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on Regulation |
| By: | Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut); Kathleen Segerson (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: A regulatory taking occurs when a government regulation reduces the value of private property to such a degree that the owner is entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. This chapter reviews legal and economic theories aimed at determining when a regulation crosses the compensation threshold. It also assesses the consequences of various compensation rules on the efficiency of land use decisions and government policymaking. |
| Keywords: | Compensation, eminent domain, regulation, takings |
| JEL: | H11 K11 Q28 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-16&r=reg |
| By: | Carsten Burhop (University of Cologne); David Chambers (University of Cambridge); Brian Cheffins (University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | This study of initial public offerings (IPOs) carried out on the Berlin and London stock exchanges between 1900 and 1913 casts doubt on the received �law and finance� wisdom that legally mandated investor protection is pivotal to the development of capital markets. IPOs that resulted in official quotations on the London Stock Exchange performed as well as Berlin IPOs despite the Berlin market being more extensively regulated than the laissez faire London market. Moreover, the IPO failure rate on these two stock markets was lower than it was with better regulated US IPOs later in the 20th century. |
| Keywords: | Law and finance, initial public offering, regulation, investor protection, financial history |
| JEL: | G14 G18 G24 G32 G38 K22 N23 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wso:wpaper:10&r=reg |
| By: | Martin, Elsa; Destandau, Francois; Rozan, Anne |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implication of wetland construction for the cost-effective design of a pesticide charge. A model is developed in order to show that, for a given target, the introduction of wetland construction can reduce overall abatement costs and can lower the input charge asked to the farmers. This result remains true as long as the cost of constructing a wetland is not too high. A numerical illustration is carried out in order to simulate pesticide regulations in a wine catchment in North-East of France |
| Keywords: | water policy, constructed wetlands, agricultural pollution regulation, Agribusiness, Land Economics/Use, Q25, Q58, K32, |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aesc11:108777&r=reg |
| By: | Bruce Owen (Public Policy Program, Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | Only when we understand why open access is necessary can we design an implementation that is responsive to the particular form of market failure that gives rise to the need for regulatory intervention. Otherwise, we are “shooting in the dark.” There are at least two equal access issues: First, should competitors have equal access to each other’s facilities, and second, should competitors have equal access to each other’s entertainment and other content. The answers depend on whether such departures from normal competition policy would enhance consumer welfare. Normal competition policy is to rely on market forces to allocate resources in a way that enhances consumer welfare. Competition generally produces supplier incentives that are compatible with welfare maximization. Centralized allocation and regulation in principle can mirror these incentives, but requires information not usually available to those in charge of the intervention. Regulators are also subject, by design, to political influence. |
| Keywords: | Net neutrality, open access |
| JEL: | I23 |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sip:dpaper:10-013&r=reg |
| By: | Manello Alessandro (University of Bergamo and Ceris - Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, Moncalieri (TO), Italy) |
| Abstract: | this research presents an extension of the directional distance function model to measure performances for firms which produce a large number of pollutants and operate in different industrial sectors. I use this methodology to estimate productivity indexes on a sample of Italian firms that were forced to declare their emissions to the European Pollution Release and Transfer Register in 2007. A proxy for the environmental regulation’s cost is derived and results show a significant impact in term of potential value added lost. Estimations also reveal differences in mean environmental performances among industries; furthermore, the effect of pollution control follows the same path. |
| Keywords: | Directional distance function, Environmental regulation, Polluting industries |
| JEL: | Q50 Q52 Q56 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csc:cerisp:201103&r=reg |
| By: | Tuei, B. Chepkoech |
| Abstract: | Regulation in the dairy industry targets the small scale producers and milk traders with the aim of ensuring that they meet requirements for milk quality control. The paper presents results from a study carried out in Kikuyu division, Central province of Kenya that assessed the challenges and the benefits accrued to on farm clean milk production and the level to which farmers were aware of regulations governing the dairy sector. The farmers were producers of milk only and possessed no milk bar licenses, public health licenses, business producer licenses nor single business licenses. They had little knowledge of laws regulating dairying with 40% identifying Kenya Dairy Board (KDB)as law enforces, 20% as law enforcers and educators while 40% had no knowledge of their mandate. Farmers adopt hygienic milk production and handling if the practices are cost effective and simple to understand. Those who carried out milk production, disease control and facility hygiene were 55% while 21.1% tested for mastitis and another 22.9% able to keep the zero grazing units clean. Information on milk quality control was acquired from extension workers from the Ministry of Livestock development by 52% of the producers, 36% from the veterinary department of the same ministry and 12% through seminars. There is need to develop pro-poor interventions, strengthen infrastructure, farmer groups and security so as to maximize the production of quality and quantity of milk. |
| Keywords: | milk quality control, regulation, Livestock Production/Industries, |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaae10:97077&r=reg |
| By: | Ojo, Marianne |
