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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2016‒06‒25
ten papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Yola Engler; Rudolf Kerschbamer; Lionel Page |
| Abstract: | For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation between back-transfers and second- order beliefs of the trustor: While reciprocity models predict a negative correlation, guilt-aversion models predict a positive one. This paper tests the hypothesis that the inconclusive results in previous studies investigating the reaction of trustees to their beliefs are due to the fact that reciprocity and guilt-aversion are behaviorally relevant for different subgroups and that their impact cancels out in the aggregate. We find little evidence in support of this hypothesis and conclude that type heterogeneity is unlikely to explain previous results. |
| JEL: | C25 C70 C91 D63 D64 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2016-17&r=soc |
| By: | Ben Fine (Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London, UK); Juan Pablo Dur·n Ortiz (MIT Displacement Research and Action Network, US) |
| Abstract: | The current idea of ísocial capitalî as driver of development and social change is not so much an illusion as a delusion. A justification for this emerges once power, class, conflict and context are explicitly brought to bear upon the social capital paradigm. This paper studies social capital in Colombia beginning with its initial definition proposed by Pierre Bourdieu in the early 1980s, with emphasis upon a contextualised reproduction and exercise of elite power. In this light, the real as opposed to the delusionary social capital can explain a great deal of the social and economic evolution of the country. For Colombia has been captured by the ísocial capitalî of national elites, drug dealers and multinational firms, ably abetted by the US government. It has launched a campaign of systematic violence against its citizenry under the paper-thin ideology of development and the war against drugs and terrorism in order to accrue profits from evictions and land expropriation. |
| Keywords: | development, evictions, land expropriation, social capital, war against drugs and terrorism |
| JEL: | O54 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:soa:wpaper:195&r=soc |
| By: | Luigi Butera (Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics (BFI), Department of Economics, University of Chicago); Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | Philanthropy, and particularly ensuring that ones giving is effective, can require substantial time and effort. One way to reduce these costs, and thus encourage greater giving, could be to encourage delegation of giving decisions to better-informed others. At the same time, because it involves a loss of agency, delegating these decisions may produce less warm-glow and thus reduce one’s charitable impulse. Unfortunately, the importance of agency in charitable decisions remains largely unexplored. In this paper, using a laboratory experiment with real donations, we shed light on this issue. Our main finding is that agency, while it does correlate with self-reported warm-glow, nevertheless seems to play a small role in encouraging giving. In particular, people do not reduce donations when giving decisions are made by (costly) algorithms that guarantee efficient recipients. Moreover, we find participating in giving groups a weaker form of delegation is also effective in that they are appealing to donors who would not otherwise make informed donations, and thus improves overall effective giving. Our results suggest that one path to promoting effective giving may be to create institutions that facilitate delegated generosity. |
| Keywords: | Altruism, Laboratory Experiment, Agency, Charitable Giving |
| JEL: | C9 D64 D71 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1060&r=soc |
| By: | Kummer, Michael; Slivko, Olga; Zhang, Michael |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we address the impact of surging unemployment on online public good provision. Specifically, we ask how drastically increased unemployment affects voluntary contributions of content to the online encyclopedia Wikipedia. We put together a monthly country-level data set, which combines country specific economic outcomes with data on contributions to the online encyclopedia. As a source of exogenous variation in the economic state we use the fact that European countries were affected by the financial crisis in the US in September 2008 with different intensity. For European countries, we find that the economic downturn is associated with more viewership, which channels higher participation of volunteers in Wikipedia expressed in editing activity and content growth. We provide evidence for increased information search online or online learning as a potential channel of the change in public goods provision, which is a potentially important side effect of economic downturn. |
| Keywords: | online platform,Wikipedia,public goods,unemployment,user generated content |
| JEL: | D29 D80 H41 J60 L17 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:15078r&r=soc |
| By: | M. Savioli; R. Patuelli |
| Abstract: | Economic processes, consisting of interactions between human beings, exploit the social capital of persons endowed with specific cultures, identities and education. By taking into account this complexity, we focus on the role of institutions and policymaking in the building of social capital and its relevance to the fulfilment of their objectives. Social capital, however, is elusive and has several dimensions with which to interpret its multifaceted functions in economics and society. We cannot forget that social capital is sometimes even undesirable for society, for instance when unethically used. Even so, it is widely accepted that social capital has stable and positive effects. |
| JEL: | Z13 B52 D78 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1070&r=soc |
| By: | Alemanno, Alberto |
