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on Regulation |
| By: | Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Petros, Fidel |
| Abstract: | We use a laboratory experiment to investigate whether statements from a governmental institution expressing concerns about price increases trigger such increases by facilitating tacit collusion. Such statements on market conduct are disclosed after an exogenous and unexpected upward cost shock. The two potential channels affecting tacit collusion work through (i) a reduction of strategic uncertainty and (ii) an inducement of correlated beliefs. We find that issued statements of concern become a self-fulfilling prophecy, triggering price increases, and that a reduction in strategic uncertainty drives this adverse effect. Our results suggest that institutions should refrain from publishing such statements of concern |
| Keywords: | beliefs, coordination device, strategic uncertainty, tacit collusion |
| JEL: | C91 C72 L41 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:301157 |
| By: | Woodcock, Ramsi |
| Abstract: | Progressives who respond to conservative law and economic arguments by rejecting neoclassical economic theory are making a mistake because neoclassical economics is the only ideology that honors the modern view—associated with the Death of God narrative in Western culture—that there are no longer universal standards of value. To make a case for redistribution of wealth that appeals to the modern view regarding value—one that progressives themselves hold—progressives must engage with economics. Fortunately, the concept of the gains from trade in neoclassical economics (also known as “surplus” or “economic rent”) allows progressives to make a strong case for redistribution of wealth because the gains from trade do not need to be appropriated by any particular market participant in order for efficiency to prevail in markets. This approach is called “inframarginalism” to contrast it with the conservative view that the valuations of the marginal buyer and seller pin down price in competitive markets and therefore leave progressives no room for redistribution. |
| Date: | 2024–08–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:xghn8 |
| By: | Charles Dennery |
| Abstract: | New Zealand’s productivity level remains markedly below the OECD frontier. Insufficient competition is an important contributor to this performance, as the relatively small number of competitors in New Zealand’s small market contributes to market concentration. Ensuring adequate competition policy settings is important for offsetting these geographic handicaps, foster innovation and support higher living standards. This paper reviews the competition landscape and the recent reforms in several concentrated markets and network sectors and provides recommendations for additional sectoral reforms or inquiries. It also provides recommendations for improving the overall regulatory landscape, including the prerogatives of the Commerce Commission and other government regulators and regulations on business entry and conduct. Finally, it addresses the question of competition enforcement in digital markets, where New Zealand faces some of the same challenges that other OECD economies have to tackle. |
| Keywords: | early childhood, education, New Zealand, primary, secondary |
| JEL: | K2 L4 L7 L8 L9 |
| Date: | 2024–08–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1817-en |
| By: | Imelda (Geneva Graduate Institute and CEPR); Xiaoying Guo (Geneva Graduate Institute) |
| Abstract: | In many developing and emerging economies, frequent power outages are often a consequence of electricity rationing, stemming from the insufficient generation capacity to meet peak demand. In an effort to minimize the disruption caused by sudden power outages, utilities often implement scheduled outages to allow consumers to prepare. However, these planned outages may inadvertently influence criminal behavior and planning. This study investigates the causal relationship between planned electricity outages and crime rates, leveraging a geographic discontinuity in outage duration due to differences in electricity suppliers within the City of Cape Town, South Africa. We compare crime trends in areas served by the municipal grid, which benefits from pumped hydro storage to mitigate outages, with those served by the national grid, where outages are more severe. We find that 10 hours per month more outages lead to an increase of 2.6 percent or eight more crime incidents. The analysis reveals that while overall crime rates are affected, specific types of crime, such as robbery, theft, and violent crime, are particularly sensitive to power outages. Outages caused by electricity rationing create opportunities for certain types of criminal activity, particularly at night. The larger the share of areas affected by severe load shedding, the higher the incidence of crime. Conversely, crimes less related to load shedding, such as commercial and drug-related offenses, are not affected by these outages.This research contributes to the growing body of evidence on the socioeconomic consequences of power outages and highlights the importance of reliable electricity access for public safety and development. |
