|
on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Lawrence E. Blume; William A. Brock; Steven N. Durlauf; Yannis M. Ioannides |
| Abstract: | While interest in social determinants of individual behavior has led to a rich theoretical literature and many efforts to measure these influences, a mature "social econometrics" has yet to emerge. This chapter provides a critical overview of the identification of social interactions. We consider linear and discrete choice models as well as social network structures. We also consider experimental and quasi-experimental methods. In addition to describing the state of the identification literature, we indicate areas where additional research is especially needed and suggest some directions that appear to be especially promising. |
| Keywords: | social interactions, social networks, identification |
| JEL: | C21 C23 C31 C35 C72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0754&r=soc |
| By: | David Hugh-Jones (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena); Martin A. Leroch (University of Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against the person who harmed them, but against somebody else in that person's group. Group reciprocity may be a key motivation behind intergroup conflict. We investigated group reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. After a group identity manipulation, subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with others from different groups. Subjects then allocated money between themselves and others, learning the group of the others. Subjects who knew that their partner in the Prisoner's Dilemma had defected became relatively less generous to people from the partner's group, compared to a third group. We use our experiment to develop hypotheses about group reciprocity and its correlates. |
| Keywords: | reciprocity, groups, conflict |
| JEL: | D74 C92 |
| Date: | 2010–09–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-066&r=soc |
| By: | Heineck, Guido (IAB, Nürnberg); Süssmuth, Bernd (University of Leipzig) |
| Abstract: | What are the long-term effects of Communism on economically relevant notions such as social trust? To answer this question, we use the reunification of Germany as a natural experiment and study the post-reunification trajectory of convergence with regard to individuals’ trust and risk, as well as perceived fairness and cooperativeness. Our hypotheses are derived from a model of German reunification that incorporates individual responses both to incentives and to values inherited from earlier generations as recently suggested in the literature. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we find that despite twenty years of reunification East Germans are still characterized by a persistent level of social distrust. In comparison to West Germans, they are also less inclined to see others as fair or helpful. Implied trajectories can be interpreted as evidence for the passing of cultural traits across generations and for cooperation being sustained by values rather than by reputation. Moreover, East Germans are found to be more risk loving than West Germans. In contrast to trust and fairness, full convergence in risk attitude is reached in recent years. |
| Keywords: | social trust, risk attitudes, political regimes, German reunification |
| JEL: | P51 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5219&r=soc |
| By: | Cohen-Zada, Danny (Ben Gurion University); Sander, William (DePaul University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we first explore how an exogenous increase in the opportunity cost of religious participation affects individuals' religious participation and reported happiness using data from the General Social Survey. The exogenous shift in the cost of religious participation is a result of repealing of so-called blue laws which restrict retail activity on Sundays. We find that repealing blue laws causes a significant decline in the level of religious participation of white women and in their happiness. We do not observe any significant decline in reported happiness of other groups whose religious participation was not significantly affected by repeal. We also use repeal as an instrumental variable (IV) for church attendance and provide direct evidence that church attendance has a significant positive effect on happiness, especially for women. |
| Keywords: | religious participation, happiness, blue laws |
| JEL: | K10 J16 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5198&r=soc |
| By: | Deepti Goel; Kevin Lang |
| Abstract: | It is shown that increasing the probability of obtaining a job offer through the network should raise the observed mean wage in jobs found through formal (non-network) channels relative to that in jobs found through the network. This prediction also holds at all percentiles of the observed wage distribution, except the highest and lowest. The largest changes are likely to occur below the median. [Working Paper No. 189]. |
| Keywords: | job offereing, formal, social ties, median, wages, observed mean, |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2932&r=soc |
| By: | Gorodnichenko, Yuriy (University of California, Berkeley); Roland, Gerald (University of California, Berkeley) |
| Abstract: | We construct an endogenous growth model that includes a cultural variable along the dimension of individualism-collectivism. The model predicts that more individualism leads to more innovation because of the social rewards associated with innovation in an individualist culture. This cultural effect may offset the negative effects of bad institutions on growth. Collectivism leads to efficiency gains relative to individualism, but these gains are static, unlike the dynamic effect of individualism on growth through innovation. Using genetic data as instruments for culture we provide strong evidence of a causal effect of individualism on income per worker and total factor productivity as well as on innovation. The baseline genetic markers we use are interpreted as proxies for cultural transmission but others have a direct effect on individualism and collectivism, in line with recent advances in biology and neuro-science. The effect of culture on long-run growth remains very robust even after controlling for the effect of institutions and other factors. We also provide evidence of a two-way causal effect between culture and institutions. |
