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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Simon Gachter, Daniele Nosenzo and Martin Sefon (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Daniele Nosenzo (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (School of Economics, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We compare social preference and social norm based explanations for peer effects in a three-person gift-exchange game experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our baseline treatment we observe that the second agent's effort is influenced by the effort choice of the first agent, even though there are no material spillovers between agents. This peer effect is predicted by a model of distributional social preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms compliance. A conditional logit investigation of the explanatory power of payoff inequality and elicited norms finds that the second agent's effort can be best explained by the social preferences model. In further treatments with modified games we find that the presence/strength of peer effects changes as predicted by the social preferences model. As with the baseline treatment, a conditional logit analysis favors an explanation based on social preferences, rather than social norms following for these treatments. Our results suggest that, in our context, the social preferences model provides a parsimonious explanation for the observed peer effect. |
| Keywords: | peer effects, social influence, gift-exchange, experiment, social preferences, inequity aversion, measuring social norms. |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-01&r=soc |
| By: | Martin Ljunge (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates the effect of trust on internet use by studying the general population as well as second generation immigrants in 29 European countries with ancestry in 87 nations. There is a significant positive effect of trust on internet use. The positive trust effect is not universal to all media, as individuals with high trust are shown to consume less television. The finding provides evidence for one mechanism through which trust creates good outcomes. Individuals with high trust spend time online, and eschew the isolation of the TV couch, which may produce more productive opportunities. |
| Keywords: | trust; internet use; intergenerational transmission; cultural transmission; TV watching |
| JEL: | D13 D83 J62 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–05–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1209&r=soc |
| By: | Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg |
| Abstract: | In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's belief about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. A growing number of surveys and experiments ask participants to state beliefs explicitly but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by informing the agent about exogenous manipulations of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied. The procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV-estimated effect is significant, confirming the causal role of beliefs. It is only slightly and insignificantly smaller than in estimations without instrumentation, consistent with a mild effect of social norms or other omitted variables. -- In vielen ökonomischen Zusammenhängen sind die Erwartungen der Spieler bezüglich relevanter Ereignisse, z. B. über das Verhalten anderer Spieler, eine schwer zu fassende Variable von Interesse. Zwar werden in einer wachsenden Zahl von Untersuchungen und Experimenten Teilnehmer gebeten, ihre Erwartungen ausdrücklich zu nennen, jedoch ist noch wenig bekannt über die Kausalbeziehung zwischen Erwartungen und anderen Verhaltensvariablen. In diesem Paper wird die Möglichkeit diskutiert, Instrumente zur Erhebung von Erwartungen zu kreieren, bei denen der Spieler über exogene Manipulationen der relevanten Ereignisse informiert wird. Wir führen Experimente zu einem Vertrauensspiel durch, bei denen der Betrag, der durch den zweiten Spieler zurückgesendet wird (trustee), exogen variiert wird. Dieses Vorgehen erlaubt die Entdeckung kausaler Wirkungsketten von Erwartungen auf Entscheidungen unter plausiblen Annahmen. Der IV-geschätzte Effekt ist signifikant und bestätigt die kausale Rolle von Erwartungen. Er ist nur wenig kleiner als in Schätzungen ohne Instrumentation und konsistent mit einem leichten Effekt sozialer Normen oder anderen vernachlässigter Variablen. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital,trust game,instrumental variables,belief elicitation |
| JEL: | C72 C81 C91 D84 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2012302&r=soc |
| By: | Monica I. Garcia-Perez (Department of Economics, St. Cloud State University) |
| Abstract: | Using a simple search model, with urn-ball derived matching function, this paper investigates the effect of firm owner’s and coworkers’ nativity on hiring patterns and wages. In the model, social networks reduce search frictions and wages are derived endogenously as a function of the efficiency of the social ties of current employees. As a result, individuals with more efficient connections tend to receive higher wages and lower unemployment rate. However, because this efficiency depends on matching with same-type owners and coworkers, there is also a differential effect among workers’ wages in the same firm. This analysis highlights the potential importance of social connections and social capital for understanding employment opportunities and wage differentials between these groups. |
| Keywords: | immigration; search models; social networks; wage differential; hiring process. |
| JEL: | J15 J21 J31 J61 R23 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:scs:wpaper:1221&r=soc |
