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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Vorhies,Francis; Wilkinson,Emily |
| Abstract: | Many ex ante measures taken to reduce disaster risk can deliver co-benefits that are not dependent on disasters occurring. In fact, building resilience to climate extremes and disasters can achieve multiple objectives. These are secondary to the main objective of disaster risk management of avoiding disaster losses, but identifying and measuring additional co-benefits can enhance the attractiveness of disaster risk management investments. Co-benefits are often economic, such as investment in dams or irrigation to reduce drought risk generating greater productivity; but they can also include significant environmental and social benefits. This paper identifies some of the potential categories of co-benefits associated with disaster risk management investments, expanding on typologies created by agencies seeking to promote social and environmental safeguarding in their work. The paper looks at previous studies on disaster risk management where co-benefits are mentioned but not explored in any detail. The paper examines two new case studies where environmental and socioeconomic co-benefits were uncovered in an irrigation project to reduce drought risk, and an urban flood risk management project, in Jamaica and Mexico, respectively. This review points to several challenges in traditional cost-benefit analysis techniques and puts forward alternative approaches to identify environmental and socioeconomic co-benefits when planning disaster risk management investments. The authors argue that a comprehensive disaster risk management co-benefits framework is needed that includes and categorizes all potential positive environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Co-benefits research focused on revisiting existing cases and developing new case studies could play an important role in this regard. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change Economics,Hazard Risk Management,Economic Theory&Research,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Environmental Economics&Policies |
| Date: | 2016–04–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7633&r=ppm |
| By: | Jordi Blanes i Vidal; Marc Möller |
| Abstract: | We model an organization as a team choosing between a status quo project and a potentially superior alternative. We show that the members' concern for each other's motivation leads to a lack of communication, resulting in a failure to adapt (i.e. the status quo is maintained even when evidence for the alternative's superiority has been observed). Adaptation failures are particularly severe when production exhibits strong complementarities. Improving the organization's aggregate information has the adverse effect of reducing communication. In the long run, the organization can become "locked-in" with the status quo, in that adaptation is impaired for every adoptable alternative. |
| Keywords: | teams, organizations, communication, disclosure, adaptation, motivation |
| JEL: | D02 D23 L29 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1421&r=ppm |
| By: | Strausz, Roland |
| Abstract: | Crowdfunding provides innovation in that it enables entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this benefit. Studying the subsequent trade-off between screening and moral hazard, the paper characterizes optimal mechanisms. Popular all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding schemes reflect their salient features. Efficiency is sustainable only if returns exceed investment costs by a margin reflecting the degree of moral hazard. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment. As a screening tool for valuable projects, crowdfunding promotes social welfare. Crowdfunding complements rather than substitutes traditional entrepreneurial financing. |
| Keywords: | aggregate demand uncertainty; Crowdfunding; entrepreneurship; moral hazard; venture capital |
| JEL: | D82 G32 L11 M31 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11222&r=ppm |
| By: | Di Corato, Luca (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences); Brady, Mark (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences) |
| Abstract: | We examine the impact that subsidies paid to passive farmers have on the lease of land and on the speed of land development. First, we find that, even if delaying land development, paying passive farmers increases the value of the land. Second, when bargaining for the lease of land, we show that the agreement between the parties is conditional on an underlying development project passing a threshold level in terms of profitability. Third, we identify the conditions leading to a Pareto improvement. Last, we illustrate our findings by considering the establishment of an energy crop on leased land. |
| Keywords: | Real Options; Land development; Passive Farming; Nash Bargaining |
| JEL: | C61 Q15 R14 |
| Date: | 2016–04–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:slueko:2016_004&r=ppm |
| By: | Mohajeryami, Saeed; Jennings, Ronald; Alkhbbaz, Ghadeer |
| Abstract: | This paper sheds light on distributed generation (DG) and energy storage and their impacts on electricity distribution networks. The purpose is to consider the various technologies of DG and energy storage and their financial and dynamic influence on the distribution network performance. In this paper, some different business cases in the U.S. related to energy storage and DG are investigated. One of these cases is related to Hawaiian Electric CO. One of the goals of Hawaiian Electric Co. for 2030 is to provide at least 65 percent of its electricity from renewable resources and working on providing sufficient energy storage. The company is considering energy storage project proposals on Oahu in order to provide their services by 2017. The paper will provide a look inside the company and how they are managing their existing projects and their future plans. |
