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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2017‒11‒05
ten papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Björn Bartling; Yagiz Özdemir |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor will step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. We study experimentally whether people employ the argument “if I don’t do it, someone else will” to justify taking a narrowly self-interested action. Our data reveal a clear pattern. Subjects do not employ the “replacement excuse” if a social norm exists that classifies the selfish action as immoral. But if no social norm exists, subjects are more inclined to take a selfish action in situations where another subject can otherwise take it. By demonstrating the importance of social norms of moral behavior for limiting the power of the replacement excuse, our paper informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals. |
| Keywords: | replacement excuse, social norms, moral behavior, competition, markets, utilitarianism, deontological ethics |
| JEL: | C92 D02 D63 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6696&r=soc |
| By: | Bogliacino, Francesco; Grimalda, Gianluca; Jimenez, Laura |
| Abstract: | We report experimental results from three Colombian villages concerning the impact of a voting mechanism on interpersonal trust and trustworthiness. The vote is purely consultative in that participants are asked to declare in a secret ballot the most “appropriate” plan of action for individuals involved in a “Trust Game”. The plan of action that is most voted is then publicly announced. The mechanism is unbinding, as only the aggregate result of the voting is disclosed and it has no bearing on individual decisions. In spite of the strategic irrelevance of the announcement, we observe an increase in both trust and trustworthiness after the announcement is carried out, in comparison to the baseline condition where no voting takes place. |
| Keywords: | Experiments, Trust, Voting |
| JEL: | C9 D7 H4 |
| Date: | 2017–10–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:82138&r=soc |
| By: | Andrej Angelovski (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Daniela Di Cagno (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Werner Güth (Luiss Guido Carli, Rome; Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt; Max Planck Institute on Collective Goods, Bonn); Daniela Grieco (Università Bocconi) |
| Abstract: | To shed light on the choice between trusting a partner versus monitoring her, we let one party decide between two stylized game paradigms—namely, the Ultimatum Game and the Yes–No Game. While in Ultimatum Games responders monitor the allocation proposal, in Yes–No Games, responders react without monitoring. Since monitoring can be costly, we allow the shared amount in Yes–No Games to be larger than that in Ultimatum Games. Experimental conditions can vary the monitoring cost, who decides between trusting and monitoring (i.e., proposer or responder), and whether the responder’s conflict payoff will be negative or positive. The latter brings about Yes–No Game (i.e., trusting) social dilemma situations. We question whether some responders opt for trusting and predominantly accept an unknown offer, especially when justified by efficiency concerns, and whether some proposers, due to behavioral concerns, are more inclined to suggest monitoring. |
| Keywords: | Trust, Monitoring, Institutional Choice, Ultimatum Game, Yes No Game |
| JEL: | C91 C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1707&r=soc |
| By: | Simon Gaechter; Leonie Gerhards; Daniele Nosenzo |
| Abstract: | A burgeoning literature in economics has started examining the role of social norms in explaining economic behavior. Surprisingly, the vast majority of this literature has studied social norms in asocial decision settings, where individuals are observed to act in isolation from each other. In this paper we use a large-scale dictator game experiment (N = 850) to show that “peers†can have a profound influence on individuals’ perceptions of norms of fair sharing, which we elicit in an incentive compatible way. However, in contrast to these strong peer effects in social norms of fair sharing, we find limited evidence of the influence of norms and peers on actual sharing behavior. We discuss how these results can be explained by heterogeneity in normative views as well as in willingness to comply with norms. |
| Keywords: | social norms, norm compliance, peer effects, fair sharing, dictator game, framing, experiments |
| JEL: | A13 C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6497&r=soc |
| By: | Brian J. Asquith; Judith K. Hellerstein; Mark J. Kutzbach; David Neumark |
| Abstract: | We explore the links between social capital and labor market networks at the neighborhood level. We harness rich data taken from multiple sources, including matched employer-employee data with which we measure the strength of labor market networks, data on behavior such as voting patterns that have previously been tied to social capital, and new data – not previously used in the study of social capital – on the number and location of non-profits at the neighborhood level. We use a machine learning algorithm to identify potential social capital measures that best predict neighborhood-level variation in labor market networks. We find evidence suggesting that smaller and less centralized schools, and schools with fewer poor students, foster social capital that builds labor market networks, as does a larger Republican vote share. The presence of establishments in a number of non-profit oriented industries are identified as predictive of strong labor market networks, likely because they either provide public goods or facilitate social contacts. These industries include, for example, churches and other religious institutions, schools, country clubs, and amateur or recreational sports teams or clubs. |
| JEL: | J01 J64 R23 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23959&r=soc |
