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on Regulation |
| By: | Imelda (Department of Economics, University of Hawai‘i at MÄ noa); Matthias Fripp (Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Hawai‘i at MÄ noa); Michael J. Roberts (Department of Economics & Sea Grant, University of Hawai‘i at MÄ noa) |
| Abstract: | On a levelized-cost basis, solar and wind power generation are now competitive with fossil fuels. But supply of these renewable resources is variable and intermittent, unlike traditional power plants. As a result, the cost of using flat retail pricing instead of dynamic, marginal-cost pricing—long advocated by economists—will grow. We evaluate the potential gains from dynamic pricing in high-renewable systems using a novel model of power supply and demand in Hawai’i. The model breaks new ground in integrating investment in generation and storage capacity with chronological operation of the system, including an account of reserves, a demand system with different interhour elasticities for different uses, and substitution between power and other goods and services. The model is open source and fully adaptable to other settings. Consistent with earlier studies, we find that dynamic pricing provides little social benefit in fossil-fuel- dominated power systems, only 2.6 to 4.6 percent of baseline annual expenditure. But dynamic pricing leads to a much greater social benefit of 8.5 to 23.4 percent in a 100 percent renewable power system with otherwise similar assumptions. High renewable systems, including 100 percent renewable, are remarkably affordable. The welfare maximizing (unconstrained) generation portfolio under the utility’s projected 2045 technology and pessimistic interhour demand flexibility uses 79 percent renewable energy, without even accounting for pollution externalities. If overall demand for electricity is more elastic than our baseline (0.1), renewable energy is even cheaper and variable pricing can improve welfare by as much as 47 percent of baseline expenditure. |
| Keywords: | Renewable energy, variable pricing, storage, demand response, optimization |
| JEL: | Q41 Q42 Q53 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201803&r=reg |
| By: | Audrey Berry (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - AgroParisTech - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement) |
| Abstract: | For households, taxing carbon raises the cost of the energy they use to heat their home and to travel. This paper studies the distributional impacts of the recently introduced French carbon tax and the design of compensation measures. Using a microsimulation model built on a representative sample of the French population from 2012, I simulate for each household the taxes levied on its consumption of energy for housing and transport. Without recycling, the carbon tax is regressive and increases fuel poverty. However, I show how compensation measures can offset these impacts. A flat cash transfer offsets tax regressivity by redistributing |
| Keywords: | Carbon tax,Distributional impacts,Fuel poverty,Revenue recycling,Microsimulation |
| Date: | 2018–01–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01691088&r=reg |
| By: | Christian Desmaris (IEP Lyon - Sciences Po Lyon - Institut d'études politiques de Lyon - Université de Lyon, LAET - Laboratoire Aménagement Économie Transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Fabio Croccolo (Dirigente Generale - Ufficio per la regolazione dei Servizi Ferroviari - Ministero delle Infrastrutture e Trasporti) |
| Abstract: | Italy is nowadays the only European country to have organized a head-on competition on its whole high speed railway (HSR) network. This paper discusses the issues of this new market structure for the Italian Rail Regulator, both in terms of regulatory design and economic regulation practices. Such HSR competition and regulation took place in a very specific and ambivalent context (including declining Italian railway demand, negative European macroeconomic environment), together with a new ambitious and innovating private competitor (NTV) and strong reactions from the incumbent (Trenitalia). The Italian Rail Regulator's interventions look like more or less a set of everyday life decisions and empirical trade-off than a duly achieved economic doctrine and policy. The level of access charges seems to be a strategic variable to enlarge the scope for profitable entry in Italy. However, this new context still does not answer the question whether HSR operators reach their economic equilibrium in open access competition. |
| Keywords: | Rail market,Regulation,High-speed,Open access,Competition,Italy |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01825881&r=reg |
| By: | Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez (Department of Economics, University of Málaga); Arnold Polanski (School of Economics, University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | We apply a network approach to analyze individual and aggregate consumption that generates predominately local pollution (e.g., noise, water and air quality, waste disposal sites). This allows us to relate the individual pollution levels to network centralities and to design policy measures aimed at reducing the aggregate contamination. We then apply our theoretical framework to analyze the European data on fossil fuel energy consumption and discuss possible transfer schemes that, according to our model, would result in lower aggregate levels of pollution in the EU. |
