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on Public Finance |
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Issue of 2021‒02‒15
eight papers chosen by |
| By: | Michael Kogler |
| Abstract: | How can tax policy improve financial stability? Recent studies suggest large stability gains from eliminating the debt bias in corporate taxation. It is well known that this reform reduces bank leverage. This paper analyzes a novel, complementary channel: risk taking. We model banks’ portfolio choice under moral hazard and emphasize the ‘incentive function’ of equity. We find that (i) an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) and a lower tax rate discourage risk taking and offer stability and welfare gains, (ii) a revenue-neutral ACE unambiguously improves financial stability, and (iii) capital regulation and deposit insurance influence the risk-taking effects of taxation. |
| Keywords: | corporate taxation, tax reform, banking, risk taking, financial stability |
| JEL: | G21 G28 H25 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8830&r=all |
| By: | Natasha Sarin; Lawrence H. Summers; Owen M. Zidar; Eric Zwick |
| Abstract: | We argue the revenue potential from increasing tax rates on capital gains may be substantially greater than previously understood. First, many prior studies focus primarily on short-run taxpayer responses, and so miss revenue from gains that are deferred when rates change. Second, the composition of capital gains has shifted in recent years, such that the share of gains that are highly elastic to the tax rate has likely declined. Third, focusing on capital gains tax collection may understate fiscal spillovers from decreasing the preferential tax treatment for capital gains. Fourth, additional base-broadening reforms, like eliminating stepped-up basis and making charitable giving a realization event, will decrease the elasticity of the tax base to rate changes. Overall, we do not think the prevailing assumption of many in the scorekeeping community—that raising rates to top ordinary income levels would raise little revenue—is warranted. A crude calculation illustrates that raising capital gains rates to ordinary income levels could raise $1 trillion more revenue over a decade than other estimates suggest. Given the magnitudes at stake, scorekeeping procedures employed in evaluating capital gains should be made more transparent and be the subject of external professional debate and review. |
| JEL: | H0 H2 H3 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28362&r=all |
| By: | Thomas A. Gresik; Eric Bond |
| Abstract: | We examine the effects of unilateral changes in a country’s tax parameters in a two country model when both countries are part of a destination-based cash flow taxation (DBCFT) system. We con-sider deviations from a globally efficient DBCFT equilibrium by allowing each country to vary its corporate tax rate, degree of taxation of capital income, and level of border adjustment. We decompose the effect of policy changes into fiscal effects and price effects, and show that regardless of the similarity between the two countries, at least one country has an incentive to move toward taxation of capital income. If countries are identical, each has an incentive to move toward source-based taxation. In contrast, changes in corporate tax rates have neither fiscal or price effects, and thus can be set unilaterally. Our results show that an international agreement to establish multilateral DBCFT requires a commitment mechanism to prevent deviations from cash flow taxation and full border adjustments. |
| Keywords: | destination-based taxes, source-based taxes, cash-flow taxes |
| JEL: | H73 H21 F23 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8836&r=all |
| By: | Advani, Arun (University of Warwick, CAGE, and IFS) |
| Abstract: | We use administrative tax data from audits of self-assessment tax returns to understand what types individuals are most likely to be non-compliant. Non-compliance is common, with one-third of taxpayers underpaying by some amount, although half of aggregate under-reporting is done by just 2% of taxpayers. Third party reporting reduces non-compliance, while working in a cash-prevalent industry increases it. However, compliance also varies significantly with individual characteristics: non-compliance is higher for men and younger people. These results matter for measuring inequality, for understanding taxpayer behaviour, and for targeting audit resources. |
| Keywords: | JEL Classification: |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:530&r=all |
| By: | Clément Malgouyres (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques); Thierry Mayer (Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris, CEPII - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales - Centre d'analyse stratégique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR); Clément Mazet-Sonilhac (Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris, Banque de France - Banque de France - Banque de France) |
