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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2010‒09‒11
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Thomas Bernauer (Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS), Institute for Environmental Decisions IED, ETH Zurich); Lena Maria Schaffer (Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS), Institute for Environmental Decisions IED, ETH Zurich) |
| Keywords: | Climate change, Governance |
| JEL: | Q54 |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ied:wpsied:10-12&r=res |
| By: | Matthew A. Cole (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, UK); Robert J.R. Elliott (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, UK); Toshihiro Okubo (Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University) |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the small but growing body of literature which tries to explain why, despite the predictions of some theoretical studies, empirical support for the pollution haven hypothesis remains limited. We break from the previous literature, which tends to concentrate on US trade patterns, and focus on Japan. In common with Ederington et al.’s (2005) US study, we show that pollution haven effects are stronger and more discernible when trade occurs with developing countries, in industries with the greatest environmental costs and when the geographical immobility of an industry is accounted for. We also go one step further and show that our findings relate not only to environmental regulations but also to industrial regulations more generally. |
| Keywords: | Environmental regulations, trade, agglomeration, immobility, industry |
| JEL: | F18 L51 L60 Q56 R3 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2010-22&r=res |
| By: | Giovanni Ganelli; Juha Tervala |
| Abstract: | In this paper we examine the international transmission of environmental policy using a New Keynesian model of the global economy. We first consider the case in which the quality of the environment affects utility, but not productivity. This allows us to look at the trade-off between environmental quality and output. We then consider the case in which the quality of the environment increases productivity but does not affect utility. Our main results show that in both cases a unilateral implementation of a more stringent environmental policy by the domestic country raises foreign welfare under a benchmark parameterization. However, since this policy can have a negative impact on domestic utility but a positive one on world utility, an international coordination problem can arise in the implementation of environmental policy: no country will have an incentive to implement environmental reforms if there is a possibility that its trading partners will do so. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, International Policy Coordination, Open Economy Macroeconomics |
| JEL: | E30 F41 F42 Q50 |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp58&r=res |
| By: | Paul Collier and Anthony J. Venables |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an overview of the relationships between natural resources, governance, and economic performance. The relationships run in both directions, with re-sources potentially altering the quality of governance, and governance being particularly important for resource poor countries. Both these relationships have threshold effects; if governance quality is above a certain level, then natural resources can lead to further improvement, while, below the threshold, further deterioration may take place. Theoretical and empirical work is reviewed, the interactions between the relationships discussed, and policy implications outlined. |
| Date: | 2010–04–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0250&r=res |