| Abstract: | Beyond Networks critically dissects and systematizes an insightful, well-researched and elegantly written account of the democratic potential carried out by coalitions of civil society actors. Once established a case for studying coalitions of civil society organization through the lens of Global Administrative Law, the book eventually unveils its underlying research question. This volume specifically attempts to explain how civil society networks – which are studied within the broader notion of Global Civil Society (GSC) – drive the development of principles of democratic value at the supranational level. It does so within the broader debate about new modes of global governance and in particular that of experimentalist governance. It proceeds to theorize an autonomous organization network model within GSC: the so-called 'interlocutory coalitions'. Those coalitions are typically made of diverse category of entities whose major – sometimes solely – common feature is the cross-border pursuit of a common cause. In order to build an original and valuable taxonomy of civil society networks, interlocutory coalitions must be contrasted to other forms of networks, including social networks, trans-governmental committees, think tanks, Parallel Summits and QUANGOs. After reconstructing their respective composition, membership, rules of governance and legal status, the book delves into interlocutory coalitions' decision-making. How do coalitions presenting high degree of variation when it comes to their mission, governance, funding and membership coalesce around one common cause? How do they come to existence and get along? How can such coalitions speak with one voice when representing and advocating their common position in front of the relevant international organizations? What kind of techniques and deliberative mechanisms are used to attain a common position and then convey it to the outside world? This book provides a rigorous, constructive and promising stepping stone to embark on such a challenging journey. Yet the case for a global participatory democracy remains to be made. |
| Keywords: | Open government; Transparency; Participation; Civic empowerment; Coalitions; Legitimacy; Accountability; Civil society; European Union; Good governance |
| JEL: | K19 K33 |
| Date: | 2016–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1138&r=soc |
| By: | Grund, Christian (RWTH Aachen University); Harbring, Christine (RWTH Aachen University); Thommes, Kirsten (Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus) |
| Abstract: | We analyze how different previous roles as partners or strangers in public good games affect an individual's subsequent cooperation in a partner setting. We systematically vary a group's composition from all individuals being partner over blended groups of partners and strangers to all individuals being stranger in each round. Our results show that previous group composition does not affect cooperation in the subsequent partner setting with one exception: Groups cooperate significantly less compared to all other settings, when one stranger entered the group. We further analyze this situation in-depth and find that individuals may labor under an ultimate attribution error: They feel that the newcomer is a "bad apple". The cooperativeness towards the newcomer, but also among oldtimers is disturbed in this case. We conduct additional treatments to back up this result and to show how certain information can prevent such an error. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, economic experiments, group composition, public good game, teams |
| JEL: | C9 M5 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9982&r=soc |
| By: | Alexandra Avdeenko; Thomas Siedler |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes the importance of parental socialization on the development of children’s far right-wing preferences and attitudes towards immigration. Using longitudinal data from Germany, our intergenerational estimates suggest that the strongest and most important predictor for young people’s right-wing extremism are parents’ right-wing extremist attitudes. While intergenerational associations in attitudes towards immigration are equally high for sons and daughters, we find a positive intergenerational transmission of right-wing extremist party affinity for sons, but not for daughters. Compared to the intergenerational correlation of other party affinities, the high association between fathers’ and sons’ right-wing extremist attitudes is particularly striking. |
| Keywords: | political preferences, extremism, gender differences, longitudinal data, intergenerational links |
| JEL: | C23 D72 J62 P16 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp845&r=soc |
| By: | Giacomo De Giorgi; Anders Frederiksen; Luigi Pistaferri |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study consumption network effects. Does the consumption of our peers affect our own consumption? How large is such effect? What are the economic mechanisms behind it? We use long panel data on the entire Danish population to construct a measure of consumption based on administrative tax records on income and assets. We combine tax record data with matched employer-employee data so that we can construct peer groups based on workplace, which gives us a much tighter, precise, and credible definition of networks than used in previous literature. We use the available data to construct peer groups that do not perfectly overlap, and as such provide valid instruments derived from the network structure of one's peers group. The longitudinal nature of our data also allow us to estimate fixed effects models, which help us tackle reflection, self-selection, and common-shocks issues all at once. We estimate non-negligible and statistically significant endogenous and exogenous peer effects. Estimated effects are quite relevant for policies as they generate non-negligible multiplier effect. We also investigate what mechanisms generate such effects, distinguishing between "keeping up with the Joneses", a status model, and a more traditional risk sharing view. |
| JEL: | D12 D91 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22357&r=soc |
| By: | Drazen, Allan; Ozbay, Erkut |
| Abstract: | We present experimental evidence that policies chosen by leaders depend on whether they were elected or appointed. Consistent with previous studies of the "dictator game" , we find that unitary policymakers do not always act selfishly, that is, choose a policy that maximizes their own payoffs. However, the way in which one became the leader matters. Leaders who are elected are significantly more likely to choose a policy not equal to their "type" than leaders who are appointed. Elected leaders who act non-selfishly will favor the voter rather than the losing candidate, while appointed leaders show no tendency to favor the voter over the losing candidate. Our results provide support for the view that non-selfish behavior of leaders reflects a reciprocity motive. They also show that candidates do not simply implement their own preferences once in office, as suggested by the basic citizen-candidate model. |
| Keywords: | Citizen-Candidate; Dictator Game; leaders; Reciprocity |
| JEL: | C91 D64 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11338&r=soc |