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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2017‒12‒11
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Giuseppe Danese (Católica Porto Business School – CEGE – Universidade Católica Portuguesa) |
| Abstract: | Previous literature has studied waste picking as an economic, social and environmental phenomenon of great importance in countries characterized by ineffective waste collection and recycling programs. The legal foundations of waste picking have, however, received little scholarly attention. Surveys conducted with waste pickers from 5 cities (Bogotá, Pune, Belo Horizonte, Durban, Nakuru) find that existing, and often hostile, regulations and competition from new entrants are key concerns for the waste pickers. In this paper, I argue that any system of legal rules that tries to exclude the waste pickers from the waste value chain results in high transaction costs and risks further aggravating existing social injustices. Several inclusive property right regimes are conceivable, from waste picker ownership of waste to a res nullius (nobody’s property) regime complemented by a right of first possession. Res nullius creates incentives for the stakeholders of waste to specialize in different segments of the collection and recycling chain. Possible drawbacks of this regime are dissipating rents because of open access to waste. |
| Keywords: | property rights, solid waste, waste pickers, informal economy, res nullius |
| JEL: | K11 Q53 O17 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cap:wpaper:022017&r=res |
| By: | Stella Tsani (Athens University of Economics and Business); Phoebe Koundouri |
| Abstract: | Aquaculture production can yield significant economic, social and environmental effects. These exceed the financial costs and benefits aquaculture producers are faced with. We propose a methodology for the development of integrated production models that allow for the inclusion of the socio-economic and environmental effects of aquaculture into the production management. The methodology develops on a Social Cost-Benefit Analysis context and it includes three parts: i) environmental, that captures the interactions of aquaculture with the environment, ii) economic, that makes provision for the incorporation of economic determinants in the production models and iii) social, that introduces the social preferences to the production and management process. Alternatives to address data availability issues are also discussed. The methodology extends the assessment of the costs and benefits of aquaculture beyond pure financial metrics and beyond the quantification of private costs and benefits. It can also support the development of integrated models of aquaculture production that take into consideration both the private and the social costs and benefits associated with externalities and effects not appropriately captured by market mechanisms. The methodology can support aquaculture management and policies targeting sustainable and efficient aquaculture production and financing from an economic, financial, social and environmental point of view. |
| Keywords: | Aquaculture, Production Model, Socio-economic assessment, Environmental Effects, Blue Growth |
| JEL: | Q01 Q22 Q51 B41 |
| Date: | 2017–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aue:wpaper:1708&r=res |
| By: | Tatyana Chesnokova (Waseda Institute for Advanced Study, Waseda University,Tokyo, Japan.); Stephanie F. McWhinnie (School of Economics, University of Adelaide) |
| Abstract: | International fishery access agreements allow fishermen from one country to harvest fish in another country's waters. We empirically examine, using a unique global panel dataset, why countries sign fisheries access agreements with each other and compare these to the characteristics of countries that choose the path of international trade. We show that access agreements and fish exports are driven by two key motives: a pattern of comparative advantage in fishing, which depends on fish stocks and fishing capacities; and gravity factors of economic size and distance. Our results suggest that most gravity factors work similarly for agreements and exports: larger countries that are closer to each other are more likely to sign access agreements or to trade. However, the pattern of advantage is determined differently: source countries with larger fishing capacity are more likely to export fish, while source countries with lower fishing capacity are more likely to sign agreements. |
| Keywords: | International fisheries, access agreements, international trade, empirical |
| JEL: | Q22 Q27 F13 F14 F18 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2017-11&r=res |