|
on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Fischer, Justina A.V.; Torgler, Benno |
| Abstract: | Research on the effects of positional concerns on individuals’ attitudes and behavior is sorely lacking. To address this deficiency, we use the International Social Survey Programme 1998 data on 25’000 individuals from 26 countries to investigate the impact of relative income position on three facets of social capital, covering horizontal and vertical trust as well as norm compliance. Testing relative deprivation theory, we identify a deleterious positional income effect for persons below the reference income, particularly for their social trust and confidence in secular institutions. Also often a social capital-lowering effect of relative income advantage occurs, while a rise in absolute income almost always contributes positively. These results indicate that a rise in income inequality in society too large is rather detrimental to the formation of social capital. |
| Keywords: | Relative income; positional concerns; social capital; social norms; deprivation theory |
| JEL: | I30 D31 Z13 |
| Date: | 2011–02–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28650&r=soc |
| By: | Tonin, Mirco (University of Southampton); Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents results from a modified dictator experiment aimed at distinguishing and quantifying the two intrinsic motivations for giving: warm glow and pure altruism. In particular, we implemented a within-subject experimental design with three treatments: (i) one, T1, where the recipient is the experimenters, which measures altruistic feelings towards the experimenters, (ii) the Crumpler and Grossman (2008) design, T2, in which the recipient is a charity, and the dictator’s donation crowds out one-for-one a donation by the experimenters, which aims at measuring warm glow giving, (iii) a third one, T3, with a charity recipient and no crowding out, which elicits both types of altruism. We use T1 to assess to what extent altruistic feelings towards the experimenters are a potential confound for measuring warm glow in T2. We find giving in T1 not to be significantly different from T2, suggesting that the Crumpler and Grossman design provides an upper bound estimate of warm glow giving. We provide a lower bound estimate based on the behavior of subjects whose warm glow giving in T2 is not confounded, that is, those who do not display altruistic feelings towards the experimenters in T1. We use these two estimates to quantify the portion of giving in T3 due to pure altruism and find it to be between 20% and 26% of endowment. We also propose a new method of detecting warm glow motivation based on the idea that in a random-lottery incentive (RLI) scheme, such as the one we employ, warm glow accumulates and this may lead to satiation, whereas purely altruistic motivation does not. |
| Keywords: | dictator game, warm glow, pure altruism, charitable giving, random lottery, incentive scheme |
| JEL: | C91 D64 |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5461&r=soc |
| By: | LOPEZ-PINTADO, Dunia (Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics, Sevilla, Spain; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | Some behaviors, ideas or technologies spread and become persistent in society, whereas others vanish. This paper analyzes the role of social influence in determining such distinct collective outcomes. Agents are assumed to acquire information from others through a certain sampling process that generates an influence network, and they use simple rules to decide whether to adopt or not depending on the observed sample. We characterize, as a function of the primitives of the model, the diffusion threshold (i.e., the spreading rate above which the adoption of the new behavior becomes persistent in the population) and the endemic state (i.e., the fraction of adopters in the stationary state of the dynamics). We find that the new behavior will easily spread in the population if there is a high correlation between how influential (visible) and how easily influenced an agent is, which is determined by the sampling process and the adoption rule. We also analyze how the density and variance of the out-degree distribution affect the diffusion threshold and the endemic state. |
| Keywords: | social influence, networks, diffusion threshold, endemic state |
| JEL: | C73 L14 |
| Date: | 2010–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010083&r=soc |
| By: | Francesca Gino (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit); Bradley R. Staats (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) |
| Abstract: | Drawing on theoretical insights from research on social comparison processes, this article explores how managers can use performance feedback to sustain employees' motivation and performance in organizations. Using a field experiment at a Japanese bank, we investigate the effects of valence (positive versus negative), type (direct versus indirect), and timing of feedback (one-shot versus persistent) on employee productivity. Our results show that direct negative feedback (e.g., an employee learns her performance falls in the bottom of her group) leads to improvements in employees' performance, while direct positive feedback does not significantly impact performance. Furthermore, indirect negative feedback (i.e., the employee learns she is not in the bottom of her group) worsens productivity while indirect positive feedback (i.e., the employee learns she is not in the top of her group) does not affect it. Finally, both persistently positive and persistently negative feedback lead to improvements in employees' performance. Together, our findings offer insight into the role of performance feedback in motivating productivity in repetitive tasks. |
| Keywords: | Feedback, Framing, Learning, Motivation, Persistence, Productivity, Social comparison |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:11-078&r=soc |
| By: | Traag Tanja; Marie Olivier; Velden Rolf van der (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate how successful social bonding theory is at predicting juvenile delinquency and school dropout behaviour. We adopt a simple dynamic approach which assumes that past involvement in risky behaviour reduces individual restraints for future participation in risky behaviour. We use a ten years education panel following Dutch adolescents who participated in a survey in their first year of high school in 1999. This information was matched to annual information on police arrests based on registry data. Our results show that school performance (as measured by test scores) is the key social bond element preventing young people from engaging in risk behaviour. We also find that involvement in past risky behaviour increases the likelihood of future missteps and that the protective influence of school performance is mitigated. |