| Keywords: | culture, institutions, development, growth |
| JEL: | O1 O3 O4 O5 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5187&r=soc |
| By: | Goette, Lorenz (University of Lausanne); Huffman, David (Swarthmore College); Meier, Stephan (Columbia University); Sutter, Matthias (University of Innsbruck) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how group boundaries, and the economic environment surrounding groups, affect altruistic cooperation and punishment behavior. Our study uses experiments conducted with 525 officers in the Swiss Army, and exploits random assignment to platoons. We find that, without competition between groups, individuals are more prone to cooperate altruistically in a prisoner's dilemma game with in-group as opposed to out-group members. They also use a costly punishment option to selectively harm those who defect, encouraging a norm of cooperation towards the group. Adding competition between groups causes even stronger in-group cooperation, but also a qualitative change in punishment: punishment becomes antisocial, harming cooperative and defecting out-group members alike. These findings support recent evolutionary models and have important organizational implications. |
| Keywords: | group membership, competition, punishment, army, experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C93 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5189&r=soc |
| By: | Arnstein Aassve; Bruno Arpino; Francesco C. Billari |
| Abstract: | Young people leave the parental home at different ages, and differences exist both between and within societies. To explain this heterogeneity, differences in earnings and employment, education and family formation are popular candidates. Comparative research has emphasised the importance of institutional arrangements, in particular the way state welfare systems are able to support young individuals in the transition to adulthood. It has been argued, however, that despite differences in welfare support, differences in social norms also play an important role. In this paper we make an attempt to explain the heterogeneity in individuals’ perceptions of the "age deadline" for leaving home. Using information from the third round of the European Social Survey (ESS) we implement a series of multi-level regression models where we account both for country and regional heterogeneity. The idea is that contextual variables may affect individuals’ perception of the age deadline, which in turn is likely to matter for the actual age of leaving home. Just as in the literature concerned with explaining actual behaviour, we find that strong normative differences between countries persist. We also find significant, though lower, regional variability in the analysis on the pooled set of European countries we have in our data set. Unemployment rate and education are found to have a strong role in explaining heterogeneity of norms at the country level, while religiosity influences age norms mostly at the regional level. This is consistent with the idea that "cultural" factors are important at the regional level while "structural" factors show their influence at the country level. |
| Keywords: | age norms, European Social Survey, leaving home, multilevel analysis |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:don:donwpa:032&r=soc |
| By: | Carolin Haeussler |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how scientists decide whether to share information with their colleagues or not. Detailed data on the decisions of 1,694 bio-scientists allow to detect similarities and differences between academia-based and industry-based scientists. Arguments from social capital theory are applied to explain why individuals share information even at (temporary) personal cost. In both realms, the results suggest that the likelihood of sharing decreases with the competitive value of the requested information. Factors related to social capital, i.e., expected reciprocity and the extent to which a scientist’s community conforms to the norm of open science,either directly affect information-sharing or moderate competitive interest considerations on information-sharing. The effect depends on the system to which a scientist belongs. |
| Keywords: | information-sharing; social capital; reciprocity; open science; bio-sciences; IP protection mechanisms |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsw:rswwps:rswwps154&r=soc |
| By: | David Hugh-Jones; Ro'i Zultan |
| Abstract: | In experiments, people behave more cooperatively when they are aware of an external threat, while in the field, we observe surprisingly high levels of cooperation and altruism within groups in conflict situations such as civil wars. We provide an explanation for these phenomena. We introduce a model in which different groups vary in their willingness to help each other against external attackers. Attackers infer the cooperativeness of a group from its members' behaviour under attack, and may be deterred by a group which bands together against an initial attack. Then, even self-interested individuals may behave cooperatively when threatened, so as to mimic more cooperative groups. By doing so, they drive away attackers and increase their own future security. We argue that a group's reputation is a public good with a natural weakest-link structure. We test the implications of our model in a laboratory experiment. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, conflict, defence, signaling |
| JEL: | C73 C92 D74 |
| Date: | 2010–09–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-064&r=soc |