nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2024‒11‒11
three papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi, Universidad de la RepÃúºblica


  1. Green Patents in an Oligopolistic Market with Green Consumers By Langinier, Corinne; Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita
  2. Environmental Regulations and Green Innovation: The Role of Trade and Technology Transfer By Langinier, Corinne; Martinez-Zarzoso, Inmaculada; Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita
  3. Impact of environmental regulations and environmental provisions on trade By Thais Nuñez-Rocha; Inmaculada Martinez Zarzoso Zaki; Chahir Zaki

  1. By: Langinier, Corinne (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita (University of Winnipeg)
    Abstract: We analyze the impact of patent policies and emission taxes on green innovation. We allow for strategic interactions of firms in a duopolistic market in the presence of green conscious consumers. We identify a paradoxical effect of increasing emission taxes beyond a certain threshold which results in an increase in emissions. Decreasing patenting costs mitigates this paradox, while the impact of tightening patentability requirements is more complex. Moreover, we show that the greater the proportion of green-conscious consumers, the less likely firms are to license a green patent, which results in higher emissions levels. With green consumers, the lowest emissions occur for an intermediate range of taxes for which licensing does occur. Finally, we find that while tax increases lead to a switch from overinvestment to underinvestment in the absence of green conscious consumers, they have the reverse effect in their presence.
    Keywords: Patent; Green Innovation; Pollution
    JEL: L13 O34 Q50
    Date: 2024–10–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2024_007
  2. By: Langinier, Corinne (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Martinez-Zarzoso, Inmaculada (University of Goettingen); Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita (University of Winnipeg)
    Abstract: Our theoretical model predicts that green innovation is an inverted U-shaped function of emission tax under free trade, while it is upward sloping under autarky. Our empirical analysis supports this finding by using the Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS) as a proxy for environmental regulations. Our theory also determines the conditions under which international technology transfers increase green innovation. The empirical results indicate that technology transfers increase green innovation at any given level of EPS, although the inverted U-shape persists. We observe that OECD and non-OECD countries lie on either side of the turning point. Implementing stricter environmental regulations in non-OECD countries increases green innovation, while the reverse is likely to hold for most OECD countries. Our findings also show that market-based regulations are more effective in non-OECD countries for fostering green innovation, while non-market-based regulations are more effective in OECD countries.
    Keywords: Green Innovation; Environmental Policy; International Trade; Technology Transfer
    JEL: O34 Q55 Q56 Q58
    Date: 2024–10–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2024_008
  3. By: Thais Nuñez-Rocha (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [2022-...] - UO - Université d'Orléans - UT - Université de Tours - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne); Inmaculada Martinez Zarzoso Zaki (Georg-August-University = Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Universitat Jaume I = Jaume I University); Chahir Zaki (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [2022-...] - UO - Université d'Orléans - UT - Université de Tours - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne)
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine how stringent environmental regulations affect international trade flows. We show that national environmental legislation reinforces the impact on trade of environmental provisions in deep trade agreements.
    Keywords: International trade environmental regulations environmental provisions in trade agreements F18 K32, International trade, environmental regulations, environmental provisions in trade agreements F18, K32
    Date: 2023–03–30
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04731483

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