nep-pub New Economics Papers
on Public Finance
Issue of 2024‒10‒14
six papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong, Johns Hopkins University


  1. Putting the "Finance" into "Public Finance": A Theory of Capital Gains Taxation By Mark A. Aguiar; Benjamin Moll; Florian Scheuer
  2. Tax Rate-based Incentives, Tax Base-based Incentives, and the Combined Policy Effects on Corporate Innovation By Liu, Sheng; Feng, Haibo; Xu, Yongyi; Xu, Fei
  3. How to Design and Implement Property Tax Reforms By Martin Grote; Jean-François Wen
  4. Design of Partial Population Experiments with an Application to Spillovers in Tax Compliance By Cruces, Guillermo; Tortarolo, Dario; Vazquez-Bare, Gonzalo
  5. Vehicle taxes as a climate policy instrument: econometric evidence from Spain By Léon-Gómez, Carlos R.; Teixidó, Jordi J.; Verde, Stefano F.
  6. Tax disincentives to formal employment in Latin America By Bargain, Olivier; Jara, H. Xavier; Rivera, David

  1. By: Mark A. Aguiar; Benjamin Moll; Florian Scheuer
    Abstract: Standard optimal capital tax theory abstracts from modeling asset prices, making it unsuitable for thinking about capital gains and wealth taxation. We study optimal redistributive taxation in an environment with asset price changes, adopting the modern finance view that asset prices fluctuate not only because of changing cash flows, but also due to other factors (“discount rates”). We show that the optimal tax base (i) generally differs from the case with constant asset prices, and (ii) depends on the sources of asset-price changes. Whenever asset prices fluctuate, and are not exclusively driven by cash flow changes, taxes must target realized trades and generally involve a combination of realization-based capital gains and dividend taxes. This result stands in contrast to the classic Haig-Simons comprehensive income tax concept, as well as recent proposals for wealth or accrual-based capital gains taxes.
    JEL: E6 H21
    Date: 2024–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32951
  2. By: Liu, Sheng (School of Economics and Trade, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies); Feng, Haibo (School of Economics, Jinan University); Xu, Yongyi (School of Economics, Jinan University); Xu, Fei (Department of Economics, Umeå University)
    Abstract: Tax incentive policies are an important means for governments to encourage corporate innovation. The issue of policy composite fallacy exists under certain conditions, which has been overlooked by existing studies. Based on China's tax survey data from 2008 to 2016 and employing the method of constructing the marginal effective tax rate for enterprises, this paper empirically tests the effects of tax rate-based incentives, tax base-based incentives, and their combined policy effects. The following findings are obtained: tax base-based incentives consistently promote corporate innovation through the innovation risk-sharing mechanism. Whether tax rate-based incentives promote innovation depends on the extent to which the expectation of compensating for innovation risk loss through tax rate incentives is met. The combined policy effect of tax base- and tax rate-based incentives also depends on the level of government risk-sharing and the expectation of compensation for corporate innovation risk loss, with empirical results showing that the combination of the two policies impedes corporate innovation; compared with tax rate-based incentives and their combination, tax base-based incentives have a greater and more lasting impact in terms of lagged effects. Finally, the paper conducts a heterogeneity analysis on enterprises with different levels of innovation and different property rights. The conclusions of the article provide theoretical and practical bases for optimizing the combination of tax incentive policies and improving the quality of innovation.
    Keywords: Tax incentives; Risk sharing; Innovation
    JEL: H20 O10 O31
    Date: 2024–09–24
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:umnees:1027
  3. By: Martin Grote; Jean-François Wen
    Abstract: Property taxes are often under-exploited sources of local public revenues. A broad-based tax, raised at modest rates, can potentially generate significantly higher revenues in many countries, and meet most of the costs of improved local public services. This note provides a practical guide to designing and implementing reforms to recurrent taxes on immoveable property and real estate transfer taxes. It addresses the fundamental policy choices regarding the property tax base and tax rate, and the key functions of the tax administration for managing collections – valuation, billing, and enforcement. The advice in the note stems from a review of the literature and insights gained from the experiences of the Fiscal Affairs Department in delivering capacity development on property taxes. It covers and updates some of the analytical work by Norregaard (2013) while providing granular advice on practical aspects of reforming property taxes. The note is motivated by the resource mobilization needs of developing countries, but the design considerations are also pertinent for advanced and emerging market economies seeking to increase the revenue productivity of property taxes.