| By: | Sascha Becker; Thiemo Fetzer; Dennis Novy |
| Abstract: | On 23 June 2016, the British electorate voted to leave the European Union. We analyze vote and turnout shares across 380 local authority areas in the United Kingdom. We find that exposure to the EU in terms of immigration and trade provides relatively little explanatory power for the referendum vote. Instead, we find that fundamental characteristics of the voting population were key drivers of the Vote Leave share, in particular their education profiles, their historical dependence on manufacturing employment as well as low income and high unemployment. At the much finer level of wards within cities, we find that areas with deprivation in terms of education, income and employment were more likely to vote Leave. Our results indicate that a higher turnout of younger voters, who were more likely to vote Remain, would not have overturned the referendum result. |
| Keywords: | political economy, voting, referendum, migration, austerity, globalisation, UK, Scotland, EU |
| JEL: | D72 N44 R23 Z13 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6438&r=soc |
| By: | L. Guiso; H. Herrera; M. Morelli; T. Sonno |
| Abstract: | We define as populist a party that champions short-term protection policies while hiding their long-term costs by using anti-elite rhetoric to manipulate beliefs. We provide a framework that rationalizes this definition and generates sharp implications for people support to populist platforms (the demand side), for the timing of appear ance of populist parties and their chosen orientation (the supply side) as well as for non-populist parties response to populist success (an equilibrium market reaction). Using individual data on voting in European countries we document that key fea tures of the demand for populism as well as the supply heavily depend on turnout incentives, previously neglected in the populism literature. Once turnout effects are properly taken into account, economic insecurity drives consensus to populist policies directly as well as through indirect negative effects on trust and attitudes towards migrants. On the supply side, populist parties are more likely to emerge and prosper when countries deal with systemic economic insecurity crisis that both left-oriented incumbent parties (relying on government-based policies) and right-oriented (relying on markets) find hard to address, disappointing voters who lose faith in them and abstain. Relative entry space determines the orientation choice of populist parties, i.e., whether they enter on left or right of the political spectrum. The typical non-populist party policy response is to reduce the distance of their platform from that of new populist entrants, thereby magnifying the aggregate supply of populist policies. Keywords: voter participation, short term protection, anti-elite rhetoric, populist entry. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:610&r=soc |
| By: | Konstantin Büchel; Maximilian von Ehrlich |
| Abstract: | Social interactions are considered pivotal to agglomeration economies. We explore a unique dataset on mobile phone calls to examine how distance and population density shape the structure of social interactions. Exploiting an exogenous change in travel times, we show that distance is highly detrimental to interpersonal exchange. Despite distance-related costs, we find no evidence that urban residents benefit from larger networks when spatial sorting is accounted for. Higher density rather generates a more efficient network in terms of matching and clustering. These differences in network structure capitalize into land prices, corroborating the hypothesis that agglomeration economies operate via network efficiency. |
| Keywords: | social interactions, agglomeration externalities, network analysis, spatial sorting |
| JEL: | R10 R23 D83 D85 Z13 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6568&r=soc |
| By: | Wrohlich, Katharina; Unterhofer, Ulrike |
| Abstract: | We analyze whether the introduction of the fathers’ quota in parental leave in 2007 has changed the gender roles attitudes in the grandparents’ generation. Exploting the quasi-experimental setting of the reform, we find a positive effect of the fathers’ quota on attitudes towards gender equality. The results suggest that such programs not only induce direct behavioral responses by the target group but also have indirect effects on other groups through social interaction. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168297&r=soc |
| By: | Matthew Ellman (Institute of Economic Analysis, IAE-CSIC, and Barcelona GSE) |
| Abstract: | Online social networks (OSN) influence the transmission of information in society. This paper analyzes how a profit-motivated OSN designs the instant feedback options, such as “likes†or up-votes and down-votes or disapprovals, that it aggregates into user ratings, and how these design choices affect social and economic outcomes. The OSN seeks to maximize advertising revenues via maximal engagement. We compare OSN designs that allow users to only up-vote other users' content contributions or “posts†against OSN designs that allow both up and down votes. Users care about what others think of them. The feedback system mediates what users with imperfect private signals learn about each others' contributions and about each other. The OSN design affects both the expected social approval gains from engaging as a contributor and the value to users from engaging as viewers of others' content. Up and down votes improve viewers information but removing the down-vote option can raise user willingness to contribute content by reducing the threat of unambiguous disapproval. We investigate a full set of OSN designs in a range of social contexts. |
| Keywords: | Online social networks, feedback design, user-generated content, quality, rating systems, platform economics, media economics. |
| JEL: | L13 L82 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1718&r=soc |