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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Elisa Villani (University of Bologna, Italy); Christian Lechner (Free University of Bolzano, Italy) |
| Abstract: | Innovation ecosystems are characterised by a variety of complementary actors and relationships among them. Universities are considered a key player in innovation ecosystems for their ability of generating knowledge and qualified expertise for entrepreneurial innovation. While much attention has been paid to mature ecosystems characterised by cutting-edge technologies, the role of less established universities in less innovative regions, characterised by a lack of relationships, familyowned firms, difficult university-industry collaborations, but great potential, has remained very much underexplored. Based on a longitudinal case study of a young university in Italy, this paper aims at contributing to existing literature by looking at the role of the university in defining actors’ positions and relationships in establishing an innovation ecosystem. In doing so, we contribute to existing literature in several ways. First, we highlight that the formation of an innovation ecosystem in a small area highly depends on the university’s potential of disrupting established relationships, creating new ones and, thus, playing an active role in designing the ecosystem. Second, we provide a process-based view for understanding the establishment of an innovation ecosystem through the evolution of interactions, roles and activities. Finally, we describe the micro-dynamics characterising innovation ecosystem emergence and institutionalisation and we show that bottomup approaches are possible as well. |
| Keywords: | Ecosystems, university, university-industry collaboration, innovation, longitudinal case study |
| JEL: | M10 |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bzn:wpaper:bemps63&r=all |
| By: | Mathieu Verougstraete (Former staff of the Macroeconomic and Financing for Development Division of United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) |
| Abstract: | Cross-border infrastructure networks are critical for improving regional connectivity, their financing has however been challenging. This paper examines whether Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) may contribute to their development and reviews experience with this type of financing arrangements in the energy, transport and telecommunication sectors. By involving several countries, cross-border projects face specific challenges as these projects are by nature more complex, face augmented political risks and necessitate higher level of coordination. To support countries in financing cross-border projects, the paper studies these challenges in detail. It also highlights the policy actions required to achieve enhanced regional connectivity. It stresses, for instance, the importance of supporting intergovernmental platforms where international networks can be planned, regulatory hurdles tackled and financing arrangements structured. Developing guidelines for cross-border projects would also help countries in their efforts to enhance regional connectivity. The paper concludes by recognizing the potential of PPP for these projects, though it acknowledges that supportive policy actions from participating governments will be required for their success as well as a strong high-level political backing. |
| Keywords: | public-private partnership (PPP), infrastructure development, regional connectivity, Asia and the Pacific |
| JEL: | H54 R42 O16 |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unt:wpmpdd:wp/18/05&r=all |
| By: | Nana Adrian, Marc Möller |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a rationale for equal sharing in heterogeneous partnerships. We introduce project choice and information sharing to a standard team production setting. A team with two agents can choose whether they want to work on a status quo project or on an alternative project. If the (expected) quality of the projects is given and common knowledge, it is optimal for team surplus to give a higher share to the more productive agent in order to optimally motivate. If agents have private information, we have to give the higher share of profits to the less productive agent if we want agents to share this information, which would allow for better adaptation. Equal revenuesharing strikes a balance between the two objectives of adaptation and motivation and can be efficient even in the presence of considerable productivity differences across partners |
| Keywords: | Team adaptation, effort motivation, information disclosure |
| JEL: | D2 D8 L2 |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1904&r=all |