| Keywords: | local pollution, negative externalities, networks |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mal:wpaper:2018-6&r=reg |
| By: | Paul Belleflamme; Martin Peitz |
| Abstract: | On many two-sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade. |
| Keywords: | Network effects, two-sided markets, platform competition, intermediation, pricing, imperfect competition |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L86 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_028_2018&r=reg |
| By: | PAWAN KUMAR (SANT LONGOWAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY) |
| Abstract: | Road transport plays a key role in socio- economic development. Most suitable for short and medium distances, it offers a number of advantages such as flexibility, reliability, speed and door to door service. Over the years, share of transport in overall traffic handling has been continuously increasing on the one hand and on the other especially public passenger transport is bearing losses year after year. The present paper is an attempt to find out the reasons of loss making of Pepsu road transport corporation (P.R.T.C) in Punjab. And it has been observed that due to government policies and lethargic attitude of some staff members this is corporation is bearing loss year after year and becoming liability on the government. |
| Keywords: | Passenger Road Transport, polices, pros cons. |
| JEL: | A12 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:5407923&r=reg |
| By: | Chandan Sharma (Associate Professor, Indian Institute of Management Lucknow, India); Vatcharin Sirimaneetham (Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development Division, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) |
| Abstract: | Public-private partnerships are generally defined as a contractual agreement between a public agency and a private entity on a long-term project aimed at providing a public service and infrastructure.1 Examples of public services delivered through PPP are prison services and public parks, while infrastructure can refer to both economic infrastructure, such as electricity and mobile phone networks, and social infrastructure, such as public schools and hospitals. In general, the private entity assumes a large part of the financial and operational risks in a project, while the income could be in the form of user fees of the public service or infrastructure provided. An example is a consortium of private companies that build, operate and maintain a toll road in exchange for toll charges. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unt:pbmpdd:pb72&r=reg |
| By: | Catherine Muller-Vibes (Toulouse Business School); Chantal Roucolle (ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile); Miguel Urdanoz (Toulouse Business School) |
| Abstract: | The pricing policy of airlines is based on revenue management. Revenue management analysts daily observe competitive prices and strategically adjust their own tariffs. One could expect this behavior to lead to a sound homogenization of airline prices evolution while competing on a market. We test empirically whether airline pricing strategies evolve on a similar manner, on a particular set of long-haul routes. Using new and original data including information on ticket prices paid, purchasing and departure dates, we estimate a model for the effect of dynamic factors on the evolution of ticket prices, based on economic theory. We use a 3 rd degree polynomial regression between prices and number of days to departure for each airline operating on the routes, and control for key revenue management variables, competition factors and individual effects. Our results show that competing airlines pricing strategies are statistically distinct during their ticket sale period. Airlines maximize their profits by sequentially increasing or decreasing their prices, but they do so in a non-synchronized fashion, and with different magnitudes. |
| Keywords: | Panel data,Air transportation, Price discrimination, Revenue management |
| Date: | 2018–07–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01822988&r=reg |
| By: | Hyman, Richard |
| Abstract: | Purpose The purpose of this paper is to perform a systematic cross-country comparison of key features of industrial relations in Europe in a context where consolidated post-war institutions are under attack on many fronts. The author discusses a number of key similarities and differences across the countries of Europe, and end by considering whether progressive alternatives still exist. Design/methodology/approach This paper draws upon academic literature and compares the contributions to this special issue in the light of common problems and challenges. Findings The trend towards the erosion of nationally based employment protection and collective bargaining institutions is widely confirmed. In most of Central and Eastern Europe, where systems of organised industrial relations were at best only partially established after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the scope for unilateral dominance by (in particular foreign-owned) employers has been further enlarged. It is also clear that the European Union, far from acting as a force for harmonisation of regulatory standards and a strengthening of the “social dimension” of employment regulation, is encouraging the erosion of nationally based employment protections and provoking a growing divergence of outcomes. However, the trends are contradictory and uneven. Originality/value This paper contributes to an updated cross-country comparative analysis of the ongoing transformations in European industrial relations and discusses still existing progressive alternatives. |
