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on Regulation |
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Issue of 2005‒05‒29
five papers chosen by Christian Calmes Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada |
| By: | Denis, CLAUDE; Jean, HINDRIKS |
| Abstract: | In this paper we consider mixed oligopoly markets for differentiated goods where private and public firms compete either in prices or quantities. We then study the welfare effect of privatization interpreted as partial strategic delegation of the public firm to a private manager with profit concern. It is shown that partial privatization improves welfare with quantity competion when goods are subsitutes, and with price competition when goods are complements. However full privatization (complete delegation to private manager) can never be optimal. It is also shown that the public firm can make more profit than the private firm in equilibrium, and that this possibility is more likely under quantity competition. Turning to market regulation policy, we find : (i) that public and private firms should be taxed the same; and (ii) that price regulation is better than quantity regulation. |
| Date: | 2005–01–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005016&r=reg |
| By: | Frode Brevik; Manfred Gärtner |
| Abstract: | We analyze an overlapping-generations world comprising two groups of small countries whose preferences for public spending differ. Key steady-state effects from introducing bank secrecy and a withholding tax in countries with low government spending are: a reduction of global capital and income, a shift of wealth towards bank-secrecy countries, and falling consumption, welfare and government spending despite rising tax rates in the rest of the world. Qualitative results are robust to changes in tax-payer honesty, the Leviathan effect (permitting governments to drive public spending higher than citizens prefer), and the fraction of withholding taxes repatriated to countries of residence. |
| JEL: | E2 E62 F42 H2 |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:dp2005:2005-07&r=reg |
| By: | Mark Armstrong (University College London); David Sappington (University of Florida) |
| Abstract: | In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are pro-competitive from corresponding anti-competitive liberalization policies |
| Keywords: | Competition, Regulation, Liberalization |
| JEL: | L |
| Date: | 2005–05–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0505011&r=reg |
| By: | Rudiger Ahrend; William Tompson |
| Abstract: | The paper provides an overview of the course of economic reform and the performance of the Russian economy since the early 1990s and an analysis of the structural reform challenges ahead. It assesses the contribution of institutional and structural reforms to economic performance over the period, before turning to the question of where further structural reforms could make the biggest contribution to improved performance. Three major conclusions emerge. First, there is still a great deal to be done to strengthen the basic institutions of the market economy. While the Russian authorities have embarked on some impressive - and often technically complex - 'second-generation' reforms, many 'first-generation' reforms have yet to be completed. Secondly, the central challenges of Russia's second decade of reform are primarily concerned with reforming state institutions. Thirdly, the pursuit of reforms across a broad front could enable Russia to profit from complementarities that exist among various strands of reform. <p> Quinze ans de réformes économiques en Russie: Qu'a-t-elle acquis? Que reste-t-il à faire? <p> L'article donne un aperçu du déroulement des réformes économiques et des performances de l'économie russe depuis le début des années 90, ainsi qu'une analyse des enjeux des futures réformes structurelles. L'article considère la contribution des réformes institutionnelles et structurelles à la performance économique durant la période, avant d'examiner dans quels domaines des réformes structurelles additionnelles pourraient avoir la plus grande contribution à l'amélioration de la performance économique. Il en résulte trois conclusions majeures. Premièrement, il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour renforcer les institutions de base d'une économie de marché. Bien que les autorités russes aient commencé quelques réformes de "seconde génération" qui sont impressionnantes - et souvent techniquement complexes-, il reste un bon nombre de réformes de "première génération" à achever. Deuxièmement, les défis centraux de la deuxième décennie de réformes concernent en première ligne la réforme des institutions de l'État. Troisièmement, la poursuite des réformes sur un large front permettrait à la Russie de profiter des complémentarités existantes entre les différents axes des réformes. |
| Keywords: | Russia; economy; reform; growth; stabilisation; transparency; corruption; state ownership; competition; transition |
| JEL: | H1 K2 P21 P26 P27 P31 P37 |
| Date: | 2005–05–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oed:oecdec:430&r=reg |
| By: | Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee) |
| Abstract: | Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasion rates: Fines depending on the duration of an evasion spell, and different vintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs when switched between evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparent representation of revenue losses and social costs due to tax evasion, novel findings on the effect of policy on tax evasion, and a tractable framework for the analysis of tax evasion dynamics. |
| Date: | 2004–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:szg:worpap:0407&r=reg |