|
on Regulation |
| By: | Eliana Viviano (Banca d'Italia) |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes the relationship between barriers to entry and employment in the Italian retail trade sector. In Italy the opening of large outlets is regulated at the regional level. By using differences-in-differences estimators I study the effects of the rules implemented in Abruzzo and Marche, two otherwise close and similar Italian regions, that adopted very different policies: the first set tight restrictions on the opening of large stores; the second did not impose substantial entry barriers. The results show that entry barriers have a negative and sizeable impact on employment growth. Some evidence is also found that fiercer competition encourages the development of more efficient small retail trade shops. These findings are robust to a number of checks. |
| Keywords: | entry barriers, employment growth, differences-in-differences estimator |
| JEL: | J21 J23 K23 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_594_06&r=reg |
| By: | Lars P. Feld |
| Abstract: | The impact of regulatory competition on policy outcomes and particularly on policy innova-tion is widely debated among scientists from different fields as well as among policymakers. In this paper, Swiss cantonal regulation is studied in order to gain further insights into the policy impact of regulatory competition and harmonization. Starting from a theoretical per-spective that particularly emphasizes the beneficial impact of inter-jurisdictional competition on policy innovations, and a discussion of the existing empirical evidence on regulatory com-petition, the development of the common market, regulatory competition and harmonization in Switzerland across time is analyzed. In an econometric analysis of the extent of regulation at the Swiss cantonal level, some indicative empirical evidence on the main determinants of Swiss cantonal regulation is derived. |
| Keywords: | Regulatory Competition; Political Innovation; Corporatist Protectionism |
| JEL: | H11 H71 D72 J23 K31 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-22&r=reg |
| By: | Philippe Mossé (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - [CNRS : UMR6123] - [Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille I][Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II]) |
| Abstract: | Inscrite dans les réformes, tout en accompagnant des évolutions professionnelles et organisationnelles endogènes, la régulation de l'hôpital combine deux dynamiques : de rationalisation et de légitimation. Mais elle repose sur une pluralité de logiques et de sens dont le seul calcul rationnel a du mal à rendre compte. La première partie présentera une analyse des principaux éléments du contexte socioéconomique<br />de la régulation de l'hôpital. La deuxième décrira les deux principaux “ référentiels ” de cette régulation. En conclusion, on montrera ce que cette configuration ouvre ou non en matière de recompositions des paysages hospitaliers. |
| Keywords: | Hôpital; Régulation; Politique hospitalière; Réforme hospitalière; Modernisation du service public; France |
| Date: | 2006–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00084545_v1&r=reg |
| By: | Antonio Acconcia (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Claudia Cantabene (Università di Napoli Federico II) |
| Abstract: | During the first half of the 1990s a pool of Italian judges carried out an investigation, named Mani Pulite (literally clean hands), that led many people to be prosecuted and convicted because of corruption. The impact of Mani Pulite was so much influential that since then many indicators suggest a steadily decreasing path for bureaucratic corruption in Italy. This paper shows that Mani Pulite was mainly effective in deterring corruption as it broke up the feed due to infrastructure investments, mainly those related to public buildings, sanitation, and land reclamation. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Public Investment, Deterrence |
| JEL: | D73 H54 K42 |
| Date: | 2006–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:159&r=reg |
| By: | Newell, Richard G. (Resources for the Future); Pizer, William A. (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Seminal work by Weitzman (1974) revealed that prices are preferred to quantities when marginal benefits are relatively flat compared to marginal costs. We extend this comparison to indexed policies, where quantities are proportional to an index, such as output. We find that policy preferences hinge on additional parameters describing the first and second moments of the index and the ex post optimal quantity level. When the ratio of these variables’ coefficients of variation divided by their correlation is less than two, indexed quantities are preferred to fixed quantities. A slightly more complex condition determines when indexed quantities are preferred to prices. Applied to the case of climate change, we find that quantities indexed to GDP are preferred to fixed quantities for about half of the 19 largest emitters, including the United States and China, while (consistent with previous work) prices dominate for all countries. |
| Keywords: | price, quantity, regulation, uncertainty, policy, environment, climate change |
| JEL: | Q28 D81 C68 |
| Date: | 2006–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-06-32&r=reg |
| By: | Per Pettersson-Lidbom |
| Abstract: | Previous empirical studies have found a positive relationship between the size of legislature and the size of government. Those studies, however, do not adequately address the concerns of endogeneity. In contrast, this paper uses variation in legislature size induced by statutory council size laws in Finland and Sweden to estimate the causal effect of legislature size on government size. These laws create discontinuities in council size at certain known thresholds of an underlying continuous variable, which make it possible to generate ?near experimental? causal estimates of the effect of council size on government size. In contrast to previous findings, I find a negative relationship between council size and government size: on average, spending and revenues are decreased by roughly 0.5 percent for each additional council member. |
| Keywords: | government size, legislature, regression-discontinuity design, natural experiment |
| JEL: | H00 H30 E60 P16 D70 K10 H10 C90 H70 |
| Date: | 2004–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fer:dpaper:350&r=reg |