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on Regulation |
| By: | Christoph Böhringer (University of Oldenburg, Departmentof Economics); Alexander Cuntz (Expert Commission for Research and Innovation, Berlin, Germany); Dietmar Harhoff (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Munich, Germany); Emmanuel A. Otoo (Universtiy of Oldenburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Feed-in tariffs under the Renewable Energy Sources Act, the so - called Erneuerbare - Energien - Gesetz (EEG), have triggered a massive expansion of electricity from renewable energy sources in Germany over the last decade. The increase in non-competitive renewable power generation though went hand in hand with a substantial rise in electricity prices with consumers paying for the renewable energy subsidies. The high cost burden has provoked an intense public debate on the benefits of renewable energy promotion. In this paper, we assess one popular justification for feed-in tariffs, i.e., induced innovation as a positive spillover externality. Based on regressions with a time - technology fixed effect negative binomial model, we find that innovation impacts of feed-in tariffs under the EEG are insignificant. |
| Keywords: | renewable energy promotion, feed-in tariffs, innovation, negative binomial regression |
| JEL: | C23 H23 O38 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:old:dpaper:363&r=reg |
| By: | Kurt R. Brekke (Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics); Tor Helge Holmås (Uni Rokkan Centre); Odd Rune Straume (Universidade do Minho - NIPE) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effects of price regulation and parallel imports in the onpatent pharmaceutical market. First, we develop a theory model in which a pharmacy negotiates producer prices with a brand-name firm and then sets retail prices. We show that the effects of price regulation crucially depend on whether the producer faces competition from parallel imports. While parallel imports improve the bargaining position of the pharmacy, price regulation counteracts this effect and may even be profitable for the producer. Second, we use a unique dataset with information on sales and prices at both producer and retail level for 165 substances over four years (2004-7). Exploiting exogenous variation in the regulated price caps, we show that stricter price regulation reduces competition from parallel imports. While the effect is clearly negative on producer profits for substances without parallel imports, the effect is not significant for substances with parallel imports. Finally, we show that stricterprice regulation reduces total expenditures, but the effect is much stronger for substances with parallel import. Thus, our results suggest that price regulation may promote both static and dynamic efficiency in the presence of parallel imports. |
| Keywords: | Pharmaceutical market; Price regulation; Parallel imports |
| JEL: | I11 I18 L13 L51 L65 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nip:nipewp:01/2014&r=reg |
| By: | Birg, Laura |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes a maximum price system and a reference price system in a vertical differentiation model with a brand-name drug and a generic. In particular, both instruments are compared with respect to their performance in reducing public expenditure, limiting financial exposure of patients, improving access to pharmaceuticals, and stimulating competition. For identical regulatory prices, free pricing under the reference system tends to result in a higher price for the brand-name drug. For identical price reductions of the brand-name drug, the lower reimbursement amount under the reference price system results in lower health expenditure, but higher financial exposure of patients. Total welfare is higher under the maximum price system. -- |
| Keywords: | pharmaceutical regulation,reference price,maximum price,price cap,health,policy objectives |
| JEL: | I18 L50 H51 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:183&r=reg |
| By: | Claire Bergaentzlé (PACTE - Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Grenoble - CNRS : UMR5194 - Université Pierre-Mendès-France - Grenoble II - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I); Cédric Clastres (PACTE - Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Grenoble - CNRS : UMR5194 - Université Pierre-Mendès-France - Grenoble II - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I); Haikel Khalfallah (PACTE - Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Grenoble - CNRS : UMR5194 - Université Pierre-Mendès-France - Grenoble II - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I) |
