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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Katleen Van den Broeck (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Stefan Dercon (University of Oxford) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses whether agricultural information flows give rise to social learning effects in banana cultivation in Nyakatoke, a small Tanzanian village. Based on a village census, full information is available on socio-economic characteristics and banana production of farmer kinship members, neighbours and informal insurance group members. This allows a test for social learning within these groups and the identification of different types of social effects. Controlling for exogenous group characteristics, the effect of group behaviour on individual farmer output is studied. The results show that social effects are strongly dependent on the definition of the reference group. It emerges that no social effects are found in distance based groups, exogenous social effects linked to group education exist in informal insurance groups, and only kinship related groups generate the endogenous social effects that produce positive externalities in banana output. |
| Keywords: | social interactions; social learning; agricultural information networks |
| JEL: | O12 O13 O55 Q12 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0708&r=soc |
| By: | Alan Kirman; Sheri Markose; Simone Giasante; Paolo Pin |
| Abstract: | We study the formation of social networks that are based on local interaction and simple rule following. Agents evaluate the profitability of link formation on the basis of the Myerson-Shapley principle that payoffs come from the marginal contribution they make to coalitions. The NP-hard problem associated with the Myerson-Shapley value is replaced by a boundedly rational 'spatially' myopic process. Agents consider payoffs from direct links with their neighbours (level 1) which can include indirect payoffs from neighbours' neighbours (level 2) and up to M-levels that are far from global. Agents dynamically break away from the neighbour to whom they make the least marginal contribution. Computational experiments show that when this self-interested process of link formation operates at level 2 neighbourhoods, agents self-organize into stable and efficient network structures that manifest reciprocity, equity and segregation reminiscent of hunter gather groups. A large literature alleges that this is incompatible with self-interested behaviour and market oriented marginality principle in the allocation of value. We conclude that it is not this valuation principle that needs to be altered to obtain segregated social networks as opposed to global components, but whether it operates at level 1 or level 2 of social neighbourhoods. Remarkably, all M>2 neighbourhood calculations for payoffs leave the efficient network structures identical to the case when M=2. |
| Date: | 2007–04–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esx:essedp:629&r=soc |
| By: | Santiago Sanchez-Pages |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes coalition formation in a model of contests with linear costs. Agents first form groups and then compete by investing resources. Coalitions fight for prizes that are assumed to be subject to rivalry, so their value is non-increasing in the size of the group. This formulation encompasses as particular cases some models proposed in the rent-seeking literature. We show that the formation of groups generates positive spillovers and analyze two classes of games of coalition formation. A contest among individual agents is the only stable outcome when individual defections leave the rest of the group intact. More concentrated coalition structures, including the grand coalition, are stable when groups collapse after a defection, provided that rivalry is not too strong. Results in a sequential game of coalition formation suggest that there exists a non-monotonic relationship between the level of underlying rivalry and the level of social conflict. |
| Keywords: | Contests, coalition formation, conflict, rivalry. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D74 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:158&r=soc |
| By: | Pande, Rohini |
| Abstract: | Building on the large and growing empirical literature on the political behaviour of individuals in low income countries this chapter seeks to understand corruption through the lens of political economy -- particularly in terms of the political and economic differences between rich and poor countries. Our focus is on the political behaviour of individuals exposed to democratic political institutions. We review the existing literature on the determinants of individual political behaviour to ask whether we can understand the choice of political actors to be corrupt and, importantly, of other individuals to permit it, as a rational response to the social or the economic environment they inhabit. We also discuss the implications of this view of corruption for anti-corruption policies. |
| Keywords: | corruption; development |
| JEL: | O12 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6273&r=soc |
| By: | Michel André Maréchal; Christian Thöni |
| Abstract: | A substantive amount of lab experimental evidence suggests that the norm of reciprocity has important economic consequences. However, it is unclear whether the norm of reciprocity survives in a natural and competitive environment with experienced agents. For this purpose we analyze data from a natural field experiment conducted with sales representatives who were instructed to randomly distribute product samples as gifts to their business partners. We find that distributing gifts to store managers boosts sales revenue substantially, which is consistent with the notion of reciprocity. However, the results underline that the nature of the relationship between market participants crucially affects the prevalence of reciprocal behavior. |
| Keywords: | reciprocity, gift exchange, field experiment |
| JEL: | D63 C93 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:dp2007:2007-09&r=soc |
