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on Public Finance |
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Issue of 2006‒02‒19
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Biung-Ghi Ju (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas); Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain) |
| Abstract: | Progressivity, inequality reduction and merging-proofness are three well-known axioms in taxation. We investigate implications of each of the three axioms through characterizations of several families of taxation rules and their logical relations. We also study the preservation of these axioms under two operators on taxation rules, the so-called convexity operator and minimal-burden operator, which give intuitive procedures of determining a tax schedules. |
| Keywords: | taxation, progressivity, inequality reduction, merging-proofness, convexity operator, minimal-burden operator. |
| Date: | 2006–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kan:wpaper:200603&r=pub |
| By: | Claudio A. Piga (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University) |
| Abstract: | The paper studies the characteristics and the effects of a tax imposed by a local government on the land used to create new tourists' accommodations. First, a dynamic policy game between a monopolist in a tourist area and a local government is considered. In each period the former has to decide the size of land undergoing development whereas the latter has to choose the tax to levy on each newly developed area unit. Linear Perfect Markov strategies are derived for both the non-cooperative and the public monopoly case. In equilibrium a public monopoly would develop land more rapidly than a private monopoly. Furthermore, the more the monopolist discounts the future, the more the long run use of the natural resource is reduced. Second, the properties of the tax are studied considering an oligopolistic market structure. The tax alone does not lead to the socially optimal level of land use. However, its combined eect with another policy instrument such as a quota induces the optimal level of resource use. |
| Keywords: | Tourism, Taxation, Land Use, differential game, time consistency. |
| JEL: | H21 Q32 R52 L83 L50 |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2006_2&r=pub |
| By: | José Ramón García (Dpto. Análisis Económico, Universitat de València); José Vicente Ríos (Dpto. Análisis Económico, Universitat de València) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we introduce a progressive income tax in the shirking model with union bargaining presented by in Altenburg and Straub (2002). Indeed, we differentiate taxation on employees and employers for the fiscal policy analysis. The main results show that it is possible, with a constant revenue reform, to enhance employment by shifting the tax imposition towards lower firm taxation. And, that it is crucial to consider a proportional or progressive taxation on labour income in order to be able to analyse the effect on unemployment for a constant replacement rate. |
| Keywords: | Labour taxation, union bargaining, efficiency wages |
| JEL: | E24 J32 J41 J51 |
| Date: | 2004–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2004-42&r=pub |
| By: | José Rueda-Llano (Universidad de Alicante); Luis Corchón (Universidad de Alicante) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no social rule which is efficient, nondictatorial and strategy-proof. For the case of more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality or by Envy-Freeness. Journal of Economic Literature |
| Keywords: | Strategy-proofness, public goods economies, differentiable mechanisms |
| JEL: | D61 D78 H41 |
| Date: | 2004–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2004-29&r=pub |