| Keywords: | labour economics ; |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2011006&r=soc |
| By: | Bin Dong (The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology); Benno Torgler (The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, CREMA – Centre for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts and CESifo) |
| Abstract: | We explore theoretically and empirically whether social interaction, including local and global interaction, influences the incidence of corruption. We first present an interaction-based model on corruption that predicts that the level of corruption is positively associated with social interaction. Then we empirically verify the theoretical prediction using within-country evidence at the province-level in China during 1998 to 2007. Panel data evidence clearly indicates that social interaction has a statistically significantly positive effect on the corruption rate in China. Our findings, therefore, underscore the relevance of social interaction in understanding corruption. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Social Interaction, China |
| JEL: | K42 D72 D64 O17 J24 |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.09&r=soc |
| By: | Jean-Louis Arcand (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Marcel Fafchamps (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I) |
| Abstract: | Using a rich dataset from West Africa we study the determinants of membership in rural producer organizations (RPO). We ...nd that on average it is the more fortunate members of rural society who belong in RPOs. In Senegal, the dominant criteria are land ownership. In Burkina Faso it is economic status and family ties with village authorities. Ethnicity also plays a role: RPO membership is less likely for ethnic groups that traditionally emphasize livestock raising. We also look for evidence of assortative matching along multiple dimensions. To this e¤ect we develop an original methodology based on dyadic regressions. We ...nd robust evidence of assortative matching by physical and ethnic proximity as well as by wealth and social status. |
| Keywords: | keywords: matching;group membership;rural producer organizations;Africa |
| Date: | 2011–02–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00562629&r=soc |
| By: | Falk, Armin (University of Bonn); Meier, Stephan (Columbia University); Zehnder, Christian (University of Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | Social preference research has received considerable attention among economists in recent years. However, the empirical foundation of social preferences is largely based on laboratory experiments with self-selected students as participants. This is potentially problematic as students participating in experiments may behave systematically different than non-participating students or non-students. In this paper we empirically investigate whether laboratory experiments with student samples misrepresent the importance of social preferences. Our first study shows that students who exhibit stronger prosocial inclinations in an unrelated field donation are not more likely to participate in experiments. This suggests that self-selection of more prosocial students into experiments is not a major issue. Our second study compares behavior of students and the general population in a trust experiment. We find very similar behavioral patterns for the two groups. If anything, the level of reciprocation seems higher among non-students suggesting that results from student samples might be seen as a lower bound for the importance of prosocial behavior. |
| Keywords: | methodology, selection, experiments, prosocial behavior |
| JEL: | C90 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5475&r=soc |
| By: | Bernard Fortin; Myra Yazbeck |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at opening the black box of peer effects in adolescent weight gain. Using Add Health data on secondary schools in the U.S., we investigate whether these effects partly flow through the eating habits channel. Adolescents are assumed to interact through a friendship social network. We first propose a social interaction model of fast food consumption using a generalized spatial autoregressive approach. We exploit results by Bramoullé, Djebbari and Fortin (2009) which show that intransitive links within a network (i.e., a friend of one of my friends is not my friend) help identify peer effects. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood and generalized 2SLS strategies. We also estimate a panel dynamic weight gain production function relating an adolescent’s Body Mass Index (BMI) to his current fast food consumption and his lagged BMI level. Results show that there are positive significant peer effects in fast food consumption among adolescents belonging to a same friendship school network. The estimated social multiplier is 1.59. Our results also suggest that, at the network level, an extra day of weekly fast food restaurant visits increases BMI by 2.4%, when peer effects are taken into account. |
| Keywords: | Obesity, overweight, peer effects, social interactions, fast food, spatial models |
| JEL: | C31 I10 I12 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1103&r=soc |
| By: | Kenju Kamei (Brown University); Louis Putterman (Brown University); Jean-Robert Tyran (University of Vienna) |
| Abstract: | The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. The reason is that informal sanctions achieve more efficient outcomes than theory predicts, especially when the mechanism is chosen by voting. |
| Keywords: | sanction; social dilemma; public goods; voluntary contribution mechanism; punishment; experiment |
| JEL: | C92 C91 D71 H41 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1105&r=soc |
| By: | Docquier, Frederic; Lodigiani, Elisabetta; Rapoport, Hillel; Schiff, Maurice |
| Abstract: | Migration is an important yet neglected determinant of institutions. This paper documents the channels through which emigration affects home country institutions and considers dynamic-panel regressions for a large sample of developing countries. The authors find that emigration and human capital both increase democracy and economic freedom. This implies that unskilled (skilled) emigration has a positive (ambiguous) impact on institutional quality. Simulations show an impact of skilled emigration that is generally positive, significant for a few countries and for many countries once incentive effects of emigration on human capital formation are accounted for. |
