|
on Regulation |
| By: | Martínez Ros, Ester; Kesidou, Effie; García-Quevedo, Jose |
| Abstract: | Building on insights from institutional theory, the resource-based view of the firm, and internationalisation, we seek to explain the variation in the adoption of organisational eco-innovations such as environmental management systems (EMS) across sectors in Spain in the period 2009&-2014. Previous studies on eco-innovation report that regulatory push/pull, technology-push, market-pull, and firm factors are drivers of this process. However, this literature pays relatively little attention to non-technological forms of eco-innovation, such as EMS. As a result, just how EMS adoption can be encouraged across sectors remains unclear in the innovation literature. Here, we seek to address this problem by combining data from the following sources: the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel, the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) survey, the Industry Survey, the Environmental Protection Survey, and the Air Emissions Account. The results of the econometric analysis of panel data reveal that, first, coercive institutional pressures are driving the adoption of EMS reflecting differences across sectors in energy and pollution intensity. Second, the adoption of ISO 9000 &- a highly institutionalised system of quality management &- increases the adoption of EMS in each industry because of complementarities between the two systems. Third, sectors with a high percentage of internationalised firms operate a higher number of EMS. |
| Keywords: | EMS; Panel data; Internationalisation; Institutional theory; Eco-innovation |
| JEL: | Q58 Q50 O30 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:idrepe:27380&r=reg |
| By: | Frederick van der Ploeg; Armon Rezai |
| Abstract: | A simple rule for the optimal global price of carbon is presented, which captures the geo-physical, economic, and ethical drivers of climate policy as well as the effect of uncertainty about future growth of consumption. There is also a discussion of the optimal carbon budget and the amount of unburnable carbon and stranded fossil fuel reserves and a back-on-the-envelope expression are given for calculating these. It is also shown how one can derive the end of the carbon era and peak warming. This simple arithmetic for determining climate policy is meant to complement the simulations of large-scale integrated assessment model, and to give analytical understanding of the key determinants of climate policy. The simple rules perform very well in a full integrated assessment model. It is also shown how to take account of a 2°C upper limit on global warming. Steady increases in energy efficiency do not affect the optimal price of carbon, but postpones the carbon-free era somewhat and if technical progress in renewables and economic growth are strong leads to substantially lower cumulative emissions and lower peak global warming. |
| Keywords: | social cost of carbon, climate ethics, prudence, carbon budget, peak warming, end of carbon era, stranded assets, simple rules, energy efficiency |
| JEL: | H21 Q51 Q54 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:oxcrwp:197&r=reg |
| By: | Matthias Dahm (University of Nottingham, School of Economics); Paula González (Universidad Pablo de Olavide); Nicolás Porteiro (Universidad Pablo de Olavide) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the incentives of a firm to invest in information about the quality of its product and to disclose its findings. If the firm conceals information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is determined by a trade-off. Overall, stricter enforcement reduces the incentives for selective reporting but crowds out information search. Our model implies that there are situations in which the relationship between the two monitoring instruments might be complementary. We also show that the welfare effects of mandatory disclosure depend on how it is enforced and that imperfect enforcement (in which some information remains concealed) might be optimal. In particular, the optimal fine might be smaller than the largest possible fine, even though the latter requires lower resource costs for inspections. |
| Keywords: | strategic information transmission, scepticism, confidence effect, monitoring, penalty, fine, sanction, detection probability |
| JEL: | D82 L15 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:18.09&r=reg |
| By: | Puja Singhal |
| Abstract: | Policy makers have long favored command-and-control (CAC) methods to tackle environmental damage. The number of CAC policies devoted to environmental protection has increased steadily since the 1950s and have been a large part of the overall portfolio of environmental laws andregulation in the industrialized world. Schmitt and Schulze (2011) document that between 1970 and 2011 the two most prevalent EU air-pollution control instruments were CAC in nature. Over 50% of the policy instruments were of the CAC type (regulatory, interventionist, and top-down), with emission limits and technical requirements playing the role of the top two. In China and India, most of the environmental legislation also take the form of explicit directives that levy restrictions on both mobile (vehicular) and stationary sources (factories and combustion plants) of pollution (see Tanaka 2014, Greenstone and Hanna 2014).In the last two decades, there has been a notable increase in research evaluating policy and programs for environmental protection. The design of empirical studies emphasizes causal inference by comparing group of regulated (treated) firms with a comparable control group of firms that were not subject to the treatment. As a result, we now have an improved perspective on the causal effects of environmental policy instruments that address industrial pollution. This review discusses some of the implementation details of prominent CAC type regulations and highlights the lessons learned from the empirical evaluation of these initiatives. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwrup:124en&r=reg |
| By: | Gonzalez Lira, Andres; Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq |
| Abstract: | Attempts to curb illegal activity by enforcing regulations gets complicated when agents react to the new regulatory regime in unanticipated ways to circumvent enforcement. We present a research strategy that uncovers such reactions, and permits program evaluation net of such adaptive behaviors. Our interventions were designed to reduce over-fishing of the critically endangered Pacific hake by either (a) monitoring and penalizing vendors that sell illegal fish or (b) discouraging consumers from purchasing using an information campaign. Vendors attempt to circumvent the ban through hidden sales and other means, which we track using mystery shoppers. Instituting random monitoring visits are much more effective in reducing true hake availability by limiting such cheating, compared to visits that occur on a predictable schedule. Monitoring at higher frequency (designed to limit temporal displacement of illegal sales) backfires, because targeted agents learn faster, and cheat more effectively. Sophisticated policy design is therefore crucial for determining the sustained, longer-term effects of enforcement. Data collected from fishermen, vendors, and consumers allow us to document the upstream, downstream, spillover, and equilibrium effects of enforcement on the entire supply chain. The consumer information campaign generates two-thirds of the gains compared to random monitoring, but is simpler for the government to implement and almost as cost-effective. |
| Keywords: | enforcement; law and economics; Over-fishing; regulation |
| JEL: | K42 L51 O1 |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13114&r=reg |
| By: | Brozovic, Nicholas |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy |
| Date: | 2017–02–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:usao17:260543&r=reg |
| By: | Manzano, Carolina (Rovira i Virgili University); Vives, Xavier (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups each with a finite number of identical bidders. Equilibrium is unique, and the relative market power of a group increases with the precision of its private information but declines with its transaction costs. In line with empirical evidence, we .nd that an increase in transaction costs and/or a decrease in the precision of a bidding group.s information induces a strategic response from the other group, which thereafter attenuates its response to both private information and prices. A "stronger" bidding group -which has more precise private information, faces lower transaction costs, and is more oligopsonistic- has more market power and so will behave competitively only if it receives a higher per capita subsidy rate. When the strong group values the asset no less than the weak group, the expected deadweight loss increases with the quantity auctioned and also with the degree of payoff asymmetries. Market power and the deadweight loss may be negatively associated. |
| Keywords: | demand/supply schedule competition; private information; liquidity auctions; Treasury auctions; electricity auctions; |
| JEL: | D44 D82 E58 G14 |
| Date: | 2017–01–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-1162&r=reg |