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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Bergantiños, Gustavo; Lorenzo, Leticia |
| Abstract: | A planner wants to carry out a project involving several firms. In many cases the planner, for instance the Spanish Administration, includes in the contract a penalty clause that imposes a payment per day if the firms do not complete their activities or the project on time. We discuss two ways of including such penalty clauses in contracts. In the first the penalty applies only when the whole project is delayed. In the second the penalty applies to each firm that incurs a delay even if the project is completed on time. We compare the two penalty systems and find that the optimal penalty (for the planner) is larger in the second method, the utility of the planner is always at least as large or larger in the second case and the utility of the firms is always at least as large or larger in the first. Surprisingly, the final delay in the project is unrelated to which penalty system is chosen. |
| Keywords: | game theory; PERT; delays; penalties |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2019–01–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:97139&r=all |
| By: | Juan-José Ganuza; Gerard Llobet |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that the concession model discourages firms from acquiring information about the future profitability of a project. Uninformed contractors carry out good and bad projects because they are profitable in expected terms even though it would have been optimal to invest in screening them out according to their value. White elephants are identified as avoidable negative net present-value projects that are nevertheless undertaken. Institutional arrangements that limit the losses that firms can bear exacerbate this distortion. We characterize the optimal concession contract, which fosters the acquisition of information and achieves the first best by conditioning the duration of the concession to the realization of the demand and includes payments for not carrying out some projects. |
| Keywords: | concession contracts, Information acquisition, flexible-term concessions |
| JEL: | D82 D86 H21 L51 |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1134&r=all |
| By: | Jean-Philippe Meloche |
| Abstract: | Economists have long argued that road pricing improves the efficiency of infrastructure development. However, pricing projects for roads remain scarce, often for lack of political support. This research focuses on the mechanisms through which technological innovation, and, more specifically, the emergence of satellite-based navigation systems, contributes to the success of road pricing projects in four jurisdictions considered as first movers: Singapore, United States (Oregon), Germany and Norway. Interviews with local experts helped determine how the problem, policy and political streams converge to enable implementation of road pricing projects in these countries. The first movers’ experience demonstrates that new technologies and increasing traffic problems are factors that contribute to an increasing need for pricing, but do not eliminate political hurdles. This suggests that it is better to plan things far ahead of time and move forward slowly in the hope of one day successfully implementing a road pricing project. |
| Keywords: | Road Pricing,Public Policy,Implementation,New Technologies,Window of Opportunity GNSS, |
| Date: | 2019–12–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2019s-35&r=all |
| By: | Jean-Philippe Meloche |
| Abstract: | Economists have long argued that road pricing improves the efficiency of infrastructure development. However, pricing projects for roads remain scarce, often for lack of political support. Quebec is no exception. After the implementation of tolls on portions of highways 25 and 30 in the early 2010s, the issue has faded out of political concern. This research focuses on the mechanisms through which technological innovation, and more specifically the emergence of global satellite-based navigation systems, contributes to the comeback of road pricing on the political agenda. A case analysis of Quebec is compared to four other cases considered as first movers in road pricing: Singapore, Oregon (USA), Germany and Norway. Interviews with local experts helped determine how the streams of solutions, problems and politics converge to enable implementation of road pricing projects. The first movers’ experience demonstrates that new technologies and increasing traffic problems are factors that contribute to an increasing need for pricing, but do not eliminate political hurdles. This suggests that it is better to plan things far ahead of time and move forward slowly in the hope of one day successfully implementing a road pricing project. Depuis longtemps, les économistes défendent l’idée que la tarification routière améliore l’efficacité de production des infrastructures. Pourtant, les projets de tarification demeurent rares sur les routes, souvent faute d’appui politique. Le Québec ne fait pas exception. Après la mise en vigueur des péages sur des portions des autoroutes 25 et 30 au début des années 2010, le débat sur la tarification s’est quelque peu essoufflé. Cette recherche s’intéresse aux mécanismes par lesquels l’innovation technologique, et plus précisément l’émergence des outils de positionnement par satellite, contribue à remettre les projets de tarification routière à l’ordre du jour. Une analyse du cas du Québec est mise en comparaison avec quatre territoires considérés comme des précurseurs en matière de tarification routière : Singapour, l’Oregon (États-Unis), l’Allemagne et la Norvège. Des entrevues auprès d’experts locaux ont permis d’identifier les mécanismes à travers lesquels les courants des problèmes, des solutions et de la politique arrivent à se coupler afin de permettre la mise en œuvre des projets de tarification routière sur ces territoires. L’expérience des précurseurs montre que les nouvelles technologies et l’amplification des problèmes de circulation sont des facteurs qui contribuent à accroître la nécessité de la tarification, mais qu’ils n’éliminent pas pour autant les obstacles politiques. Ce constat suggère qu’il vaut mieux s’y prendre longtemps d’avance et cheminer doucement pour espérer réussir un jour l’implantation d’un projet de tarification routière. |
| Keywords: | Road Pricing,Public Policy,Implementation,New Technologies,Quebec, Tarification routière,Politiques publiques,Mise en œuvre,Nouvelles technologies,Québec |
| Date: | 2019–12–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2019s-36&r=all |
| By: | de Groot, Harmke (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management) |
| Abstract: | The three essays collected in this dissertation advance our understanding of how organizational competencies and R&D objectives are related with partner selection and R&D performance at the project level. The first essay shows how the organizational competencies and R&D prime objective of the focal firm are related with who is seen as the most important partner in the R&D project. The second essay examines how organizational competencies affect the innovation performance of companies when collaborating with an external R&D organization. The third essay focuses on the relationship of absorptive capacity and knowledge distance with new product development performance. |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:aaa0a695-cb71-459e-98b6-67eafc579f21&r=all |