| Keywords: | Population Policies,Economic Theory&Research,International Migration,Human Migrations&Resettlements,Voluntary and Involuntary Resettlement |
| Date: | 2011–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5557&r=soc |
| By: | Lionel Richefort (Nantes-Atlantic Economics and Management Laboratory (LEMNA), University of Nantes – IEMN); Patrick Point (Research Group on Theoretical and Applied Economics (GREThA),University of Bordeaux 4 – CNRS) |
| Abstract: | A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France). |
| Keywords: | Common-pool Resource, Digraph, Cycle, Independent Set, Empirical Example |
| JEL: | C72 D85 H41 |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.147&r=soc |
| By: | Zakharenko, Roman |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I merge two theories -- theory of "passionate individuals" by Gumilev(1989) and Memetics by Dawkins(1976) - to develop a formal growth theory that states that societies become more developed when their members have more intrinsic motivation to solve problems of social importance (i.e. make "cultural contributions"). Individuals derive utility from genetic fitness (i.e. the number of surviving children) as well as from cultural fitness, defined as the amount of appreciation ("honor") of one's cultural contribution by future generations. To make a cultural contribution, one must study/honor cultural contributions of the past, which leads to multiple steady states. In the survival steady state, individuals expect that no one in the future will be interested in their cultural contribution, which makes them allocate all energy onto maximization of genetic fitness and care little about cultural contributions of the past. In the passionate steady state, individuals expect high appreciation of their cultural contribution and thus spend a lot of energy onto making such a contribution, which makes them highly appreciate cultural contributions of the past. Empirical implications of theory are also discussed. |
| Keywords: | passionate individuals; human values; poverty traps; memetics; economic growth |
| JEL: | O11 O49 Z13 |
| Date: | 2011–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28552&r=soc |
| By: | Francesca Gino (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit); Sreedhari D. Desai (Harvard Law School; Harvard Kennedy School) |
| Abstract: | Four experiments demonstrated that recalling memories from one's own childhood lead people to experience feelings of moral purity and to behave prosocially. In Experiment 1, participants instructed to recall memories from their childhood were more likely to help the experimenter with a supplementary task than were participants in a control condition, and this effect was mediated by self-reported feelings of moral purity. In Experiment 2, the same manipulation increased the amount of money participants donated to a good cause, and self-reported feelings of moral purity mediated this relationship. In Experiment 3, participants who recalled childhood memories judged the ethically-questionable behavior of others more harshly, suggesting that childhood memories lead to altruistic punishment. Finally, in Experiment 4, compared to a control condition, both positively-valenced and negatively-valenced childhood memories led to higher empathic concern for a person in need, which, in turn increased intentions to help. |
| Keywords: | Childhood, Ethics, Memories, Morality, Prosocial Behavior, Purity |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:11-079&r=soc |
| By: | Charles Figuieres; David Masclet; Marc Willinger |
| Abstract: | We develop a model that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. The novel idea is that people’s moral motivation is "weak". Their judgment about the right contribution depends on observed contributions by group members and on an intrinsic "moral ideal". We show that the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents lead to the decline of the average contribution over time. The model is compatible with persistence of over-contributions, variability of contributions (across and within individuals), and the “restart effect”. Furthermore, it offers a rationale for conditional cooperation. <P>Cet article présente un modèle théorique qui permet d’expliquer le déclin des contributions observé dans les expériences de contribution volontaire au financement de biens publics répétés à horizon fini. Ce modèle s’appuie sur l’idée de motivation morale faible selon laquelle les agents auraient une motivation intrinsèque à contribuer un montant non nul au bien public et que cette motivation intrinsèque serait conditionnée à l’observation des contributions des autres membres du groupe. Ce modèle est compatible avec la persistance de la sur-contribution, la variabilité inter et intra individuelle dans les montants de contributions et l’effet de « restart ». |
| Keywords: | Conditional cooperation, voluntary contributions, moral motivation, experiments on public goods games, coopération conditionnelle, contributions volontaires, motivation morale, expériences de biens publics |
| JEL: | H00 H41 C72 |
| Date: | 2011–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-09&r=soc |
| By: | Bin Dong (The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology); Benno Torgler (The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, CREMA – Centre for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts and CESifo) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and democracy. We establish a political economy model where the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection. Our empirical analysis with cross-national panel data provides evidence that is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the effect of democratization on corruption depends on the protection of property rights and income equality which shows that corruption is a nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work better as a control of corruption if the property rights system works and there is a low level of income inequality. On the other hand if property rights are not secured and there is strong income inequality, democracy may even lead to an increase of corruption. In addition, property rights protection and the mitigation of income inequality contribute in a strong manner to the reduction of corruption. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Democracy, Income inequality, Property rights |
| JEL: | D73 H11 P16 |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.08&r=soc |