|
on Regulation |
|
Issue of 2007‒01‒23
eight papers chosen by Christian Calmes Universite du Quebec en Outaouais, Canada |
| By: | Theocharis N. Grigoriadis (The European Union Delegation to Russia); Benno Torgler (University of California) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relative impact of regional energy production on the legislative choices of Russian Duma deputies on energy regulation between 1994 and 2003. We apply Poole’s optimal classification method of roll call votes using an ordered probit model to explain energy law reform in the first decade of Russia’s democratic transition. Our goal is to analyze the relative importance of home energy on deputies’ behavior, controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandate, committee membership and socio-demographic parameters. We observe that energy resource factors have a considerable effect on deputies’ voting behavior. On the other hand, we concurrently find that regional economic preferences are constrained by the public policy priorities of the federal center that continue to set the tone in energy law reform in post-Soviet Russia. |
| Keywords: | Energy Regulation, Energy Roll Law Reform, Energy Resources, Roll Call Votes, Legislative Politics, State Duma, Russia |
| JEL: | Q40 D72 K23 P27 P37 P31 R11 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.146&r=reg |
| By: | Stijn Claessen; Valentina Bruno |
| Abstract: | For a large number of companies from different countries, we analyze how company corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of company valuation. We confirm that corporate governance plays a crucial role in efficient company monitoring and shareholder protection, and consequently positively impacts valuation. We find substitution in valuation impact between corporate governance measures at the company and country level, with a possibility of over-regulation. Corporate governance appears also more valuable for companies that rely heavily on external financing, consistent with the hypothesis that corporate governance main role is to protect external financiers. |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp574&r=reg |
| By: | Sijbren Cnossen |
| Abstract: | This paper provides estimates of the external costs of harmful alcohol use in the European Union (EU) and confronts them with the alcohol excise duty collections per adult and per litre of pure alcohol in the various Member States. In all but one Member State, drinkers do not appear to pay their way. This reflects the EU’s acquiescence in a formidable alcohol problem. Fifteen per cent of adults ‘drink too much’, while the extent of youth drinking has reached alarming proportions. The external costs should be internalised in price through an appropriate optimal alcohol excise duty, supplemented by regulatory measures aimed at specific problem groups. Further, a coordinated alcohol tax policy seems called for, which would, among others, raise the minimum duties on wine, beer and spirits, preferably in line with their relative alcohol content. A drawback of these measures is that they would reduce the welfare of moderate drinkers. |
| Keywords: | alcohol taxation; European Union; external costs; social costs |
| JEL: | H2 H8 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:76&r=reg |
| By: | Zoltán Varsányi (Magyar Nemzeti Bank) |
| Abstract: | The present regulation of concentration risk does not take into consideration recent, sophisticated methods in credit risk quantification; the new Basle Capital Accord has left the regulatory treatment unchanged. Recently, substantial work has begun within the EU on this issue with the formation of the Working Group on Large Exposures within CEBS. The present paper is concerned with the models available under Basle 2 for credit risk quantification: it is searching for tools that can be applied in a new regime in general and that are capable of replicating the riskiness of credit portfolios with risk concentrations - an area that the original Basel model does not cover. The main idea of the paper is to disassemble nongranular portfolios into homogenous parts whose loss can then be directly simulated - taking into consideration the correlation between the parts - without the need to simulate single exposures. This makes the calculation of portfoliowide loss very fast. |
| Keywords: | Basel regulation, multifactor model, NORTA, numerical integration. |
| JEL: | C15 G28 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnb:wpaper:2006/11&r=reg |
| By: | Silvester van Koten |
| Abstract: | When a bidder (referred to as the privileged bidder) is residual claimant to a part of the revenue from an auction with two bidders whose valuations are independently and identically distributed, bidding incentives are changed. Specifically, the privileged bidder will bid more aggressively to increase the auction revenue. Indeed, the privileged bidder is more likely to win the auction and the good is sold for a higher price. However, since the auction is now inefficient, welfare is decreased. These results are of interest for regulators of the EU electricity industry. The extant EU regulatory framework allows for profits from new cross-border transmission lines (socalled interconnectors) to be unregulated and for incumbent Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs) to have ownership of generating and transmission activities. When electricity generators have to secure transmission rights in an auction, the VIU, because of its combined ownership of generation and transmission activities, is in the position of a privileged bidder. The VIU will secure a higher profit, while competing electricity generators will earn less because they are less likely to gain transmission rights and, in any case, pay a higher price for it. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric auctions, bidding behavior, electricity markets, regulation,vertical integration. |