| Keywords: | outages; developing countries; crime; law enforcement |
| JEL: | O18 O17 K42 |
| Date: | 2024–08–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp18-2024 |
| By: | Jackson Dorsey; Derek C. Wolfson |
| Abstract: | We examine technology adoption and consumer welfare disparities across demographic groups using data from an online solar photovoltaic (PV) marketplace. Low-income households are 25% less likely to purchase solar through the platform and obtain 53% lower expected consumer surplus than high-income households. Moreover, Black and Hispanic households are relatively less likely to purchase solar through the platform and obtain lower consumer surplus than White and Asian households. We develop a method to decompose the drivers of consumer welfare disparities between demographic groups. Differences in demand fully account for the consumer surplus disparities between high- and low-income households and between White and Hispanic households. However, supply-side factors explain 37% of the consumer surplus gap between White and Black households. Black households get relatively fewer bids and face higher prices, and installers have higher implied costs to serve them. Lastly, we assess counterfactuals that offer targeted price discounts to certain demographic groups. |
| JEL: | D22 D44 D63 H23 L11 Q4 Q41 Q48 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32814 |
| By: | Von Arnim, Rudiger; Tröster, Bernhard; Raza, Werner |
| Abstract: | Can consumers trust that the food they buy in the supermarket, even if imported, is not harmful to their health? What would be the consequences if their trust in existing health and safety standards were to be undermined by recognizing lower foreign standards? Against the backdrop of public debates (e.g., on the merits of chlorine-washed chicken, banned in the EU, but legal under the proposed TTIP agreement with the United States), this paper discusses the close link between trust, regulation and international trade. It turns out that as local regulatory systems have evolved, they have created a "generalized trust" that promotes economic activity. Aggressive regulatory harmonization through trade agreements could jeopardize the fragile balance of trust and activity. |
| Keywords: | non-tariff barriers, TTIP, CETA, international treaties, trade agreement |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hbsfof:300717 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Depuis la guerre russe en Ukraine, de nombreux pays européens se sont efforcés de trouver des sources d'énergie alternatives. L'une des réponses consistait à augmenter les importations de gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL). En contournant l'utilisation de gazoducs venant de l'Est en construisant des terminaux GNL, l'UE a ouvert la porte à une plus grande variété de fournisseurs potentiels. Le Partenariat Europe-Afrique pour l'énergie et le climat fournit un cadre pour une alliance gagnant-gagnant. Les pays africains seront des acteurs clé à l'avenir, notamment les pays subsahariens comme le Nigeria, le Sénégal, le Mozambique et l'Angola. Selon le plan REPowerEU, les partenariats hydrogène en Afrique permettront d'importer 10 millions de tonnes d'hydrogène d'ici 2030, remplaçant environ 18 milliards de mètres cube de gaz russe importé. L'Algérie, le Niger et le Nigeria ont récemment convenu de construire un gazoduc transsaharien de 4 128 kilomètres qui traverserait les trois pays jusqu'à l'Europe. Une fois achevé, le gazoduc transportera 30 milliards de mètres cube de gaz par an. La Coalition africaine pour le commerce et l'investissement (ACTING) estime la capacité potentielle d'exportation de GNL subsaharienne à 134 millions de tonnes de GNL (environ 175 milliards de m3) d'ici 2030. L'Afrique subsaharienne devrait également devenir le principal producteur d'hydrogène vert d'ici 2050. Cependant, ce marché reste à développer et nécessite une expansion significative de la production renouvelable et de la disponibilité de l'eau. Cependant, les pays de l'UE et les entreprises concernées seraient bien avisés de prendre note de l'adoption d'objectifs européens beaucoup plus stricts de réduction des gaz à effet de serre pour 2030 et de la publication de la stratégie méthane de la Commission européenne. Cela étant dit, l'UE pourrait risquer de voir plus de la moitié des infrastructures GNL européennes inutilisées d'ici 2030, dans la mesure où la capacité européenne de GNL en 2030 dépasse la demande totale prévue de gaz, y compris le GNL et le gazoduc. Quoi qu'il en soit, il ne faut pas oublier que les pays africains souhaitent et doivent développer en priorité leurs marchés gaziers nationaux et que le potentiel d'exportation dépend de ce développement national. À long terme, un mix énergétique mondial serait nécessaire pour accélérer les changements induits par les nouvelles ressources, les nouvelles technologies et les engagements climatiques. Ces changements dans l'utilisation et la disponibilité des ressources énergétiques affecteraient également l'utilisation des combustibles fossiles. Quoi qu'il en soit, outre l'approvisionnement en GNL, l'UE doit également veiller à augmenter ses propres capacités de stockage afin de pouvoir garantir une réponse rentable à un goulot d'étranglement dans l'approvisionnement en gaz naturel. Cependant, le GNL seul ne suffit pas à assurer la résilience du système en cas de rupture d'approvisionnement. Les ressources énergétiques alternatives et les économies d'énergie restent essentielles. |
