nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2016‒04‒04
nine papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”

  1. Conflict and Networks By Marcin Dziubinski; Sanjeev Goyal; Adrien Vigier;
  2. Online Networks, Social Interaction and Segregation: An Evolutionary Approach By Angelo Antoci; Fabio Sabatini; Francesco Sarracino
  3. Racial Sorting and the Emergence of Segregation in American Cities By Allison Shertzer; Randall P. Walsh
  4. Early Marriage, Social Networks and the Transmission of Norms By Niaz Asadullah; Zaki Wahhaj
  5. Cultural Leaders and the Dynamics of Assimilation By Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves
  6. Intra-household Resource Allocation and Familial Ties By Harounan Kazianga; Zaki Wahhaj
  7. Networks in the laboratory By Syngjoo Choi; Edoardo Gallo; Shachar Kariv;
  8. Collective Efficacy of a Regional Network: Extending the Social Embeddedness Perspective of Entrepreneurship By Muhammad, Nabeel; Léo-Paul, Dana
  9. Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: a social dilemma experiment By Ispano, Alessandro; Schwardmann, Peter

  1. By: Marcin Dziubinski; Sanjeev Goyal; Adrien Vigier;
    Abstract: Conflict remains a central element in human interaction. Networks - social, economic and infrastructure - are a defining feature of society. The two intersect in a wide range of empirical contexts. This motivates the recent interest in conflict and networks.The aim of the survey is to present the general themes, provide a survey of then ascent research and point to a number of interesting open questions.
    Date: 2015–12–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1565&r=soc
  2. By: Angelo Antoci; Fabio Sabatini; Francesco Sarracino
    Abstract: We have developed an evolutionary game model, where agents can choose between two forms of social participation: interaction via online social networks and interaction by exclusive means of face-to-face encounters. We illustrate the societal dynamics that the model predicts, in light of the empirical evidence provided by previous literature. We then assess their welfare implications. We show that dynamics, starting from a world in which online social interaction is less gratifying than offline encounters, will lead to the extinction of the sub-population of online networks users, thereby making Facebook and alike disappear in the long run. Furthermore, we show that the higher the propensity for discrimination between the two sub-populations of socially active individuals, the greater the probability that individuals will ultimately segregate themselves, making society fall into a social poverty trap.
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1603.05828&r=soc
  3. By: Allison Shertzer; Randall P. Walsh
    Abstract: Residential segregation by race grew sharply in the United States as black migrants from the South arrived in northern cities during the early twentieth century. The existing literature emphasizes discriminatory institutions as the driving force behind this rapid rise in segregation. Using newly assembled neighborhood-level data, we instead focus on the role of “flight” by whites, providing the first systematic evidence of the role that prewar population dynamics played in the emergence of the American ghetto. Leveraging exogenous changes in neighborhood racial composition, we show that white departures in response to black arrivals were quantitatively large and accelerated between 1900 and 1930. Our preferred estimates suggest that white flight was responsible for 34 percent of the increase in segregation over the 1910s and 50 percent over the 1920s. Our analysis suggests that segregation would likely have arisen in American cities even without the presence of discriminatory institutions as a direct consequence of the widespread and decentralized relocation decisions of white urban residents.
    JEL: J15 N32 R23
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22077&r=soc
  4. By: Niaz Asadullah; Zaki Wahhaj
    Abstract: We investigate whether female early marriage is a conduit for the transmission of social norms, specifically norms relating to gender roles and rights within the household. We exploit differences in the age of onset of menarche between sisters as an exogenous source of variation in marriage age. This approach allows us to control for beliefs and attitudes that are transmitted from parents to children. We find that early marriage increases agreement with statements supportive of gender bias in the allocation of resources and traditional gender roles. The woman's own schooling, her husband's schooling, and her social network together account for, at most, one-third of the estimated effect, suggesting that the major pathway for norm transmission is the experience of early marriage itself.
    Keywords: Gender Roles, Social Norms, Schooling, Household Decision-Making
    JEL: J12 J16 Z10
    Date: 2016–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1602&r=soc
  5. By: Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves
    Abstract: This paper studies the population dynamics of cultural traits in a model of intergenerational cultural transmission with perfectly-forward looking cultural leaders who compete for oblique socialization. When there is only one leader, we show that there exists a threshold size in terms of population above which the cultural leader becomes active. We then consider the competition between two forward-looking leaders and characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium of this differential dynamic game. In terms of policy implications, we show that the policymaker should take into account the crucial interaction between the centralized transmission of cultural traits by leaders and the decentralized transmission of these traits by parents and peers and should differentiate between the short-term and long-term effects of a policy due to over-reactions or under-reactions of the different cultural groups.
    Keywords: cultural substituability; dynamic differential game.; forward-looking leaders; integration
    JEL: J13 J15 Z10
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11174&r=soc
  6. By: Harounan Kazianga; Zaki Wahhaj
    Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the link between intra-household resource allocation and familial ties between household members. We show that, within the same geographic, economic and social environments, households where members have 'stronger' familial ties (e.g. a nuclear family household) achieve near Pareto efficient allocation of productive resources and Pareto efficient allocation of consumption while households with 'weaker' familial ties (e.g. an extended family household) do not. We propose a theoretical model of the household based on the idea that altruism between household members vary with familial ties which generates predictions consistent with the observed empirical patterns.
    Keywords: Intra-household Allocation, Social Norms, Extended Families, Altruism, Household Farms, Income Shocks, Risk-sharing, Consumption Smoothing
    JEL: O12 D13 Q1
    Date: 2016–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1601&r=soc
  7. By: Syngjoo Choi; Edoardo Gallo; Shachar Kariv;
    Abstract: This chapter surveys experimental research on networks in economics. The first part considers experiments on games played on networks. The second part discusses experimental research on markets and networks. It concludes by identifying important directions for future research.
    Keywords: experiments, social networks, network games, markets, coordination, public goods, cooperation, social learning, communication, trading.
    JEL: C91 C92 D85 L14 Z13
    Date: 2015–03–17
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1551&r=soc
  8. By: Muhammad, Nabeel; Léo-Paul, Dana
    Abstract: Through participatory observation and in-depth interviews with members of the Memon community, in Pakistan, this paper probes into how the collective efforts of a regional network can facilitate entrepreneurship, social enterprises and regional development. The setting is a developing country that is lacking a large-scale entrepreneurial culture. Despite caste differences, Memons throughout the Karachi region meet and share experiences with other Memon members of their network – including Memons from unlike castes. Within this regional network Memons help one another. They give preferential treatment to other Memons of their regional network and sometimes also to co-ethnics from other regional networks. Entrepreneurship is encouraged by a collective effort without suppressing individual goals; this extends the social embeddedness perspective of entrepreneurship allowing for a collective efficacy along a regional network, facilitating entrepreneurship among individuals.
    Keywords: collective efficacy, community, cultural capital, entrepreneurship, Memon, Pakistan, participatory observation, regional development, regional network
    JEL: I25 L26 L31 N0 Q01 R11
    Date: 2015–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:70120&r=soc
  9. By: Ispano, Alessandro; Schwardmann, Peter
    Abstract: Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let experimental subjects play the traveler’s dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate substantially more over losses. Our experimental design allows us to show that this treatment effect is best explained by reference-dependent risk preferences and referencedependent strategic sophistication. We discuss policy implications and relate our findings to other experimental games played in the loss domain.
    Keywords: cooperation; traveler’s dilemma; social dilemma; loss domain; diminishing sensitivity; cognitive hierarchy
    JEL: C90 D01 D03 D81
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:27576&r=soc

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