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on Public Finance |
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Issue of 2012‒02‒08
two papers chosen by |
| By: | Lauridsen, Jørgen (Department of Business and Economics); Nannerup, Niels (Department of Business and Economics); Skak, Morten (Department of Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | Tax and public service competition between local governments concerning localisation of new residents is analysed in a setting of economic spillovers which means that also a neighbouring region will benefit from localisation via demand of residents in a border region, (a so-called host region). We identify two basic Nash-equilibrium outcomes of the analysed tax-game. In one of these outcomes local tax rates will be different across the regions – a fact that appears important for (future) empirical studies of local tax competition. Due to the lack of adequate theoretical modelling, studies in this field have often demonstrated spatial dependence of local policy variables without identifying the source of interaction between decision-makers. Our theoretical findings prove to be robust to a range of important expansions of the basic simple framework. |
| Keywords: | Local tax competition; household locational choice; spillover effects; Nash-equilibria |
| JEL: | H21 H31 H71 |
| Date: | 2011–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2011_009&r=pub |
| By: | Claude Ménard (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | Public-Private Partnership has been high on the agenda of public decision makers since the 1990's. Primarily a contractual approach to the delivery of infrastructures, goods and services traditionally provided by the public sector or by private operators submitted to tight regulation, PPP is also a very special contractual practice as it seeks to introduce market-type relationships in a context in which non-market forces play a major role. An important consequence is the overlapping of decision rights as well as property rights, which exposes PPP to a double alignment problem, organizational and institutional. Away from the ideological controversies about the legitimacy of PPP in provisioning public goods, this chapter focuses on problems rooted in the very nature of PPPs and the actual design of their supportive contracts, as well as in the institutions in which they are embedded and that define the capacity to implement and monitor these arrangements properly. |
| Keywords: | Public-Private Partnership; transaction costs; organization; infrastructures; misalignment |
| Date: | 2011–10–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00653090&r=pub |