| By: | Ayuso, Silvia (IESE Business School); Rodriguez, Miguel A. (IESE Business School); Garcia, Roberto (IESE Business School); Ariño, Miguel A. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to build on the emerging stakeholder model of corporate governance by analyzing the CSR function at board level, board diversity, and stakeholder engagement, and how it relates to financial performance. Based on an empirical study of an international sample of large companies, we find board responsibility for CSR to be a key factor in promoting engagement with primary and secondary stakeholders of the firm. Depending on the legal tradition of the country in which the company is based, we find evidence that board diversity and stakeholder engagement are positively correlated with firm financial performance. |
| Keywords: | Corporate governance; corporate social responsibility; board diversity; stakeholder engagement; firm performance; |
| Date: | 2007–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0670&r=soc |
| By: | Neumayer, Eric; de Soysa, Indra |
| Abstract: | The authors address the question of state militarization under conditions of ethnic and other diversity. " Primordialist " claims about ancient hatreds, fear, and insecurity in such societies would lead one to expect that fractionalization, polarization, and ethno-nationalist exclusion would prompt governments to militarize heavily. But contrary to such expectations, the authors find that higher levels of ethnic diversity predict lower levels of militarizat ion, whereas higher polarization and ethno-nationalist exclusion trigger neither lower nor higher levels of militarization. If fractionalization lowers the hazard of civil war, as many find, then it does not happen by way of a " garrison state " effect. The authors discuss two potential explanations for their findings, one drawing from the empirical conflict literature, the other stemming from economists ' study of public goods provision under conditions of diversity. They argue that their findings are best seen as consistent with and complementary to the empirical literature on conflict onset and duration. |
| Keywords: | Peace & Peacekeeping,Population Policies,Social Conflict and Violence,Post Conflict Reintegration,Inequality |
| Date: | 2007–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4221&r=soc |
| By: | Adegbesan, Tunji (IESE Business School); Ricart, Joan E. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | Most approaches to innovation bear the implicit assumption that increased innovativeness leads to improved organizational performance. Thus, more attention has been focused on innovativeness than on innovation performance; on novelty than on value. However, recent empirical evidence calls into question the unqualified optimism surrounding innovation, and leads us to ask what we really know about when technological innovation improves performance. In this paper, we seek to make a contribution by presenting the results of an exhaustive review of extant knowledge on the outcomes of technological innovation. Our synthesis of the literature allows us to relate in one parsimonious model the drivers and moderators of the antecedents, technical outcomes, and performance outcomes of technological innovation and technological change. We also make sense of the proliferation of terms, and consequent terminological ambiguity, which characterizes a lot of work on technological innovation. Finally, in the light of the model presented and recent developments in work on firm capabilities, we indicate possible avenues for further development of this critical area of research. |
| Keywords: | Technological innovation; organizational performance; innovation and innovativeness; |
| Date: | 2007–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0668&r=soc |
| By: | Thomas Siedler (Institute for Social and Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether schooling has a positive impact on individual's political interest, voting turnout, democratic values, political involvement and political group membership, using the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). Between 1949 and 1969 the number of compulsory years of schooling was increased from eight to nine years in the Federal Republic of Germany, gradually over time and across federal states. These law changes allow one to investigate the causal impact of years of schooling on citizenship. Years of schooling are found to be positively correlated with a broad range of political outcome measures. However, when exogenous increase in schooling through law changes is used, there is no evidence of a causal effect running from schooling to citizenship in Germany. |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ese:iserwp:2007-02&r=soc |
| By: | Carmen Beviá; Luis C. Corchón |
| Abstract: | We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless. |
| Keywords: | Cooperative Production, sharing rules, efficiency |
| JEL: | D29 D6 D78 |
| Date: | 2007–04–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:696.07&r=soc |
| By: | Olken, Benjamin |
| Abstract: | Accurate citizen perceptions of corruption are crucial for the political process to effectively restrain corrupt activity. This paper examines the accuracy of these perceptions by comparing Indonesian villagers' stated beliefs about corruption in a road-building project in their village with a more objective measure of `missing expenditures' in the project. I find that villagers' beliefs do contain real information, and that villagers are sophisticated enough to distinguish between corruption in a particular road project and general corruption in the village. The magnitude of their information, however, is small, in part because officials hide corruption where it is hardest for villagers to detect. I also find that there are biases in beliefs that may affect citizens' monitoring behaviour. For example, ethnically heterogeneous villages have higher perceived corruption levels and greater citizen monitoring, but lower actual levels of missing expenditures. The findings illustrate the limitations of relying solely on corruption perceptions, whether in designing anti-corruption policies or in conducting empirical research on corruption. |
| Keywords: | beliefs; corruption; perception |
| JEL: | D73 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6272&r=soc |