| Abstract: | Since Russia's war in Ukraine, many European countries have been scrambling to find alternative energy sources. One of the answers was to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). By bypassing the use of pipelines from the East by building LNG terminals, the EU opened up a wider variety of potential suppliers. The Europe-Africa Energy and Climate Partnership provides a framework for a win-win alliance. African countries will be key players in the future, including sub-Saharan countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, Mozambique and Angola. According to the REPowerEU plan, hydrogen partnerships in Africa will enable the import of 10 million tons of hydrogen by 2030, replacing about 18 billion cubic meters of imported Russian gas. Algeria, Niger and Nigeria recently agreed to build a 4, 128-kilometer trans-Saharan gas pipeline that would run through the three countries to Europe. Once completed, the pipeline will transport 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The African Coalition for Trade and Investment (ACTING) estimates potential sub-Saharan LNG export capacity at 134 million tonnes of LNG (approximately 175 billion m3) by 2030. Sub-Saharan Africa is also expected to become the main producer of green hydrogen by 2050. However, this market remains to be developed and requires significant expansion of renewable production and water availability. However, the EU countries and companies involved would be well advised to take note of the adoption of much stricter EU greenhouse gas reduction targets for 2030 and the publication of the European Commission's methane strategy. That being said, the EU could risk having more than half of Europe's LNG infrastructure idle by 2030, as European LNG capacity in 2030 exceeds total forecast gas demand, including LNG and pipeline gas. Regardless, it should not be forgotten that African countries want and need to develop their domestic gas markets as a priority, and that export potential depends on this domestic development. In the long term, a global energy mix would be needed to accelerate change driven by new resources, new technologies and climate commitments. These changes in the use and availability of energy resources would also affect the use of fossil fuels. Regardless of this, in addition to the LNG supply, the EU must also take care of increasing its own storage capacities to be able to guarantee a cost-efficient response to a natural gas supply bottleneck. However, LNG alone is not enough to ensure the resilience of the system in the event of a supply failure. Alternative energy resources and energy saving remain essential. |
| Abstract: | Seit Russlands Krieg in der Ukraine bemühen sich viele europäische Länder darum, alternative Energiequellen zu finden. Eine der Antworten bestand darin, den Import von Flüssigerdgas (LNG) zu steigern. Durch die Umgehung der Nutzung von Pipelines aus dem Osten mittels des Baus von LNG-Terminals erschloss sich die EU eine größere Vielfalt potenzieller Lieferanten. Die Europa-Afrika-Energie- und Klimapartnerschaft bietet einen Rahmen für eine Win-Win-Allianz. Afrikanische Länder werden in Zukunft zentrale Akteure sein, darunter auch Länder südlich der Sahara wie Nigeria, Senegal, Mosambik und Angola. Dem REPowerEU-Plan zufolge sollen Wasserstoffpartnerschaften in Afrika bis 2030 den Import von 10 Millionen Tonnen Wasserstoff ermöglichen und damit etwa 18 Milliarden Kubikmeter importiertes russisches Gas ersetzen. Algerien, Niger und Nigeria haben sich kürzlich auf den Bau einer 4.128 Kilometer langen Transsahara-Gaspipeline geeinigt, die durch die drei Länder nach Europa führen soll. Nach ihrer Fertigstellung wird die Pipeline 30 Milliarden Kubikmeter Gas pro Jahr transportieren. Die African Coalition for Trade and Investment (ACTING) schätzt die potenzielle LNG-Exportkapazität südlich der Sahara bis 2030 auf 134 Millionen Tonnen LNG (ca. 175 Milliarden m3). Es wird erwartet, dass Afrika südlich der Sahara bis 2050 auch zum Hauptproduzenten von grünem Wasserstoff wird Dieser Markt muss jedoch noch erschlossen werden und erfordert einen erheblichen Ausbau der erneuerbaren Produktion und der Wasserverfügbarkeit. Allerdings wären die beteiligten EU-Länder und Unternehmen gut beraten, die Verabschiedung deutlich strengerer EU-Treibhausgas-Reduktionsziele für 2030 und die Veröffentlichung der Methanstrategie der Europäischen Kommission zur Kenntnis zu nehmen. Außerdem könnte die EU riskieren, dass bis 2030 mehr als die Hälfte der europäischen LNG-Infrastruktur stillgelegt wird, da die europäische LNG-Kapazität im Jahr 2030 den gesamten prognostizierten Gasbedarf, einschließlich LNG und Pipelinegas, übersteigt. Ungeachtet