| Keywords: | Europe; Trade unions; Industrial relations; Neoliberalism; Collective bargaining; Globalization; Austerity |
| JEL: | J50 |
| Date: | 2018–02–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:89229&r=reg |
| By: | Stéphane Gauthier (PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne); Fanny Henriet (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Keywords: | Pigovian tax,targeting principle,local externality,pollution,commodity taxes |
| Date: | 2018–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01826330&r=reg |
| By: | Giovanni Marin (Università degli Studi di Urbino 'Carlo Bo', SEEDS - Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies (Università degli Studi di Ferrara)); Marianna Marino (ICN Business School, BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Claudia Pellegrin (EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has introduced a price for carbon, thus generating an additional cost for companies that are regulated by the scheme. The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the effect of the EU ETS on firm-level economic performance. There is a growing body of empirical literature that investigates the effects of the EU ETS on firm economic performance, with mixed results. Differently from the previous literature, we test the effect of the EU ETS on a larger set of indicators of economic performance: employment, average wages, turnover, value added, markup, investment, labour productivity, total factor productivity and ROI. Our results, based on a large panel of European firms, provide a broad picture of the economic impact of the EU ETS in its first and second phases of implementation. Contrarily to the expectations, the EU ETS did not affect economic performance negatively. Results suggest that firms have reacted to the EU ETS by passing-through costs to their customers on the one hand and improving labour productivity on the other hand. |
| Keywords: | European Emission Trading Scheme, economic performance |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01768870&r=reg |
| By: | Dominique Osso (EDF R&D - EDF R&D - EDF - EDF); Catherine Grandclément (EDF R&D GRETS - Groupe de Recherche Energie, Technologie et Société - EDF R&D - EDF R&D - EDF - EDF); Aurélie Tricoire (CSTB - Centre Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment); Marie-Hélène Laurent (EDF R&D - EDF R&D - EDF - EDF); Stanislas Nösperger (EDF R&D - EDF R&D - EDF - EDF) |
| Abstract: | This paper tackles the crucial issue of price structure in the energy retrofit market of the private residential sector. It is based on a quantitative study of retrofit prices in France (1,000+ invoices) and a qualitative sociological survey of installers (25 open-ended interviews). We show a strong dispersion of prices within single retrofit-work categories (e.g. boiler, insulation). Half of the dispersion is explained by technical and economic reasons (brand and quality of product, housing size, type of company, discount…). This means that from a technical standpoint, the price is correct. Other components of the price are revealed by the qualitative survey. On the customer side, the refurbishment market is marked by a strong uncertainty. It is technically complex and there is a concern about poor workmanship, hence the role of reputation and trust. These are factored in the price as a " confidence premium " which makes the price fair from the customers' point of view. On the installer side, the price is formed at the crossroads of three characteristics: the perception of the household willingness to pay, the management practices of the company (profit margin calculation, load plan) and an adjustment to current local market prices. The fair price from the installer point of view is the price that allows his company to survive or make profit and to win new contracts. However, a determining factor of the price lies in the installer's recommendation of exactly which work to do and with which material or equipment. For a given energy performance, several technical solutions exist that impact the final price. To conclude, we note that observed prices may differ from the technically " correct " price but this doesn't mean that prices are inaccurate. Prices incorporate qualitative dimensions such as the accessibility of the site or the work quality of the company (being on-schedule, cleanliness of the work, etc.) that make them " fair " in practice. As a policy consequence, rather than a direct intervention on prices which is complex, governmental action might focus on standardizing the presentation of quotation, craftsmen company management and on assisting customers in their choices. |
| Date: | 2018–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01826167&r=reg |