| Abstract: | Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) identify state corporate tax incidence in a spatial equilibrium model with imperfectly mobile firms. Their identification argument rests on comparative-statics omitting a channel implied by their model: the link between common determinants of a location's attractiveness and the average idiosyncratic productivity of firms choosing that location. This compositional margin causes the labor demand elasticity to be independent from the product demand elasticity, impeding the identification of incidence from reduced-form estimates. Assigning consensual values to the unidentified parameters, we find that the incidence share born by firm-owners is closer to 25% than the 40% initially reported. The null associated with the "conventional view" that the share on workers is 1 and that on firm owners is 0 is still rejected. |
| Keywords: | Incidence,Corporate income tax,Discrete/continuous choice |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03082268&r=all |
| By: | Clemens Fuest; Felix Hugger; Florian Neumeier |
| Abstract: | This paper is the first to use information from individual country-by-country (CbC) re-ports to assess the extent of profit shifting by multinational enterprises. Unlike other data often used to evaluate the extent of profit shifting and tax avoidance, CbC reports pro-vide a complete coverage of the global distribution of profits and indicators of economic activity for multinationals exceeding a certain revenue threshold. We show that 82% of the German multinationals subject to CbC reporting have tax haven subsidiaries and that these subsidiaries are notably more profitable than those in non-havens. However, only 9% of the global profits of German multinationals are reported in tax havens. Results from regression analysis suggest that approximately 40% of the profits reported in tax havens are a result of tax-induced profit shifting. The associated annual tax base loss for Germany amounts to EUR 5.4 billion. Adding estimates of profit shifting by multinationals not covered by the CbC data yields an overall estimate for profits shifted out of Germany to tax havens of EUR 19.1 billion per year, corresponding to 4.3% of the profits reported by these firms in Germany. This implies a tax revenue loss due to corporate profit shifting to tax havens of EUR 5.7 billion per year. |
| Keywords: | corporate taxation, tax avoidance, profit shifting, multinational enterprises, country-by-country reporting |
| JEL: | F23 H25 H26 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8838&r=all |
| By: | David R. Agrawal. (University of Kentucky); Dirk Foremny (UB - Universitat de Barcelona); Clara Martinez-Toledano (WIL - World Inequality Lab , Columbia Business School - Columbia University [New York]) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effect of wealth taxation on mobility and the consequences for tax revenue and wealth inequality. We exploit the unique decentralization of the Spanish wealth tax system in 2011—after which all regions levied positive tax rates except for Madrid—using linked administrative wealth and income tax records. We find that five years after the reform, the stock of wealthy individuals in the region of Madrid increases by 10% relative to other regions, while smaller tax differentials between other regions do not matter for mobility. We rationalize our findings with a theoretical model of evasion and migration, which suggests that evasion is the mechanism most consistent with all of the mobility response being driven by the paraíso fiscal. Combining new subnational wealth inequality series with our estimated elasticities, we show that Madrid's status as a tax haven reduces the effectiveness of raising tax revenue and exacerbates regional wealth inequalities. |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03093674&r=all |
| By: | Grégoire Rota-Graziosi (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - Clermont Auvergne - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, FERDI - Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International); Fayçal Sawadogo (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - Clermont Auvergne - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, FERDI - Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the tax burden on the mobile telecommunication sector in twenty-five African countries. This tax burden encompasses not only standard and particular taxes under the control of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), but also fees raised by national telecommunication Regulatory Agency (RA). Given the lack of financial data at the country level, we build a representative mobile network operator, named TELCO, using the GSMA Intelligence database. We compute the Average Effective Tax Rate (AETR) for this firm considering general and special taxes and fees levied only on the telecommunication sector. We develop a web application (https://data.cerdi.uca.fr/ telecom/), which allows the reader to replicate our analysis or to modify TELCO and tax parameters. The AETR varies significantly across countries, ranging from 33 percent in Ethiopia to 118 percent in Niger. Special taxes and fees represent a large share of the AETR illustrating some taxation by regulation and a potential tax competition (a race to the top) between the MoF and the RA. We compare the AETR of TELCO to this of a representative gold mining plant and a standard firm with similar gross return. The tax burden of the telecommunication sector is higher than this of the mining sector in 15 countries out of the 19 countries for which we have data on the gold mining sector. |
| Keywords: | Taxation,Telecommunication sector,Project analysis,Developing countries |
| Date: | 2020–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03109370&r=all |