| Abstract: | Demand side management (DSM) in electricity markets could improve energy efficiency and achieve environmental targets through controlled consumption. For the past 10 years or so DSM programmes have registered significant results. However, detailed analysis of its real impact as observed by a large number of pilot studies suggests that such programmes need to be fine-tuned to suit clearly identified conditions. This study aims to provide recommendations for the instruments to be used to prompt demand response with a view to maximizing energy and environmental efficiencies of various countries. The present study suggests that different DSM models should be deployed depending on the specific generation mix in any given country. Beside the natural benefits from cross-borders infrastructures, DSM improves the flexibility and reliability of the energy system, absorbing some shock on generation mix. We show efficiency increases with demand response but at a decreasing rate. So, according to rebound and report effects, simple DSM tools could be preferred. |
| Keywords: | EU energy policy ; Demand side management ; Energy efficiency |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00928678&r=reg |
| By: | Csizmazia, Roland Attila |
| Abstract: | This case study aims to provide a better understanding of the necessity for regulation in the market for pharmaceuticals and to reveal the impacts of parallel trades in the European Union and how they may affect markets in the future. The pharmaceutical industry up to now has largely been regulated. Although the EU is a single market, it still has variable prices for pharmaceuticals. Consequently, the price gap and other EU-specific factors have created a great environment for parallel trades. The author has confined this study to the price regulations inside the EU before the enlargement in 2004. |
| Keywords: | Regulation, pharmaceutical market, European Union, parallel trade |
| JEL: | D40 |
| Date: | 2013–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:52945&r=reg |
| By: | Sarah Becker; Rolando A. Rodriguez; Gorm B. Andresen; Martin O. W. Greiner; Stefan Schramm |
| Abstract: | Our research is centred around the question how to best integrate the variable renewable energy sources (VRES), wind power and solar photovoltaics, into the European electricity grid. The future electricity supply will be based to a large extend on these fluctuating resources. We have conducted a study, extrapolating national historical and targeted wind and solar power penetrations in Europe up to 100% VRES (R.A. Rodriguez et al, Renewable Energy 63, p. 467, Mar 2014 and S. Becker et al, Energy 64, p. 404, Jan 2014). A high share of VRES means large fluctuations in the generation, causing overproduction and deficits. One way to reduce such mismatches is power transmission spatially smoothing out the fluctuations. This has the potential to reduce the remaining shortages by sharing the surplus production of others. We find that shortages can at maximum be reduced by 40% in the hypothetical case of unlimited transmission capacities across all of Europe. A more realistic extension of the transmission grid, roughly quadrupling today's installation, turns out to be sufficient to harvest 90% of this potential benefit. Finally, the import and export of single countries is investigated. We conclude that a country's load size as well as its position in the network are the determining factors for its import/export opportunities. |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1401.4298&r=reg |
| By: | Christoph Böhringer (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics); Jared C. Carbone (Department of Economics, University Drive NW, Calgary, Canada,); Thomas F. Rutherford (University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA) |
| Abstract: | Unilateral carbon policies are inefficient due to the fact that they generally involve emission reductions in countries with high marginal abatement costs and because they are subject to carbon leakage. In this paper, we ask whether the use of carbon tariffs—tariffs on the carbon embodied in imported goods—might lower the cost of achieving a given reduction in world emissions. Specifically, we explore the role tariffs might play as an inducement to unregulated countries adopting emission controls of their own. We use an applied general equilibrium model to generate the payoffs of a policy game. In the game, a coalition of countries regulates its own emissions and chooses whether or not to employ carbon tariffs against unregulated countries. Unregulated countries may respond by adopting emission regulations of their own, retaliating against the carbon tariffs by engaging in a trade war, or by pursuing no policy at all. In the unique Nash equilibrium produced by this game, the use of carbon tariffs by coalition countries is credible. China and Russia respond by adopting binding abatement targets to avoid being subjected to them. Other unregulated countries retaliate. Cooperation by China and Russia lowers the global welfare cost of achieving a 10% reduction in global emissions by half relative to the case where coalition countries undertake all of this abatement on their own. |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:old:dpaper:360&r=reg |
| By: | Jill R. Horwitz; Daniel Polsky |