    Keywords: property tax; recurrent tax; real estate; real property transfer tax; tax reform; implement property tax reform; property tax tax collection; revenue identity; property tax administration; property tax system; Tax administration core functions; Transaction tax; Estate tax; Africa
    Date: 2024–09–19
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfhtn:2024/006
  4. By: Cruces, Guillermo (CEDLAS-UNLP); Tortarolo, Dario (World Bank); Vazquez-Bare, Gonzalo (UC Santa Barbara)
    Abstract: We develop a framework to analyze partial population experiments, a generalization of the cluster experimental design where clusters are assigned to different treatment intensities. Our framework allows for heterogeneity in cluster sizes and outcome distributions. We study the large-sample behavior of OLS estimators and cluster-robust variance estimators and show that (i) ignoring cluster heterogeneity may result in severely underpowered experiments and (ii) the cluster-robust variance estimator may be upward-biased when clusters are heterogeneous. We derive formulas for power, minimum detectable effects, and optimal cluster assignment probabilities. All our results apply to cluster experiments, a particular case of our framework. We set up a potential outcomes framework to interpret the OLS estimands as causal effects. We implement our methods in a large-scale experiment to estimate the direct and spillover effects of a communication campaign on property tax compliance. We find an increase in tax compliance among individuals directly targeted with our mailing, as well as compliance spillovers on untreated individuals in clusters with a high proportion of treated taxpayers.
    Keywords: partial population experiments, spillovers, randomized controlled trials, cluster experiments, two-stage designs, property tax, tax compliance
    JEL: C01 C93 H71 H71 H26 H26 H21 H21 O23
    Date: 2024–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17256
  5. By: Léon-Gómez, Carlos R.; Teixidó, Jordi J.; Verde, Stefano F.
    Abstract: We study the local distortionary effects of notches in Spain’s CO2-based vehicle registration tax on the distribution of new car CO2 performance. These effects are the smoking gun of carmaker strategic behaviour and affect in turn tax revenue and CO2 emissions. Using model-level data on all car registrations in Spain 2010-2020, we apply the bunching approach to the three thresholds of the tax scheme: 120, 160, and 200 gCO2/km. We find that the tax notches strongly affected market outcomes, resulting in the sale of about 388, 000 more cars (overall) at or just below the thresholds compared to the respective counterfactuals without the thresholds. This translates into about €335 million of foregone tax revenue and only very limited extra abatement of CO2 emissions. Over 90-95% of all estimated bunching took place at the first threshold (120 gCO2/km). Over 60% of all estimated bunching took place before 2015. Bunching diminished over time, which reflects diminished effectiveness of the tax in both reducing CO2 emissions and generating revenue. Taking the interactions with both EU vehicle emission standards and similar CO2-related policies in other Member States into consideration is important for interpreting these results.
    Keywords: CO2-based vehicle taxes, Notches, Bunching, Carmakers, Strategic behaviour, Emissions, Tax revenue, Policy interactions
    JEL: H23 H30 Q58
    Date: 2024–09–14
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122103
  6. By: Bargain, Olivier; Jara, H. Xavier; Rivera, David
    Abstract: To finance increased public spending and social programs, Latin America's tax systems need to develop further. Yet taxation can reduce the tax base by discouraging formal employment. Evidence on the intensity of the problem is limited and tends to focus on specifically large reforms of the tax system. Conversely, and to improve external validity, we study whether routine changes in tax policies also alter labor market formalization. Our approach is based on grouped-data estimations of formal employment responses to policy changes. We exploit tax variation across three countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia) and three periods (2008, 2014/15, 2019). We use precise calculations of counterfactual tax burdens when moving from informal to formal jobs, i.e. formalization tax rates (FTRs). For most countries and pairs of years, FTRs have a negative and significant effect on formal employment, particularly when wages are held constant across periods – in order to extract the pure policy effect – and in a series of sensitivity checks.
    Keywords: taxation; benefits; labor supply; informality
    JEL: H24 H31 J24 J40
    Date: 2024–09–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:125368

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