dessen darf nicht vergessen werden, dass die afrikanischen Länder ihre inländischen Gasmärkte vorrangig weiterentwickeln wollen und müssen und dass das Exportpotenzial von dieser inländischen Entwicklung abhängt. Langfristig wäre ein globaler Energiemix erforderlich, um den durch neue Ressourcen, neue Technologien und Klimaverpflichtungen vorangetriebenen Wandel zu beschleunigen. Diese Veränderungen in der Nutzung und Verfügbarkeit von Energieressourcen würden sich auch auf die Nutzung fossiler Brennstoffe auswirken. Unabhängig davon muss sich die EU neben der LNG-Versorgung auch um den Ausbau ihrer eigenen Speicherkapazitäten kümmern, um eine kosteneffiziente Reaktion auf einen Erdgasversorgungsengpass gewährleisten zu können. Allerdings reicht LNG allein nicht aus, um die Widerstandsfähigkeit des Systems im Falle eines Versorgungsausfalls zu gewährleisten. Alternative Energiequellen und Energieeinsparungen bleiben von entscheidender Bedeutung. |
| Keywords: | GNL, économie hydrogène, e-carburant, gaz naturel, Afrique subsaharienne, UE |
| JEL: | E22 E23 F13 F54 L71 L95 N57 Q35 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300910 |
| By: | Jeroen Hinloopen; Stephen Martin; Leonard Treuren |
| Abstract: | Antitrust laws prohibit collusion by private firms, yet many types of interfirm coopera tion are legal. Using laboratory experiments, we study spillovers from legal cooperation in one market to tacit collusion in a different market. Subjects sequentially play two homogeneous goods Bertrand games once against the same opponent. We vary whether subjects can form binding price agreements in the first market. We find that allowing subjects to coordinate their prices in the first market significantly increases prices in the second market, elevating the incidence of non-competitive market prices by more than 60 percent. This shows that repeated interaction and communication are not necessary to achieve non-competitive prices, as long as subjects can form binding agreements in a different market. Additional treatments suggest that commitment and multimarket contact are both necessary and sufficient for spillovers from legal cooperation to tacit collusion to emerge. |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:msiper:746847 |
| By: | Tröster, Bernhard; Von Arnim, Rudiger; Raza, Werner |
| Abstract: | Even though trade negotiations have increasingly come to focus on regulatory issues, the full impacts, that is, both social costs and benefits of regulatory changes, often remain unexamined in trade impact assessments. To bridge this gap, we scrutinize the theoretical foundations, methodologies and policymaking applications of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the context of health and safety regulations. CBA has become the main approach in economics to quantify the social costs and benefits of regulation. Gaining a thorough understanding of CBA processes, their applications and their limitations provides a valuable foundation for our upcoming research, the integration of the broader impacts of regulations into a global trade model. |
| Keywords: | non-tariff barriers, globalisation, international treaties, free-trade agreeements |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hbsfof:300714 |
| By: | Kang, Gusang (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | This study examines how 'killer acquisitions' in the digital platform market have impacted innovation performance post-merger. This analysis focuses particularly on M&As among various types of corporate consolidations by digital platforms. It estimates factors influencing the probability of M&A by digital platforms and uses the technological similarity index between the acquiring digital platform and the acquired company as a key explanatory variable. Then, using the technological similarity index, the analysis categorizes the M&A cases involving digital platforms into 'killer acquisitions' and 'non-killer acquisitions' and compares innovation performance by type of acquisition. The analysis focused on identifying "killer acquisitions" by examining the technology similarity index between firms before and after M&As conducted by GAFAM. Killer acquisitions were defined as those with minimal change in the technology similarity index pre- and post-transaction. The study found that killer acquisitions negatively impact innovation, as measured by a significant decline in the number of patent applications from acquired companies, compared to non-killer acquisitions where patent applications tended to increase post-acquisition. These findings highlight the need for methodologies, such as the technological similarity index, to better identify and regulate such anti-competitive acquisitions in the digital platform sector. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Innovation; killer acquisitions; non-killer acquisitions; M&A |
| Date: | 2024–08–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepwe:2024_025 |
| By: | Yao Lu; Gordon M. Phillips; Jia Yang |