| Abstract: | Whilst the predecessor (Part I) to this paper addresses criticisms and challenges which have arisen in response to recent Basel Committee's initiatives aimed at addressing capital and liquidity standards, the present paper highlights further measures which are being introduced by the Basel Committee to address such criticisms and challenges. As well as presenting and drawing attention to proposals which could serve as means of addressing challenges presented by liquidity risks, Part I of the paper concludes with the result that market based regulation is an essential and vital tool in the Basel Committee's efforts to address some of the challenges presented by liquidity risks. The present paper highlights the Basel Committee's acknowledgement of this conclusion. Furthermore, it draws attention to other areas which are considered to constitute fertile substrates for purposes of future research. This paper will also illustrate why the potential of banking regulations and disclosure requirements to impact risk taking levels is not only dependent on certain factors such as the dissemination of information to appropriate recipients, appropriate volume of disseminated information, when to disseminate such information, but also on other factors such as ownership structures and effective corporate governance measures aimed fostering monitoring, supervision and accountability. In arguing that additional leverage ratios which have recently been proposed by the Basel Committee will play a key role in facilitating the diversification of banks‘ liquid assets – via the new liquidity standards (Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio), contribution is also made to the current discussion on the resilience of the banking sector – albeit from the perspective of the stabilisation of the entire system. |
| Keywords: | liquidity risks; systemic risks; capital; standards; Basel III; moral hazard; disclosure; information; Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR); Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR); accountability; corporate governance |
| JEL: | K2 E32 G3 D8 |
| Date: | 2010–12–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:32630&r=reg |
| By: | Jean-Baptiste Gossé (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII - CNRS : UMR7234); Dominique Plihon (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII - CNRS : UMR7234) |
| Abstract: | This article provides insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe. To preserve financial stability, Europe has to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance. Among the five scenarios we defined, three achieve financial stability both inside and outside Europe. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the multi-polar scenario is the worst because it necessitates coordination at the global level which implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: (i) this level of coordination seems much more realistic than the global one; (ii) the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the "European government" might gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of cooperation with the rest of the world. |
| Keywords: | Financial Stability, Supervision and Regulation, Financial Integration |
| Date: | 2011–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cepnwp:hal-00613251&r=reg |
| By: | Alistair Ulph; David Ulph |
| Abstract: | We analyse the optimal design of climate change policies when a government wants to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the relevant carbon taxes (or other environmental policies) that would incentivise such investment by firms will be set in the future. We assume that the current government cannot commit to long-term carbon taxes, and so both it and the private sector face the possibility that the government in power in the future may give different (relative) weight to environmental damage costs. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect: it increases the incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest. Consequently the current government may need to use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required investment. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change; Emissions Taxes; Impact on R&D; Timing and Commitment |
| JEL: | H23 Q54 Q55 Q58 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:wpecon:1104&r=reg |
| By: | Gupta, Abhijit Sen (Asian Development Bank Institute) |
| Abstract: | Despite having a low exposure to the toxic assets involved in the sub-prime crisis and a gradualist approach towards liberalization of the financial sector, certain parts of the Indian financial sector were significantly affected by the global financial crisis. Though Indian policymakers reacted in a proactive manner and introduced a host of measures to counter the adverse effects of the financial crisis, the recovery has not been uniform; several markets and sectors are still reeling from the crisis’ aftershocks. The proposed Basel III norms are going to have a significant impact on the Indian financial sector. |
| Keywords: | india global financial crisis; indian financial sector; basel iii norms |
| JEL: | F41 G15 O11 |
| Date: | 2011–08–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0303&r=reg |
| By: | Heinrich, Barbara; von Cramon-Taubadel, Stephan |
| Abstract: | Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are an externality of the pork production process. To respond to climate change concerns and reduce GHG emissions, internalizing this external effect using a market-based economic instrument would be economically efficient. We calculate the welfare effects of GHG emissions using a partial equilibrium model of the German pork market. Sensitivity analysis is used to investigate the impacts of emission prices and emission rates on the welfare effects of reducing GHG emissions. Potential overall welfare gains amount to roughly ⬠360,000 in the base setting and increase to roughly ⬠3 million when emission prices are tripled. This sensitivity highlights the need for more dependable estimates of key parameters such as emission prices and emission rates. However, even the largest estimates of these welfare gains are relatively small. By contrast, the distributional effects of internalizing GHG externalities in pork production for producers, consumers and the state are large in all scenarios. The large redistribution effects that follow from even a small pork price increase as a result of internalizing GHG emissions indicate that attempts to tie German pork production into such policies would be highly controversial but may create incentives to invest in technologies which mitigate GHG emissions. |