| JEL: | L43 L51 L94 L98 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp313&r=reg |
| By: | Helena Suvova; Eva Kozelkova; David Zeman; Jaroslava Bauerova |
| Abstract: | The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1999 issued a draft New Basel Capital Accord (Basel 2). Its principles are to be incorporated into the European legislation and into the Czech banking regulations. The Standardised Approach to calculating the capital requirement for credit risk is newly based on external credit assessments (ratings). Banking regulators and supervisors have to be prepared for the process of determining eligible credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) and will have to elaborate a formal recognition procedure. This paper investigates the approaches a supervisor may apply to ECAI recognition and elaborates on the criteria of recognition. First, the paper reviews the available rating agencies on the market (including their rating penetration on the Czech market), their best practices and the experience with the use of their ratings for regulatory purposes. Second, drawing on international experience and the proposed Basel 2 rules, we outline the fundamental supervisory approaches to recognition, including the legal aspects thereof, and analyse their pros and cons and the frontiers of supervisory decision making. Third, we outline the rules for recognition, including requirements or expectations (e.g. soft limits), documentation and typical interview questions with the potential candidates. We find the CNB's approach to be in compliance with CEBS Consultative Paper CP07 (issued for public consultation in June 2005). |
| Keywords: | Basel capital accord, Basel II, Credit rating, default, eligibility criteria, eligibility evaluation, external credit assessment institution (ECAI), export credit agency (ECA), mapping rating grades, market acceptance of ECAIs, rating agency, recognition process |
| JEL: | E65 G21 G18 |
| Date: | 2005–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cnb:rpnrpn:2005/03&r=reg |
| By: | Benno Torgler; Friedrich Schneider |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses how tax morale and countries’ institutional quality affect the shadow economy, controlling in a multivariate analysis for a variety of potential factors. The literature strongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of these factors to understand the level and changes of shadow economy. Relatively new available data sources offer the unique opportunity to shed more light in the understanding of a topic that has received an increased attention. We find strong support that a higher tax morale and a higher institutional quality lead to a smaller shadow economy. |
| Keywords: | Shadow economy; tax morale; institutional quality; government intervention; corruption. |
| JEL: | D73 D78 H2 H26 O17 O5 |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2007-01&r=reg |
| By: | Valérie Paris; Elizabeth Docteur |
| Abstract: | This paper describes and assesses pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies in Canada, considering them in the context of the broader policy and market environment in which they operate, and investigating their role in contributing to Canada’s achievements in meeting a range of objectives relating to the pharmaceutical policy. The federal government regulates prices of patented pharmaceutical products with the objective of protecting consumers against excessive prices. Regulation has very likely been responsible for bringing Canada’s prices for patented medicines roughly in line with European comparators. Prices of generic products, which are not regulated, are relatively high although high... <BR>Ce document décrit et évalue les politiques de prix et de remboursement des médicaments au Canada, en les situant dans le contexte politique et l’environnement de marché dans lesquels elles s’inscrivent ; et en observant leur rôle dans l’atteinte des objectifs relatifs à la politique pharmaceutique canadienne. Le gouvernement fédéral régule les prix des médicaments brevetés dans le but de protéger les consommateurs de prix excessifs. Cette régulation a très probablement eu pour effet d’amener les prix des médicaments brevetés canadiens au niveau des prix des pays européens auxquels le Canada se compare. Les prix des médicaments génériques, qui ne sont pas régulés, sont relativement élevés malgré une forte pénétration des... |
| Keywords: | Canada, Canada, pharmaceutical policy, politique pharmaceutique, pricing and reimbursement, prix et remboursement, pharmaceutical market, marché pharmaceutique |
| JEL: | I11 I18 |
| Date: | 2006–12–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:elsaad:24-en&r=reg |