| Abstract: | We examine the rise of cloud computing and AI in China and their impacts on industry dynamics after the shock to the cost of Internet-based computing power and services. We find that cloud computing is associated with an increase in firm entry, exit and the likelihood of M&A in industries that depend more on cloud infrastructure. Conversely, AI adoption has no impact on entry but reduces the likelihood of exit and M&A. Firm size plays a crucial role in these dynamics: cloud computing increases exit rates across all firms, while larger firms benefit from AI, experiencing reduced exit rates. Cloud computing decreases industry concentration but AI increases concentration. On the financing side, firms exposed to cloud computing increase equity and venture capital financing, while only large firms increase equity financing when exposed to AI. |
| JEL: | D25 G3 G34 L20 L23 L25 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32811 |
| By: | Yannick Gabuthy (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Olivier L’haridon (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IUF - Institut universitaire de France - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche) |
| Abstract: | Law and economics primarily focus on various legal rules' capacity to rectify structural inefficiencies stemming from market failures, such as those related to preventive or criminal behaviors. Recent advancements in behavioral economics provide valuable insights into how economic agents respond to the rules they face, offering new perspectives for designing a range of legal rules and procedures. This article provides an overview of these developments as they apply to civil liability regimes, the design of criminal procedure, and criminal policy. |
| Abstract: | Longtemps confinée à l'efficacité de la protection des droits de propriété nécessaires aux échanges de marché, l'analyse économique du droit trouve en grande partie ses origines dans la nécessité de pallier les défaillances de marché associées à la remise en cause des conditions qui rendent leur fonctionnement efficace. Cette branche de l'économie s'intéresse en particulier à la capacité de différentes règles juridiques à corriger les inefficacités structurelles qui en découlent, par exemple en matière de comportements de prévention des risques liés aux activités humaines ou encore de comportements délictuels. Les développements récents de l'économie comportementale apportent un éclairage nouveau sur la réponse des acteurs de l'économie aux règles qui leur sont appliquées, et conduisent en particulier à un renouvellement profond des recommandations de l'économie en matière d'élaboration des règles de droit. Cet article en présente un panorama, appliqué notamment aux régimes de responsabilité civile et aux modalités d'application de la politique pénale. |
| Date: | 2024–01–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-04673346 |
| By: | Nils Wernerfelt; Anna Tuchman; Bradley Shapiro; Robert Moakler |
| Abstract: | Third-party cookies and related ‘offsite’ tracking technologies are frequently used to share user data across applications in support of ad delivery. These data are viewed as highly valuable for online advertisers, but their usage faces increasing headwinds. In this paper, we quantify the benefit to advertisers from using such offsite tracking data in their ad delivery. With this goal in mind, we conduct a large-scale, randomized experiment that includes more than 70, 000 advertisers on Facebook and Instagram. We first estimate advertising effectiveness at baseline across our broad sample. We then estimate the change in effectiveness of the same campaigns were advertisers to lose the ability to optimize ad delivery with offsite data. In each of these cases, we use recently developed deconvolution techniques to flexibly estimate the underlying distribution of effects. We find a median cost per incremental customer at baseline of $38.16 that under the median loss in effectiveness would rise to $49.93, a 31% increase. Further, we find ads targeted using offsite data generate more long-term customers per dollar than those without, and losing offsite data disproportionately hurts small scale advertisers. Taken together, our results suggest that offsite data bring large benefits to a wide range of advertisers. |
| JEL: | L15 L40 L49 L59 M30 M31 M37 M38 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32765 |
| By: | Georgy Malginov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Alexander Radygin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Publication of data according to the System of indicators to assess the effectiveness of state property management began in 2016 in compliance with the RF Government Decree of 29.01.2015 No.72 instead of monitoring of indicators of the public sector of the economy, conducted by Rosstat since the early 2000s based on the RF Government Decree of 4.01.1999 `No.1 (subsequently revised on 30.12.2002). It contains information about the number of federal state unitary enterprises (FSUE) and joint-stock companies (JSCs) with the RF participation in the capital. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, public sector, privatization |
| JEL: | H82 K11 L32 L33 L38 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2024-1333 |