|
on Regulation |
| By: | Bilin Neyaptý; Nergiz Dinçer |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bil:bilpap:0503&r=reg |
| By: | Cagla Okten Hasker; Kevin Hasker |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bil:bilpap:0514&r=reg |
| By: | Agarwal Anurag K; Jain D. Harsh |
| Abstract: | Enterprises, the world over, now conduct business on a dramatically more international scale. The growth of world economies is directly connected with millions of commercial contracts, which are becoming more international in character owing to global integration. Commercial arbitration has been hailed as the most efficient form of dispute settlement available to participants in international trade. As the purpose of the commercial arbitration is to resolve commercial disputes, often issues have been raised whether a particular dispute is commercial or not. With globalisation and seamless trade the aspirations of global business community, it would be of immense importance to understand the meaning of ‘commercial’ as construed in ‘international commercial arbitration’ in some of the major jurisdictions of the world. |
| Keywords: | Arbitration, Commercial, Liberal Construction, Model Law, New York Convention |
| Date: | 2006–04–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iim:iimawp:2006-04-10&r=reg |
| By: | Henrik Winterhager (ZEW Mannheim); Anja Heinze (ZEW Mannheim); Alexander Spermann (ZEW Mannheim, University of Freiburg and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Job placement vouchers can be regarded as a tool to spur competition between public and private job placement activities. The German government launched this instrument in order to end the public placement monopoly and to subsidize its private competitors. We exploit very rich administrative data provided for the first time by the Federal Employment Agency and apply propensity score matching as a method to solve the fundamental evaluation problem and to estimate the effect of the vouchers. We find positive treatment effects on the employment probability after one year of 6.5 percentage points in Western Germany and give a measure for deadweight loss. |
| Keywords: | job placement, Active Labor Market Policy, matching |
| JEL: | J68 H25 |
| Date: | 2006–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2109&r=reg |
| By: | Stéphane Auray; Thomas Mariotti; Fabien Moizeau |
| Abstract: | We investigate the design of incentives for public good quality provision in a dynamic regulation setting in which maintenance efforts and quality shocks have durable effects. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetries of information can lead to over-provision of quality under optimal regulation, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction motive. When the regulator hires a single agent to manage public good quality, over-provision of quality can also occur as a result of quality pooling, which typically occurs if quality depreciates slowly and the discount factor is large. We further show that for small levels of asymmetric information, the regulator prefers to hire a single agent rather than to contract with a sequence of agents, provided all parties can commit to a long-term contract. When no such commitment is feasible, the fact that quality physically links periods together leads to a ratchet effect even when private information is recurring, and shorter franchises are beneficial from a social point of view. |
| Keywords: | Quality, Regulation, Asymmetric Information |
| JEL: | D82 L15 L51 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0610&r=reg |
| By: | Amy Finkelstein; James Poterba; Casey Rothschild |
| Abstract: | This paper shows how models of insurance markets with asymmetric information can be calibrated and solved to yield quantitative estimates of the consequences of government regulation. We estimate the impact of restricting gender-based pricing in the United Kingdom retirement annuity market, a market in which individuals are required to annuitize tax-preferred retirement savings but are allowed considerable choice over the annuity contract they purchase. After calibrating a lifecycle utility model and estimating a model of annuitant mortality that allows for unobserved heterogeneity, we solve for the range of equilibrium contract structures with and without gender-based pricing. Eliminating gender-based pricing is generally thought to redistribute resources from men to women, since women have longer life expectancies. We find that allowing insurers to offer a menu of contracts may reduce the amount of redistribution from men to women associated with gender-blind pricing requirements to half the level that would occur if insurers were required to sell a single pre-specified policy. The latter "one policy" scenario corresponds loosely to settings in which governments provide compulsory annuities as part of their Social Security program. Our findings suggest that recognizing the endogenous structure of insurance contracts is important for analyzing the economic effects of insurance market regulations. More generally, our results suggest that theoretical models of insurance market equilibrium can be used for quantitative policy analysis, not simply to derive qualitative findings. |
| JEL: | D82 H55 L51 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12205&r=reg |
| By: | Juan Prieto Rodríguez (Universidad de Oviedo); Juan Gabriel Rodríguez (Universidad Rey Juan Carlos); Rafael Salas (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) |
| Abstract: | Standard wage discrimination models assume that independent observers are able to distinguish a priori which workers are suffering from discrimination. However, this assumption may be inadequate when severe penalties can be imposed on discriminatory employers. Antidiscrimination laws will induce firms to behave in such a way that independent observers (for instance, lawyers, economists) cannot easily detect discriminatory practices. This problem can be solved by estimating the discriminatory wage gap using finite mixture or latent class models because these procedures do not require the a priori classification of workers. In fact, the standard discrimination model can be seen as a particular case of our method when the probabilities of belonging to a group are fixed (to one or zero). We estimate discrimination coefficients for Germany and United Kingdom using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). We obtain unambiguous higher discrimination in Germany for a wide set of measures |
| Keywords: | discrimination; wages; latent class model; finite mixture models. |
| JEL: | J60 J70 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2006-38&r=reg |
| By: | Laura Valkonen |
| Keywords: | deregulation, competition, productivity, entry |
| JEL: | L51 D21 O30 K23 L80 |
| Date: | 2006–05–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:dpaper:1014&r=reg |
| By: | Thomas J. Miceli (Department of Economics, University of Connecticut); Richard P. Adelstein (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University) |
| Abstract: | The doctrine of fair use allows limited copying of creative works based on the rationale that copyright holders would consent to such uses if bargaining were possible. This paper develops a formal model of fair use in an effort to derive the efficient legal standard for applying the doctrine. The model interprets copies and originals as differentiated products and defines fair use as a threshold separating permissible copying from infringement. The analysis highlights the role of technology in shaping the efficient standard. Discussion of several key cases illustrates the applicability of the model. |
| Keywords: | Fair use, Copyright law, Technological improvement |
| JEL: | K11 O34 |
| Date: | 2005–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wes:weswpa:2005-014&r=reg |
| By: | Ralph-C Bayer (School of Economics, University of Adelaide); Julia Kupzowa |
| Abstract: | We present a simple model of corporate tax evasion allowing for potentially bad governments that abuse their fiscal powers to extort monies from firms. Our model shows that the potential existence of extortionist governments provides incentives for corporate tax evasion and increases enforcement costs. |
| Keywords: | Tax Evasion, Extortion, Corporate Taxation. |
| JEL: | H26 H11 D82 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2006-08&r=reg |