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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2015‒09‒18
six papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Sofia Dokuka (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Diliara Valeeva (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Maria Yudkevich (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Peer group effects show the influence of student social environments on their individual achievements. Traditionally, a social environment is considered by researchers of peer effects as exogenously given. However, significant peers that affect performance are often those that are deliberately chosen. Students might choose their friends among peers with similar academic achievements. A dynamic analysis of student social networks and academic achievements is needed to disentangle social selection and social influence processes in network formation. Using data about the friendship and advice networks of first year undergraduate students, we show that friends tend to assimilate each others’ achievements and choose advisers with similar grades. We explain these results by social segregation based on student performance. The article contributes to the dynamic analysis of student social networks and the understanding of the nature of peer group effects in education |
| Keywords: | social networks, academic achievements, peer group effects, higher education |
| JEL: | D85 I21 I23 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:65/soc/2015&r=all |
| By: | Landeo, Claudia (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Spier, Kathryn (Harvard Law School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results of an experiment on incentive contracts for teams. The agents, whose efforts are complementary, are rewarded according to a sharing rule chosen by the principal. Depending on the sharing rule, the agents confront endogenous prisoner's dilemma or stag-hunt environments. Our main findings are as follows. First, we demonstrate that ongoing interaction among team members positively affects the principal's payoff . Greater team cooperation is successfully induced with less generous sharing rules in infinitely-repeated environments. Second, we provide evidence of the positive effects of communication on team cooperation in the absence of ongoing team interaction. Fostering communication among team members does not significantly affect the principal's payoff , suggesting that agents' communication is an imperfect substitute for ongoing team interaction. Third, we show that offering low sharing rules can back re. The agents are willing to engage in costly punishment (shirking) as retaliation for low offers from the principal. Our findings suggest that offering low sharing rules is perceived by the agents as unkind behavior and hence, triggers negative reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | Moral Hazard in Teams; Prisoners Dilemma; Stag-Hunt Games; Infinitely-Repeated Games; Communication; Reciprocity; Laboratory Experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D86 K10 L23 |
| Date: | 2015–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2015_009&r=all |
| By: | Antonella Noya |
| Abstract: | This policy paper on social impact measurement for social enterprises was produced by the OECD and the European Commission. It presents the issues and ongoing debates surrounding social impact measurement and provides concrete examples of measurement methods. It highlights the concept of proportional measurement, in other words balancing up the costs and benefits of the measuring process. The policy brief also looks at guidance and resources for use by social enterprises and how to create a more widespread culture of measurement among stakeholders despite their often limited human and financial resources. |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:cfeaac:10-en&r=all |
| By: | Nie, Peng; Nimrod, Galit; Sousa-Poza, Alfonso |
| Abstract: | Using data from the 2010 China Family Panel Studies, we analyze the association between Internet use and various measures of subjective well-being (SWB) in a sample of 16- to 60- year-old Chinese. Our analysis shows that although intensive Internet use is significantly associated with lower levels of SWB, we hardly observe any associations when the focus is on participation in specific online activities. Nevertheless, SWB depends on perceptions of Internet use; that is, the importance that different individuals ascribe to different purposes for using the Internet and how much they believe that their Internet use is displacing other activities. Our results suggest that, contrary to previous findings, differences in beneficial outcomes (the third level digital divide) do not necessarily arise from individuals' actual Internet use (the second level digital divide) but rather may result from their subjective perceptions of such usage. Our findings also point to a possible cultural factor that puts Chinese Internet users at psychological risk. |
| Keywords: | China,digital divides,depression,happiness,Internet use,life satisfaction |
| JEL: | I10 D10 J10 Q53 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hohdps:072015&r=all |
| By: | Hideo Akabayashi (Faculty of Economics, Keio University); Akiko Kamesaka (School of Business Administration, Aoyama Gakuin University); Ryosuke Nakamura (Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University); Masao Ogaki (Faculty of Economics, Keio University); Teruyuki Tamura (Graduate School of Economics, Sophia University) |
| Abstract: | In the standard intergenerational altruism model in which the child's utility level is an argument in the parent's utility function, there are no conflicts of interests between the parent and the child if they need to reach an agreement about the amount and the timing of a present that child receives from a third party. On the other hand, in the intergenerational altruism models of cultural transmission of preferences, this may not be true. This difference in two classes of the models can be used to distinguish between them in experiments. We conducted a time preference experiment to compare individual and joint decision makings with parent-child pairs in which (1)the child alone, (2) the parent alone, and (3) the parent-child pair as a group make decisions about the amount and the timing of the payment to the child. The experimental results are not consistent with the standard intergenerational altruism model but consistent with models of cultural transmission of preferences. |
| Keywords: | intergenerational altruism, model of cultural transmission of preferences, time preference experiment, individual and joint decisions |
| JEL: | C93 D14 E2 |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:keo:dpaper:2014-005&r=all |
| By: | Romain Picot Clemente (Lab-STICC_TB_CID_DECIDE - Lab-STICC - Laboratoire des sciences et techniques de l'information, de la communication et de la connaissance - Ecole nationale d'ingénieurs de Brest - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom - ENSTA Bretagne - Institut Supérieur des Sciences et Technologies de Brest (ISSTB) - Télécom Bretagne - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Bretagne Occidentale - CNRS, LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom); Cécile Bothorel (Lab-STICC_TB_CID_DECIDE - Lab-STICC - Laboratoire des sciences et techniques de l'information, de la communication et de la connaissance - Ecole nationale d'ingénieurs de Brest - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom - ENSTA Bretagne - Institut Supérieur des Sciences et Technologies de Brest (ISSTB) - Télécom Bretagne - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Bretagne Occidentale - CNRS, LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom); Nicolas Jullien (LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom, MARSOUIN - Môle Armoricain de Recherche sur la SOciété de l'information et des usages d'INternet - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Bretagne Occidentale - Télécom Bretagne - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de Analyse de l'Information - Rennes - Institut Mines-Télécom - Université de Rennes II - Haute Bretagne, ICI - Laboratoire Information, Coordination, Incitations - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - UBO - Université de Bretagne Occidentale - Télécom Bretagne - Institut des Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société - ISHS - Institut Mines-Télécom) |
| Abstract: | In epistemic communities, people are said to be selected on their contribution in knowledge to the project (articles, codes, etc.). However, the socialization process is an important factor for inclusion, sustainability as a contributor, and promotion. Finally, what matters for being promoted? Being a good contributor? Being a good animator? Knowing the boss? We explore this question by looking at the election process for administrators in the English Wikipedia. We used the candidates' revisions and/or social attributes to construct a predictive model of promotion success, based on the candidates' past behavior and a random forest algorithm. Our model explains 78% of the results, which is better than the former models. It also helps to refine the explanation of the election process. |
| Keywords: | Promotion,Epistemic Community, Random forest, Wikipedia, Request for adminship |
| Date: | 2015–08–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01192597&r=all |