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on Public Finance |
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Issue of 2010‒04‒24
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Andr s Simonovts (Institute of Economics - Hungarian Academy of Sciences) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the impact of tax morality on progressive income (wage) taxation. We assume that transfers (cash-back) and public expenditures are financed from linear wage taxes. We derive the reported wages from individual utility maximization, when individuals obtain partial satisfaction from reporting wages (depending on their tax morality), and cannot be excluded from the use of public services. The government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, also taking into account the utility of public services. The major conjecture is illustrated by numerical examples: the optimal degree of redistribution and the size of the public services are increasing functions of the individuals' tax morality. |
| Keywords: | tax moral, reporting earnings, progressive income tax, welfare economics |
| JEL: | H55 D91 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:1005&r=pub |
| By: | Wiberg, Magnus (Ministry of finance) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effects of different corporate tax systems on the location of industry within an economic geography model with regional size asymmetries. Both the North and the South gain industry by adopting a tax regime that produces the lowest tax level. As the share of expenditures in the North increases, the Nash equilibrium has this region setting regressive taxes, while the South introduces progressive taxation. The unilateral welfare-maximizing tax structure in the North (South) is the regressive (progressive) system when expenditures in the North increase. Welfare in the North (South) is however maximized if both regions set regressive (progressive) taxes, while regressive (progressive) taxation in both regions represents a joint welfare maximizing outcome if the economic size of the North is higher (lower) than a certain threshold value. As trade is liberalized, the equilibrium tax regime adopted depends on how pro ts respond to lower trade costs. Proportional taxation is never an equilibrium, neither as regional spending changes, nor as trade is liberalized. |
| Keywords: | Economic Geography; Tax Systems; Corporate Taxation |
| JEL: | F12 H25 R12 |
| Date: | 2010–04–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2010_0006&r=pub |
| By: | Pablo Guillen (The University of Sydney); Danielle Merrett (The University of Sydney) |
| Abstract: | We propose an intergroup competition scheme (ICS) to solve the free-riding problem in the public goods game. Our solution only requires knowledge of the group contributions, is budget balanced and with the right parameters a dominant strategy. The main innovations of our design are that the prize to the winning group is paid by the losing group and that the size of the transfer depends on the difference in contribution by the two groups. With the right parameters, this scheme changes the dominant strategy from none to full contribution. We tested different parameterizations for the ICS. The experiments show dramatic gains in efficiency in all the ICS treatments. Moreover, versions of the ICS in which intergroup competition should not change the zero contribution Nash equilibrium also produce remarkable gains in efficiency and no decline in contributions over time. |
| Keywords: | public goods, intergroup competition, team production, voluntary contributions mechanism, economic experiments |
| Date: | 2010–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:wpaper:10/03&r=pub |
| By: | Sib Ranjan, Misra; Jaydev, Misra |
| Abstract: | Japan has to restructure its social security systems fromtime to time for different reasons like a far more rapid aging of population , the slow down of long term economic growth and deteriorating equity in the inter-generational transfer of welfare .But even then, the basic elements remain the same .It si pertinent to see how and to whar extent japan’s social security systems could be translated in the case of India. As apreliminary analysis ,in section One, attempt has been made to summarize the distinctive features of social security systems in Japan.Section Two dwells upon the nature and problems of the social security systems in India. An endeavour has been made in Section three to articulate on the lessons for India. Final Section Four concludes and summarizes the main findings.It has ben observed that there are certain experiences that India can learn ,amongothers, the careful application of universal social security systems, the role of insurance policies,private-public synergies ,the role of the government and governance, the importance attached to social capital. |
| Keywords: | Universal social security system; private–public partnership; Inter-generational Equity governance; social capital |
| JEL: | H55 H41 E65 |
| Date: | 2009–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22076&r=pub |