| By: | Dhillon, Amrita (University of Warwick); Iversen, Vegard (University of Manchester); Torsvik, Gaute (University of Bergen) |
| Abstract: | We study ex-post hiring risks in low income countries with limited legal and regulatory frameworks. In our theory of employee referral, the new re- cruit internalises the rewards and punishments of the in-house referee meted out by the hiring firm. This social mechanism makes it cheaper for the rm to induce worker discipline. The degree of internalization depends on the un- observed strength of the endogenous social tie between the referee and the recruit. When the referee's utility is increasing in the strength of ties, referee workplace incentives do not matter and referee and employer incentives are aligned, in this case industries and jobs with high costs of opportunism and where dense kinship networks can match the skill requirements of employers will have clusters of close family and friends, they will show a high incidence of referrals rather than anonymous hiring and will show a wage premium to referred workers matched by their higher productivity. This no longer applies if the referee's utility is decreasing in the strength of ties: referrals are then more costly for firms, they will be used less frequently by employers and will require higher referee wages (or status). We illustrate how these insights add to our understanding of South-Asian labour markets. |
| Keywords: | Efficiency wage Contracts, Moral hazard, Referee incentives, Referrals, Networks, Strength of ties, Spot market |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:warwcg:89&r=soc |
| By: | Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob; Potipiti, Tanapong |
| Abstract: | This study experimentally tests the performance in predicting decisions of a reciprocity model that was proposed by Dufwenberg et al. (2004). By applying a new approach, the study directly and individually predicts a subject's future decision from his past decision. The prediction performance is measured by the rate of correct predictions (accuracy) and the gain in the rate of the correct predictions (informativeness). Six scenarios of trust game are used to test the model's performance. Further, we compare the performance of the model with two other prediction methods; one method uses a decision in a dictator game to predict a decision in a trust game; the other uses personal information including IQ-test scores, personal attitudes and socio-economic factors. Seventy-nine undergraduate students participated in this hand-run experimental study. The results show that the reciprocity model has the best performance when compared with other prediction methods. |
| Keywords: | Reciprocity; Model performance; Trust game |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2012–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40954&r=soc |
| By: | Timothy Besley; Marta Reynal-Querol |
| Abstract: | There is a great deal of interest in the causes and consequences of conflict in Africa, one of the poorest areas of the world where only modest economic progress has been made. This paper asks whether post-colonial conflict is, at least in part, a legacy of historical conflict by examining the empirical relationship between conflict in Africa since independence with recorded conflicts in the period 1400 to1700. We find evidence of a legacy of historical conflicts using between-country and withincountry evidence. The latter is found by dividing the continent into 120km_120km grids and measuring the distance from 91 documented historical conflicts. We also provide evidence that historical conflict is correlated with lower levels of trust, a stronger sense of ethnic identity and a weaker sense of national identity. |
| Keywords: | Conflict, Trust, Identity |
| JEL: | N47 O43 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stieop:036&r=soc |
| By: | Nowotny, Klaus (University of Salzburg); Pennerstorfer, Dieter (Austrian Institute of Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the role of ethnic networks in the location decision of migrants to the EU at the regional level. Using a random parameters logit specification we find a substantially positive effect of ethnic networks on the location decision of migrants. Furthermore, we find evidence of spatial spillovers in the effect of ethnic networks. Analyzing the trade-off between potential income and network size, we find that migrants would require a sizable compensation for living in a region with a smaller ethnic network, especially when considering regions where only few previous migrants from the same country of origin are located. |
| Keywords: | network migration; ethnic networks; random parameters logit |
| JEL: | C35 F22 R23 |
| Date: | 2012–09–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:sbgwpe:2012_007&r=soc |
| By: | Nava Ashraf; Oriana Bandiera; Kelsey Jack |
| Abstract: | A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in organizations that hire individuals to perform tasks with positive social spillovers. We conduct a field experiment in which agents hired by a public health organization are randomly allocated to four groups. Agents in the control group receive a standard volunteer contract often offered for this type of task, whereas agents in the three treatment groups receive small financial rewards, large financial rewards, and non-financial rewards, respectively. The analysis yields three main findings. First, non-financial rewards are more effective at eliciting effort than either financial rewards or the volunteer contract. The effect of financial rewards, both large and small, is much smaller and not significantly different from zero. Second, non-financial rewards elicit effort both by leveraging intrinsic motivation for the cause and by facilitating social comparison among agents. Third, contrary to existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not crowd out intrinsic motivation in this setting. < |