| Keywords: | Welfare effects, greenhouse gas emissions, pork production, partial equilibrium model, Environmental Economics and Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, H23, Q18, Q54, |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aesc11:108793&r=reg |
| By: | de Vries, Frans P.; Dijkstra, Bouwe R.; McGinty, Matthew |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emis- sions trading in a two-sector (clean and dirty) economy. We compare the welfare implica- tions of an absolute cap-and-trade scheme (permit trading) with a relative intensity-based scheme (credit trading). We nd unambiguously more clean rms in the long run under credit trading. However, neither emissions trading con guration creates the rst-best out- come: there are too few (many) clean rms under permit (credit) trading. Permit trading dominates credit trading in terms of overall welfare at the long run equilibrium, except when policy is relatively lenient. It is also demonstrated that stricter policy does not necessarily induce the clean sector to grow relative to the dirty sector and we determine under what conditions this holds. |
| Keywords: | sectoral dynamics; pollution control; industrial change; imperfect competition; emissions trading |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stl:stledp:2011-15&r=reg |
| By: | Vincent A.C. van den Berg (VU University Amsterdam); Erik T. Verhoef (VU University Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | We study road supply by competing firms between a single origin and destination. In previous studies, firms simultaneously set their tolls and capacities while taking the actions of the others as given in a Nash fashion. Then, under some widely used technical assumptions, firms set a volume/capacity ratio that is socially optimal, and thus the level of travel time or service quality is socially optimal. We find that this result does not hold if capacity and toll setting take place in separate stages, as then firms want to limit the toll competition by setting lower capacities; or when firms set capacities one after another in a Stackelberg fashion, as then firms want to limit their competitors' capacities by setting higher capacities. In our Stackelberg competition, the firms that act last have few if any capacity decisions to influence. Hence, they are more concerned with the toll-competition substage, and set a higher volume/capacity ratio than sociall y optimal. The firms that act first care more about their competitors' capacities that they can influence: they set a lower volume/capacity ratio. So the first firms to enter have a too short travel time from a social perspective, and the last firms a too long travel time. The average private travel time is shorter than socially optimal. Still, in our numerical model, for three or more firms, welfare is higher under Stackelberg competition than under Nash competition, because of the larger total capacity and lower tolls. |
| Keywords: | Private Road Supply; Oligopoly; Nash Competition; Stackelberg Competition; Service Quality; Volume/Capacity ratio; Traffic Congestion; Congestion Pricing |
| JEL: | D62 L13 R41 R42 R48 |
| Date: | 2011–05–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110079&r=reg |
| By: | Ferrara, Andreas; Lange, Ian |
| Abstract: | In the last decade, voluntary environmental programs have increased considerably in scope. A novel use of these programs is to di¤use new technology in industry as means to improving their environmental outcomes. This paper tests whether the US Environmental Protection Agency s Combined Heat-and-Power Partnership has encouraged the installation of CHP applications since its start in 2001. Two hypotheses are tested here, whether (i) the Partnership has encouraged the installation of CHP applications and (ii) if the partnership has encouraged utilization of CHP once installed. Using nearest neighbor matching on data for electricity plants in the US, results nd weak evidence that the program has helped CHP system spread, controlling for the selection of rms into the partnership. |
| Keywords: | Fossil Fuels; Combined Heat and Power; Voluntary Environmental Measure s |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stl:stledp:2011-16&r=reg |
| By: | Delpeuch, Claire; Leblois, Antoine; Swinnen, Johan F.M. |
| Abstract: | The cotton sector has been amongst the most regulated in Africa, and still is to a large extent in West and Central Africa (WCA), despite repeated reform recommendations by international donors. On the other hand, orthodox reforms in East and Southern Africa (ESA) have not always yielded the expected results. This paper uses a stylized contracting model to investigate the link between market structure and equity and efficiency in sub-Saharan cotton sectors and analyze the potential consequences of orthodox reforms in WCA. We argue that the level of the world price and of government intervention, the degree of post-reform competition, as well as the degree of parastatal inefficiency, all contribute to making reforms less attractive (but not less pressing) to farmers and governments in WCA today, as compared to ESA in the 1990s. We illustrate our arguments with empirical observations on the performance of cotton sectors across sub-Saharan Africa. |
| Keywords: | Sub-Saharan Africa, cotton reforms, self-enforcing contracts, Crop Production/Industries, Q12, L33, O12, |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaae10:96176&r=reg |
| By: | David I. Stern (Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University); John C. V. Pezzey (Fenner School of the Environment and Society, The Australian National University); N. Ross Lambie (Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University) |
| Abstract: | Countries with low marginal costs of abating carbon emissions may have high total costs, and vice versa, for a given climate mitigation policy. This may help to explain different countries' policy stances on climate mitigation. We hypothesize that, under a common percentage cut in emissions intensity relative to business as usual (BAU), countries with higher BAU emissions intensities have lower marginal abatement costs, but total costs relative to output will be similar across countries; and under a common carbon price, relative total costs are higher in emissions-intensive countries. Using the results of the 22nd Energy Modeling Forum, we estimate marginal abatement cost curves for the US, EU, China, and India, which we use to estimate marginal and total costs of abatement under a number of policy options currently under international debate. The results of this analysis provide support for our hypotheses. |
| JEL: | Q52 Q54 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:ccepwp:1111&r=reg |