paper aims at to understand the significance of personalized relations in the working of the informal credit market with the help of the All Indian Debt and Investment survey data. .Our analysis shows that there is distinct compartmentalization of the Indian credit market with respect to the disbursement of loan from various credit agencies. Each of these category of credit agencies has some definite target group to cater to. Apart from this clear division of loaning pattern, the importance of trust, personalized knowledge and mutual co-operation in the informal credit market has also been observed. |
| Keywords: | Credit, Informal credit, Trust, Informality |
| JEL: | E26 G21 L14 |
| Date: | 2018–10–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:89636&r=soc |