| Keywords: | incentives, non-monetary rewards, intrinsic motivation. |
| JEL: | J33 O15 M52 D82 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stieop:035&r=soc |
| By: | Klumpp, Tilman (University of Alberta, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an overview of internet file sharing networks and explores the relationship between technological, economic, and legal aspects of file sharing. I chronicle the evolution of content sharing technology since the 1990s, and examine the role of network architecture for a copyright holder’s choice of enforcement strategy as well as users’ responses to enforcement tactics. Some conjectures for possible future enforcement approaches are also derived. The target audience of this survey consists of economists and legal scholars interested in intellectual property rights and internet file sharing. |
| Keywords: | file sharing; peer-to-peer networks; network architecture; intellectual property rights; copyright enforcement |
| JEL: | D85 K11 K42 L82 O33 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2012_019&r=soc |
| By: | Matias Kalm |
| Abstract: | Recent developments in the field of network research have led to a growing interest in interorganisational relationships among social science scholars. One of the most important research areas is related to entrepreneurship research and how relationship networks affect firm performance. However, the existing literature focuses mostly on qualitative case studies and quantitative studies that analyse mergers and acquisitions or patent types of data. By analysing connection and causality between activity in co-operational relationships and firm growth, this study seeks to empirically address the following research question : ‘How does activity in network relationships influence the growth and internationalisation of technology-based firms in emerging technology areas?’ Furthermore, the connection and causality between activity in co-operational relationships and the internationalisation rates of firms are also analysed. This analysis is based on a data set and interviews with 53 small and medium-sized firms. Both a descriptive analysis and regression methods are used to analyse the connection between activity in co-operational relationships and firm growth or internationalisation. Firm growth is measured with both revenue and the employment growth rate. In addition, the activity in in the co-operational relationships is divided into two components : increasing versus consistently high activity with network actors. To address possible causality issues, this research employs activity measures that are based on the importance of the relationships rather than simply the number of relationships. The results show that increasing activity with network actors is positively connected with firm growth as measured in both revenue and employment growth. Furthermore, the results partially support the hypothesis that consistently high activity is positively connected to firm growth. Finally, the results suggest that growth firms positively benefit from increased relationship activity with both current and prospective actors in diverse relationship networks. Moreover, the single most negative result is the relatively low impact of relationship activities on public-sector actors and networks. |
| Keywords: | interorganisational relationships, firm growth, internationalisation, networks |
| Date: | 2012–08–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:dpaper:1278&r=soc |
| By: | Maria De Paola; Vincenzo Scoppa; Marco Alberto De Benedetto (Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica, Università della Calabria) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effect of gender quotas on electoral participation by using a rich dataset of Italian municipal elections. Gender quotas were in force in Italy from 1993 until 1995. Because of the short period covered by the reform, some municipalities never voted using gender quota. This allows us to identify a treatment and a control group and to estimate the effects of gender quotas by using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Notwithstanding electoral turnout shows a decreasing trend, we find that turnout has decreased significantly less in municipalities affected by the reform, suggesting that gender quotas have produced an increase in electoral participation. The effect on electoral turnout is driven by an increase in valid ballots, although we find also an increase in blank ballots. The effect is smaller in the Southern part of the country, typically characterized by more traditional gender roles. We also find that female electors react more than males probably because they expect female policy-makers to give particular attention to women’s interests. |
| Keywords: | Gender Quotas, Political Participation, Electoral Turnout, Natural Experiment, Gender Discrimination |
| JEL: | D72 D78 J71 J16 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clb:wpaper:201206&r=soc |
| By: | Ulrike Vollstädt (Jena Graduate School "Human Behaviour in Social and Economic Change", University of Jena); Robert Böhm (Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Scienes (CEREB), University of Erfurt) |
