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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Verena Wolf (University of Paderborn); Christian Bartelheimer (University of Paderborn); Daniel Beverungen (University of Paderborn) |
| Abstract: | Workarounds are goal-driven deviations from standard operating procedures, performed to overcome obstacles constraining day-to-day work. Related research has elicited antecedents and types of workarounds but not investigated how and why workarounds diffuse in an organization, leaving their mark on co-workers, IT artifacts, and organizational structures. Drawing on organizational routines and business processes as complementary theoretical lenses, we perform a multiple case study to elicit how and why workarounds occur and impact organizations. We start by pinpointing workarounds as individual temporary fixes for technology, or for organizational, and strategic misfits in organizations. Once established, workarounds can diffuse in an organization if observed by or communicated to co-workers, initiating processes of restructuration and re-design on an organizational level. If appropriate governance structures are in place, workarounds can become official work practices or trigger the innovation of processes and IT artifacts that resolve their underlying misfits. Our results provide unique empirical insights into the mechanisms of bottom-up initiated change in organizations, substantiated by integrating previously unconnected theory on organizational routines and business process management. |
| Keywords: | workaround, organizational routine, business process management, socio-technical system, case study research, IT artifact |
| JEL: | M15 O32 O33 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:dispap:68&r=all |
| By: | Saul Lach; Zvika Neeman; Mark Schankerman |
| Abstract: | We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero co-financing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral hazard (two effort levels), the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest and zero self-financing, and a second with a lower interest plus co-financing. Calibrated simulations assess welfare gains from the optimal policy, observed loan programs, and a direct subsidy to private venture capital firms. The gains vary with the size of the externalities, cost of public funds, and effectiveness of the private VC industry. |
| Keywords: | mechanism design, innovation, R&D, entrepreneurship, additionality, government finance, venture capital |
| JEL: | D61 D82 O32 O38 |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stieip:55&r=all |
| By: | Boyer, Marcel |
| Abstract: | In the assessment of the cost of public funds, there is a pervasive economic fallacy, which is frequently repeated by officials in both the private and public sectorsas well as in academia: since the cost of borrowing is higher for a private sector firm than it is for a public sectorfirm, the cost of carrying out an activity (investment, production, distribution, provision of goods and services) will necessarily be lower ceteris paribusin the public sector than in the private sector.The statement is erroneous because part of the government’s cost of borrowing is hidden from the casual observer of interest rates or yields.The all-inclusive borrowing cost, more generally the all-inclusive cost of capital, is the same for both the public and private sector. I discuss fourspecific real cases where the error is present, the first three more succinctly and the last more more extensively: the QuebecGenerations Fund;the Québec CDPQInfra REM project;the Infrastructure Ontariomethodology to assess the riskiness of costs; the BC Hydro’s Site C hydroelectric megaproject.I discuss also a general fifth case, namely governement support programs for business (grants, loans, guarantees, subsidies, etc.). Those are often justified on the fallacious claim that the cost of financing is samller for the government than for the private sector. I propose an auction process by which the true cost of business support programs could be made transparent. Iconcludewith an appeal for amore rigorous use and management of public fiunds.Iexpect that miscalculation, misinformation, mismanagement, and fallacious analysis will backfire, as always. |
| Date: | 2020–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:125006&r=all |
| By: | Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | Creation of a television or movie project requires the bundling of inputs—writers, actors, directors—into a coherent package that can be produced and distributed. Traditionally this bundling was done by studios, which then negotiated compensation deals with input suppliers via their agents. In recent decades, however, large talent agencies have increasingly engaged in the practice of “packaging,” which involves creating vehicles for their clients and selling the completed projects to studios. The union for screenwriters has recently challenged this practice as constituting an unfair business practice, arguing that it creates a conflict of interest on the part of agencies. This paper evaluates this argument using tools and insights from the literature on transaction-specific investments and the holdup problem. JEL Classification: L14, L23, L82 Key words: Entertainment industry, packaging deals, transaction-specific investment, holdup problem |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2020-21&r=all |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The level of public investment in Belize has varied over the past years in the context of existing constraints. The sharp increase in public debt has limited available fiscal space.1 This has resulted in an increase in externally financed investments as a share of the capital budget and a growing interest in public private partnerships (PPPs) to help achieve the government of Belize’s national strategy objectives.2 However, the correlation between Belize’s public investment and GDP growth remains weak, and the public capital stock as a ratio to GDP shows a sharp deterioration, possibly pointing to investment inefficiencies. |
| Keywords: | Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP);Public investment spending;Budget planning and preparation;Capital spending;Capital budget;ISCR,CR,investment project,management process,cash flow,Project implementation,budget preparation document,investment plan,investment portfolio,investment priority |
| Date: | 2020–07–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2020/221&r=all |
| By: | Hayter, Christopher (Arizona State University); Link, Albert (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the use of publications and patents and their covariates among small, knowledge-based firms pursuing technology commercialization. It does so through an empirical examination of 1180 small firms’ R&D projects, all of which were funded through Phase II U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) awards. As such, the paper responds to recent calls to investigate not only how small, knowledge-based firms utilize specific IP strategies, but also how accretive logic specifically differs from competitive publishing and patenting logic. |
| Keywords: | Patents; Publications; Intellectual property; R&D; Strategy; |
| JEL: | L21 L26 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2020–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:uncgec:2020_011&r=all |