| Keywords: | Distributed Generation (DG); energy storage system; economic analysis |
| JEL: | Z00 |
| Date: | 2015–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:70659&r=ppm |
| By: | Fabiano Mezadre Pompermayer; Edison Benedito da Silva Filho |
| Abstract: | O artigo analisa as principais oportunidades e os desafios à atração de capital privado doméstico e estrangeiro para catalisar o incremento dos projetos de concessões no setor de infraestrutura e propõe soluções a partir da experiência recente brasileira e de outras economias emergentes. A partir do diagnóstico de esgotamento das fontes oficiais de recursos, em face da crescente demanda por recursos para o setor de infraestrutura no Brasil nas próximas décadas, há um consenso quanto a necessidade e conveniência da atração de capital privado para a viabilização dos vários projetos de concessão programados para o período. Propõe-se, então, um novo modelo de financiamento de concessões com o compartilhamento do risco de demanda que favoreça o incremento da participação do capital privado nesses projetos, incluindo a adoção de mecanismos de proteção cambial que aumentem sua atratividade aos investidores estrangeiros. The paper discusses the main challenges and opportunities for attracting both private domestic and foreign capital to foster the growth of concessions projects in the infrastructure sector, and proposes solutions from the Brazilian recent experience and other emerging economies. Given the exhaustion of the public funding sources in Brazil and the increasing demand for finance in the infrastructure sector in the coming decades,there is a consensus on the need of attracting private capital so to ensure the viability of the various concession projects planned for the period. We shall propose a new model for concession financing with provisions for demand risk to be shared between the Government and the concessionaire in order to increase participation of private capital in these projects. The model may also include currency hedge instruments in order to increase its attractiveness to foreign investors. |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipe:ipetds:2177&r=ppm |
| By: | Heine F.A.; Strobel M. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | A team contest entails both public good situations within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other group members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment One in which two groups compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the team contest. Unlike what experimental studies in isolated public goods games indicate, we find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the group project. Furthermore, comparing treatment groups, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing. This is particularly pronounced for the between-group contest. |
| Keywords: | Cooperative Games; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles; |
| JEL: | C92 D01 C71 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015034&r=ppm |
| By: | Swenja Surminski; Hayley Leck |
| Abstract: | While multi-sectoral partnerships (MSPs) now form an increasingly popular and important part of the global climate and disaster risk governance landscape, particularly in urban areas, literature offers little critical investigation of this phenomenon. Through the lens of three partnership case studies from London, Rotterdam and Durban this paper investigates the scope for MSPs to enhance climate adaptation in an urban context. We investigate the drivers behind the formation of the MSPs and consider the concept of ‘impact’ that a MSP may have through surveys and interviews. We then consider the ability of a MSP to respond to changing needs and expectations – such as new scientific evidence, shifting policy directions and member priorities – which are key features of the adaptation and urban resilience fields. Our investigation supports our proposed distinction between ‘first generation’ and ‘second generation’ MSPs, reflecting on the dynamic nature of urban adaptation with a shifting focus from initial awareness raising and agenda setting towards the implementation of adaptation action. We notice that for long-established MSPs, such as the Durban and London examples, this shift can present several challenges, while it can also give rise to new, more targeted MSPs, as the example of Rotterdam shows. |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp232&r=ppm |
| By: | Simon, Jenny; Valasek, Justin Mattias |
| Abstract: | In 2014 over $60 billion was mobilized to help developing nations mitigate climate change, an amount equivalent to the GDP of Kenya. Interestingly, breaking from the traditional model of bilateral aid, donor countries distributed nearly fifty percent of their aid through multilateral aid funds (OECD, 2015). In this paper, we show that by delegating aid spending to an international fund, donor countries mitigate a "hold-up" problem that occurs when donor countries are tempted to allocate aid based on, say, a regional preference. That is, under bilateral aid, donor-country bias decreases the incentive of recipient countries to invest in measures such as good governance that increase the effectiveness of aid. By delegating allocation decisions to a fund, however, donor countries commit to allocating aid via centralized bargaining, which provides recipient countries with an increased incentive to invest. Additionally, we show that allocating funding by majority rule further increases recipient-country investment, since higher investment increases the probability that a recipient's project will be selected by the endogenous majority coalition, and detail conditions under which majority is the optimal voting rule. |
| Keywords: | Aid policy,Climate change,International organizations |
| JEL: | F35 O19 H87 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2016303&r=ppm |