| Abstract: | In reality, it is often groups rather than individuals that make decisions. In previous experiments, groups have frequently been shown to act differently from individuals in several ways. It has been claimed that inter-group interactions may be (1) more competitive, (2) more rational, or (3) more prosocial than inter-individual interactions. While some of these observed differences may be due to differences in the experimental designs, it is still not clear which of the three motivations is prevailing as they have often been behaviorally confounded in previous experiments. We use Rubinstein's alternating offers bargaining game to compare inter-individual with inter-group behavior since it allows separating the predictions of competitive, rational and prosocial behavior. We find that groups are, on average, more rational bargainers than individuals. |
| Keywords: | alternating offers bargaining experiment, inter-group behavior, inter-individual behavior |
| JEL: | C78 D70 |
| Date: | 2012–08–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-048&r=soc |
| By: | Matthias Lücke; Toman Omar Mahmoud; Christian Peuker |
| Abstract: | Donations by migrants to community projects in their home countries (“collective remittances”) help to provide local public goods and may promote economic development. We draw on the literatures on migrant remittances and on philanthropy in general to identify possible motives for collective remittances. We test the empirical relevance of these motives using micro-level data from Eastern Europe. Our results suggest a mix of motives including altruism, exchange, and concern about future membership rights in the community of origin. We also find that communities with a high degree of ethnic fragmentation and a wide dispersion of migrants across destination countries are less likely to receive collective remittances |
| Keywords: | international migration, development, diaspora, collective remittances, philanthropy |
| JEL: | F22 F24 H41 O12 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kie:kieliw:1790&r=soc |
| By: | Gabriel Burdin (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía / University of Siena (Italia). Department of Economics.) |
| Abstract: | Worker-managed firms (WMFs) represent a marginal proportion of total firms and aggregate employment in most countries. The bulk of firms in real economies is ultimately controlled by capital suppliers. Different theoretical explanations suggest that WMFs are prone to failure in competitive environments. Using a panel of Uruguayan firms based on social security records and including the entire population of WMFs over the period January 1997-July 2009, I present new evidence on worker managed firms´ survival. I find that the hazard of exit is 24%-38% lower for WMFs than for conventional firms. This result is robust to alternative estimation strategies based on semi-parametric and parametric frailty duration models that impose different distributional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard and allow to consider firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that the marginal presence of WMFs in market economies can hardly be explained by the fact that these organizations exhibit lower survival chances than conventional firms. This paper adds to the literature on labor-managed firms, shared capitalism and to the industrial organization literature on firm survival. |
| Keywords: | labor-managed firms, capitalist firms, survival analysis. |
| JEL: | P13 P51 C41 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-06-12&r=soc |
| By: | Angela Cipollone (LUISS Guido Carli University, Department of Economics and Finance); Paolo Giordani (LUISS Guido Carli University, Department of Economics and Finance) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes and empirically tests a theory of entrepreneurial innovation to explain its high degree of concentration in space and time. In the model, a successful entrepreneurial project is the result of a search and matching process between entrepreneurs looking for funds and capitalists looking for new ideas to finance. The resulting strategic complementarity between them gives rise to a multiplier effect. Moreover, if complementarity is sufficiently strong, multiple equilibria arise, which can be ranked in terms of entrepreneurial activity. Using data from the European and the US business angels markets for the period 1996-2010, we show that (ii) a complementarity exists between business angels and the entrepreneurial projects submitted to them, and that (ii) the result of multiple equilibria is empirically plausible. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurship, financing of innovation, search and matching, strategic complementarities, venture capital, business angels. |
| JEL: | O32 O38 D83 C78 L26 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:casmef:1210&r=soc |
| By: | Moritz Bonn |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how the existence of a minority culture infl uences the well-being of the native population and its attitude towards immigrants. In this context, I assume that multicultural interaction can be advantageous for immigrants and natives if intercultural obstacles and communication problems are abolished. It is found that certain shares of the immigrant as well as of the native population have incentives to acquire knowledge of the respective other culture since it enables them to interact with each other. I find that immigrants are more likely to acquire knowledge of the domestic culture than vice versa what I attribute to differences in the respective population size, assortative matching behavior and potentially asymmetric learning costs. The model further predicts that natives who have sufficiently low costs of learning the foreign culture are willing to vote for free migration whereas those who have higher learning costs will be in favor of immigration restrictions |
| Keywords: | Immigration, Cultural Interaction, Political Economy |
| JEL: | F22 J15 Z1 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sie:siegen:154-12&r=soc |