| Abstract: | Policymakers often prefer decentralized regulation to central planning because decentralization allows them to better reflect the views of local residents, encourage experimentation, and evaluate various regulatory approaches. These advantages can be undermined, however, when the regulations of one government are affected by those of another. To examine the implications of such externalities, we consider the case of state certificate of need laws (CON), which require providers within the state to obtain licenses before adopting various types of health care technology. In particular, we analyze the cross-border effects of these laws on the number and location of magnetic resonance imaging providers. We find a large effect on the location of providers near borders between unregulated and regulated states. These results provide examples of some of the limitations of using states as policy laboratories as well as the ability of states to use state laws to reflect their local preferences. The results may also help explain conflicting studies on whether and why CON regulation may have failed to control costs and quantity. |
| JEL: | H70 I11 I18 K32 L1 L52 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19801&r=reg |
| By: | Andreas Haller; Christian Jaag; Urs Trinkner |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes whether frequency of delivery and nationwide coverage obligations constitute USO net costs. With no USO on home delivery in place, the USP may be able to increase profits by optimizing its delivery services. Three such optimizations are scrutinized in detail: (1) adjusting the number of weekly delivery days, (2a) discontinuing delivery services to certain areas and (2b) adjusting the place of delivery for households that are particularly costly to serve. The first measure relates to the frequency of delivery obligation, whereas the latter two concern the requirement of nationwide coverage of home delivery. Under robust demand assumptions both frequency and coverage obligations constitute USO net costs. The USO in delivery hence represents binding constraints on operators. |
| Keywords: | Universal service obligation, Postal sector, Net cost, Delivery |
| JEL: | L51 |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chc:wpaper:0041&r=reg |
| By: | Keser, Claudia; Schnitzler, Cornelius |
| Abstract: | Pay-for-performance has been enjoying a growing popularity among healthcare policy makers. It attempts to tie physician payment to quality of care. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we investigate the effect of pay-for-performance on physician provision behavior and patient benefit. For that purpose, we compare two payment systems, a traditional fee-for-service payment system and a hybrid payment system that blends fee-for-service and pay-for-performance incentives. Physicians are found to respond to pay-for-performance incentives. Approximately 89 percent of the participants qualify for a pay-for-performance bonus payment in the experiment. The physicians' relative share of optimal treatment decisions is significantly larger under the hybrid payment system than under fee-for-service. A patient treated under the hybrid payment system is significantly more likely to receive optimal treatment than a fee-for-service patient of matching type and illness. Pay-for-performance in many cases alleviates over- and under-provision behavior relative to fee-for-service. We observe unethical treatment behavior (i.e., the provision of medical services with no benefit to the patient), irrespective of the payment system. -- |
| Keywords: | experimental economics,physician remuneration,pay-for-performance (P4P) |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:173&r=reg |
| By: | Kiran Krishnamurthy, Chandra (CERE, Umeå University); Kriström, Bengt (CERE, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences) |
| Abstract: | Using data from a large, multi-country survey, this paper investigates the determinants of preferences for a completely green residential electricity system. Three important questions are addressed: (i) How much are households willing to pay to use only renewable energy? (ii) Does willingness-to-pay (wtp) vary significantly across household groups and countries? and (iii) What drives the decision to enter the (hypothetical) market for green energy and, given entry, what drives the level of wtp? The analysis here differs from previous ones in the literature in two distinct ways: first, data and analyses are comparable across countries and second, a comprehensive attempt to address censoring and heterogeneity is carried out. The survey data indicate, in common with prior analyses and market experience, a low wtp, about 910%. This study addressed a key aspect: how important is income for understanding wtp, relative to more âattitudinalâ determinants? Surprisingly, income exerts almost no effect on wtp, at the margin; this result is robust to controlling for censoring and heterogeneity. Key determinants of the wtp decision appear to be environmental attitudes, particularly membership in an environmental organization. |
| Keywords: | green electricity; willingness-to-pay; censoring; quantile regression; renewable energy |
| JEL: | C21 C24 Q42 Q51 |
| Date: | 2013–10–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:slucer:2014_007&r=reg |