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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2010‒07‒10
six papers chosen by |
| By: | Lundgren, Tommy (Umeå School of Business at Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden); Marklund, Per-Olov (Centre for Environmental and Resource Economics (CERE), Umeå University and Swedish University of Agricultural Science, Umeå Sweden) |
| Abstract: | As widely recognized, human mankind stands before the most challenging problem of preventing anthropogenic climate change. As a response to this, the European Union advocates an ambitious climate policy mix. However, there is no consensus concerning the impact of stringent environmental policy on firms’ competitiveness and profitability. From the traditional ‘static’ point of view there are productivity losses to be expected. On the other hand, the so called Porter hypothesis suggests the opposite; i.e., due to ‘dynamic’ effects, ambitious climate and energy policies within the EU could actually be beneficial to firms in terms of enhanced profitability and competitiveness. Based on Sweden’s manufacturing industry, our main purpose is to specifically assess the impact of the CO2 tax scheme of Sweden on firms’ profit efficiency. The empirical methodology is based on stochastic frontier estimations and, in general, the results suggest we can neither reject nor confirm the Porter hypothesis across industry sectors. Therefore, we do not generally confirm the argument of stringent environmental policies having positive dynamic effects that potentially offset costs related to environmental policy. |
| Keywords: | CO2 tax; efficiency; stochastic frontier analysis; Swedish industry |
| Date: | 2010–06–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhb:sicgwp:2010_012&r=res |
| By: | Cardenas, Juan-Camilo; Rodriguez, Luz Angela; Johnson, Nancy |
| Abstract: | The dilemma of collective action around water use and management involves solving both the problems of provision and appropriation. Cooperation in the provision can be affected by the rival nature of the appropriation and the asymmetries in the access. We report two field experiments conducted in Colombia and Kenya. The Irrigation Game was used to explore the provision and appropriation decisions under asymmetric or sequential appropriation, complemented with a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism experiment which looks at provision decisions under symmetric appropriation. The overall results were consistent with the patterns of previous studies: the zero contribution hypotheses is rejected whereas the most effective institution to increase cooperation was face-to-face communication, and above external regulations, although we find that communication works much more effectively in Colombia. We also find that the asymmetric appropriation did reduce cooperation, though the magnitude of the social loss and the effectiveness of alternative institutional options varied across sites. |
| Keywords: | Collective Action, Watersheds, Field Experiments, Colombia, Kenya, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Q0, Q2, C9, H3, H4, |
| Date: | 2009–11–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:ulaedd:91169&r=res |
| By: | Cardenas, Juan-Camilo |
| Abstract: | Behavior in the local commons is usually embedded in a context of regulations and social norms that the group of users face. Such norms and rules affect how individuals value material and non-material incentives and therefore determine their decision to cooperate or over extract the resources from the common-pool. This paper discusses the importance of social norms in shaping behavior in the commons through the lens of experiments, and in particular experiments conducted in the field with people that usually face these social dilemmas in their daily life. Through a large sample of experimental sessions with around one thousand people between villagers and students, I test some hypothesis about behavior in the commons when regulations and social norms constrain the choices of people. The results suggest that people evaluate several components of the intrinsic and material motivations in their decision to cooperate. While responding in the expected direction to a imperfectly monitored fine on over extraction, the expected cost of the regulation is not a sufficient explanatory factor for the changes in behavior by the participants in the experiments. Even with zero cost of violations, people can respond positively to an external regulator that issues a normative statement about a rule that is aimed at solving the social dilemma. |
| Keywords: | social norms, regulations, cooperation, collective action, common-pool resources, experimental economics, field experiments., Public Economics, D71, Q0, Q2, C9, H3, H4, |
| Date: | 2009–11–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:ulaedd:91168&r=res |
| By: | Maldonado, Jorge Hignio; Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar |
| Abstract: | Economic Experimental Games (EEGs), focused to analyze dilemmas associated with the use of common pool resources, have shown that individuals make extraction decisions that deviate from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed whether these deviations towards the social optimum are affected as the stock of resource changes. Performing EEG with local fishermen, we test the hypothesis that the behavior of participants differs under a situation of abundance versus one of scarcity. Our findings show that under a situation of scarcity, players over-extract a given resource, and thus make decisions above the Nash equilibrium; in doing so, they obtain less profit, mine the others-regarding interest, and exacerbate the tragedy of the commons. This result challenges previous findings from the EEG literature. When individuals face abundance of a given resource, however, they deviate downward from the prediction of individualistic behavior. The phenomenon of private, inefficient overexploitation is corrected when management strategies are introduced into the game, something that underlines the importance of institutions. |
| Keywords: | tragedy of the commons intensified, economic experimental games, resource abundance, resource scarcity, dynamic effects, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Land Economics/Use, Public Economics, D01, D02, D03, O13, O54, Q01, Q22, C93, C72, C73, C23, |
| Date: | 2009–10–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:ulaedd:91170&r=res |
| By: | Giamporcaro, Stephanie; Pretorius, Lise; Visser, Martine |
| Abstract: | This paper explores whether any investment products or strategies in South Africa take environmental sustainability into account. By looking at how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria are used in investment decision making, we found that most socially-responsible investment products and responsible investment strategies largely focus on infrastructure, development, and black economic empowerment. Environmental criteria do not yet receive comparable attention from South African asset managers and owners. Mainstreaming responsible investment principles will need to come from either an increase in demand for such practices by asset owners or from company positions on ESG issues. |
| Keywords: | responsible investment, socially responsible investment, pension funds, asset managers, screening, active share ownership |
| JEL: | G23 G28 H23 |
| Date: | 2010–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-17-efd&r=res |
| By: | Alpizar, Francisco; Martinsson, Peter |
| Abstract: | We conducted a field experiment in a protected area to explore the effects of conformity to a social reference versus a comparable, but imposed, suggested donation. As observed before, we see visitors conforming to the changing social reference. On the other hand, the treatment in which we suggested a donation resulted in lower shares of visitors donating, compared to the social reference treatment, and lower conditional donations even compared to the control. We concluded that visitors look at their peers as a reference to conform to, but partially reject being confronted with an imposed suggestion on how to behave. |
| Keywords: | conformity, donation, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D10 D60 Q50 |
| Date: | 2010–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-16-efd&r=res |