nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2005‒10‒08
nine papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada

  1. Does Financial Liberalization Improve the Allocation of Investment? Micro Evidence from Developing Countries By Arturo Galindo; Fabio Schiantarelli; Andrew Weiss
  2. Factor Adjustments After Deregulation: Panel Evidence from Colombian Plants By Marcela Eslava; John Haltiwanger; Adriana Kugler; Maurice Kugler
  3. Effects of Employment Protection on Worker and Job Flows: Evidence from the 1990 Italian Reform By Adriana Kugler; Giovanni Pica
  4. Pillar 1 vs. Pillar 2 Under Risk Management By Loriana Pelizzon; Stephen Schaefer
  5. Price Discrimination, Copyright Law, and Technological Innovation: Evidence from the Introduction of DVDs By Julie Holland Mortimer
  6. BASEL II: THE REVISED FRAMEWORK OF JUNE 2004 By Andrew Cornford
  7. Courts, firms and allocation of credit By Julia Shvets
  8. Of Regulatory Law By Andy Carloff
  9. Labour market policies and regulations in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Programmes and impacts By Adriana Marshall

  1. By: Arturo Galindo; Fabio Schiantarelli (Boston College); Andrew Weiss (Boston University)
    Abstract: Using firm level panel data from twelve developing countries we explore if financial liberalization improves the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. A summary index of the efficiency of investment allocation that measures whether investment funds are going to firms with a higher marginal return to capital is developed. We examine the relationship between this and various measures of financial liberalization and find that liberalization increases the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. This holds after various robustness checks and is consistent with firm level evidence that a stronger association between investment and fundamentals after financial liberalization.
    Keywords: financial liberalization, investment, efficiency, reform, development
    JEL: E22 E44 G28 O16
    Date: 2005–10–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:625&r=reg
  2. By: Marcela Eslava; John Haltiwanger; Adriana Kugler; Maurice Kugler
    Abstract: In this paper, we analyze employment and capital adjustments using a panel of plants from Colombia. We allow for nonlinear adjustment of employment to reflect not only adjustment costs of labor but also adjustment costs of capital, and vice-versa. Using data from the Annual Manufacturing Survey, which include plant-level prices, we generate measures of plant-level productivity, demand shocks, and cost shocks, and use them to measure desired factor levels. We then estimate adjustment functions for capital and labor as a function of the gap between desired and actual factor levels. As in other countries, we find non-linear adjustments in employment and capital in response to market fundamentals. In addition, we find that employment and capital adjustments reinforce each other, in that capital shortages reduce hiring and labor shortages reduce investment. Moreover, we find that the market oriented reforms introduced in Colombia after 1990 increased employment adjustments, especially on the job destruction margin, while reducing capital adjustments. Finally, we find that while completely eliminating frictions from factor adjustments would yield a dramatic increase in aggregate productivity through improved allocative efficiency, the reforms introduced in Colombia generated only modest improvements.
    JEL: E22 E24 O11 C14 J63
    Date: 2005–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11656&r=reg
  3. By: Adriana Kugler; Giovanni Pica
    Abstract: This paper uses the Italian Social Security employer-employee panel to study the effects of the Italian reform of 1990 on worker and job flows. We exploit the fact that this reform increased unjust dismissal costs for firms below 15 employees, while leaving dismissal costs unchanged for bigger firms, to set up a natural experiment research design. We find that the increase in dismissal costs decreased accessions and separations for workers in small relative to big firms, especially in sectors with higher employment volatility. Moreover, we find that the reform reduced firms' employment adjustments on the internal margin as well as entry rates while increasing exit rates.
    JEL: E24 J63 J65
    Date: 2005–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11658&r=reg
  4. By: Loriana Pelizzon; Stephen Schaefer
    Abstract: Under the New Basel Accord bank capital adequacy rules (Pillar 1) are substantially revised but the introduction of two new "Pillars" is, perhaps, of even greater significance. This paper focuses on Pillar 2 which expands the range of instruments available to the regulator when intervening with banks that are capital inadequate and investigates the complementarity between Pillar 1 (risk-based capital requirements) and Pillar 2. In particular, the paper focuses on the role of closure rules when recapitalization is costly. In the model banks are able to manage their portfolios dynamically and their decisions on recapitalization and capital structure are determined endogenously. A feature of our approach is to consider the costs as well as the benefits of capital regulation and to accommodate the behavioral response of banks in terms of their portfolio strategy and capital structure. The paper argues that problems of capital adequacy are minor unless, in at least some states of the world, banks are able to violate the capital adequacy rules. The paper shows how the role of Pillar 2 depends on the effectiveness of capital regulation, i.e., the extent to which banks can "cheat".
    JEL: G21 G28
    Date: 2005–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11666&r=reg
  5. By: Julie Holland Mortimer
    Abstract: This paper examines the welfare effects of intellectual property protection, accounting for firms' optimal responses to legal environments and technological innovation. I examine firms' use of indirect price discrimination in response to U.S. copyright law, which effectively prevents direct price discrimination. Using data covering VHS and DVD movie distribution, I explain studios' optimal pricing strategies under U.S. copyright law, and determine optimal pricing strategies under E.U. copyright law, which allows for direct price discrimination. I analyze these optimal pricing strategies for both the existing VHS technology and the new digital DVD technology. I find that studios' use of indirect price discrimination under US copyright law benefits consumers and harms retailers. Optimal pricing under E.U. copyright law also tends to benefit studios and consumers. I also reanalyze these issues assuming continued DVD adoption.
    JEL: L0 O3
    Date: 2005–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11676&r=reg
  6. By: Andrew Cornford
    Abstract: A major aim of Basel II has been to revise the rules of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord in such a way as to align banks´ regulatory capital more closely with their risks, taking account of progress in the measurement and management of risk and of the opportunities which these provide for strengthened supervision. Achievement of this aim has involved the incorporation in Basel II of methods for quantifying banking risks introduced since the late 1980s. The task of the designers of Basel II has been complicated by the way in which the BCBS´s rules for banks´ capital, originally intended for the internationally active banks of its member countries, have become a global standard widely applied in developing as well as developed countries. Acceptance of this role by the BCBS has entailed a global consultation process, whose results have been reflected in three consultative papers and the RF, and the different approaches and options for setting numerical capital requirements which are intended to accommodate banks and supervisors of different levels of sophistication. As well as providing a commentary on the main features of the RF this paper documents the response of the BCBS to some of the more important points which were raised during this consultation process, including the outcome of decisions taken at a meeting in Madrid in October 2003 following comments on the consultative paper of April 2003, and summarises the results of the most recent of the BCBS´s initiatives to estimate the quantitative impact of the Basel II rules on banks´ capital. This discussion includes a review of papers issued by the BCBS as part of the last stage of its work preceding the RF.
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unc:dispap:178&r=reg
  7. By: Julia Shvets (University of Cambridge, Corpus Christi College)
    Abstract: The paper investigates whether and how performance of regional commercial courts has affected external credit of Russian enterprises between 1995 and 2002. The results show that more reliable courts lead to higher bank lending to firms. This occurs predominantly through expansion of the number of businesses which have access to bank financing. There is limited evidence that trade credit also responds to changes in quality of courts. However, credit from suppliers is considerably less sensitive to court performance than bank credit. Court reliability is precisely defined and measured objectively using appeal rates of lower court decisions. The paper analytically derives the relationship between reliability of courts, appeal rates and lending to firms, identifying a specific channel through which law enforcement affects external financing. Empirical analysis is based on a new panel dataset which measures credit at the level of a firm and permits a number of robustness tests.
    Keywords: law enforcement, finance
    JEL: O12 G38 G32 K42 K41 H40
    Date: 2005–09–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0509026&r=reg
  8. By: Andy Carloff (Punkerslut Freethought)
    Abstract: Some thoughtful questions and linear answers to the economic, social, and political consequencs that comes with restrictive regulating laws. 'Regulatory law is where Socialism meets Liberalism; or what might be called the highest form of Liberalism, the lowest form of Socialism.'
    Keywords: regulation, regulatory, prohibition, minimum wage, work conditions, labor, unions
    JEL: K
    Date: 2005–09–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0509006&r=reg
  9. By: Adriana Marshall
    Keywords: labour market policies
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ilo:empstr:2004-13&r=reg

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