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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Liana Ribeiro dos Santos; T.Diana L. van Aduard de Macedo-Soares |
| Abstract: | In response to growing competitive pressures and changes, a growing number of companies have established alliances as a way to complement their resources and ensure their competitive advantages. Although these alliances are a good strategic option for companies, there is evidence of a high rate of failure. Many studies have examined partnerships’ critical success factors , but few have investigated the difficulties and risk factors. The objective of this paper is to present the results of a research that aimed at identifying risk factors for alliances established in the scope of IT projects. The research was exploratory, and focused on five strategic IT projects of the Central Bank of Brazil, developed in partnership with other public and private, both national and foreign institutions. Although the projects have been successful, the following major risk factors were identified: lack of alliance planning, lack of partner negotiation , lack of partner commitment and lack of institutional support for the alliance. The research provided some significant lessons for managing project alliances that can benefit other IT projects |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcb:wpaper:352&r=ppm |
| By: | Katolnik, Svetlana; Schöndube, Jens Robert |
| Abstract: | It's puzzling that most projects fail to complete within the predetermined timeframe given that timing considerations rank among the major goals in project management. We argue that when managers can extract private benefits from working on a project, project delay becomes optimal. We introduce a continuous-time framework for project management activities that incorporates this feature. A manager's unobserved effort cumulatively increases the project's success probability, but decreases the expected duration of the project and with it the expected flow of on-the-job benefits. A strict deadline limits incentives for effort delay, but also decreases the probability that the project will be terminated in due time. In this trade-off, the optimal deadline balances the increase in expected project value against the expected increase in project duration and costs. Since the manager does not want to "kill the golden goose" prematurely, he always prefers a stricter deadline compared to the principal. As a result, project completion is threatened by both effort provision over time and contractual agreements on time. |
| Keywords: | Optimal deadline, Dynamic incentives, Strategic delay, Project completion |
| JEL: | D82 M52 |
| Date: | 2014–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-533&r=ppm |
| By: | Brunes, Fredrik (Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, Royal Institute of Technology); Lind, Hans (Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | Many infrastructural projects have cost overruns and there has been a lot of research both on why these cost overruns occur and what can be done to reduce cost overruns. Bent Flyvbjerg is the leading researcher in the area and in this article his proposals are also the starting point. Beside a literature review a questionnaire was also sent out to experienced Swedish project managers to find out what they thought could reduce cost overruns. This has been the foundation for the proposals formulated in this article. Proposals concerns three areas 1. Organizational macro-structure, e.g. using more PPPprojects but also decentralization of budgets where cost-overruns in one project in a region leads to less other projects in the specific region. 2. Organizational quality: It should be easy to see when and where cost overruns occur and who was responsible. There should be an well-developed knowledge management system in the organization and an organization culture of openness and a focus on improvements. 3. Organizational processes, e.g. a systematic use of external reviewers in different stages of a project. |
| Keywords: | Cost-overruns; infrastructural projects; policy measures |
| JEL: | H41 H44 H54 L38 |
| Date: | 2014–08–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:kthrec:2014_006&r=ppm |
| By: | Richard Florizone; Laurence Carter |
| Keywords: | Public Sector Economics Private Sector Development - E-Business Housing and Human Habitats Law and Development - Corporate Law Finance and Financial Sector Development - Debt Markets Public Sector Development Communities and Human Settlements |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:18683&r=ppm |
| By: | Raewyn Porter; Diane Zovighian |
| Keywords: | Gender - Gender and Development Rural Development Knowledge and Information Systems Gender - Gender and Health Gender - Gender and Law Housing and Human Habitats Rural Development Communities and Human Settlements |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:18711&r=ppm |
| By: | Xie, Yang; Zilberman, David |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences |
| Date: | 2014–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt6c24636b&r=ppm |
| By: | Capuno, Joseph J. (University of the Philippines) |
| Abstract: | In many countries, public agencies or private firms are gradually moving away from being exclusive providers of goods and services that traditionally were assigned to the state or markets, respectively. Instead, state agencies, both at the national and the local level, and private organizations, both for-profit firms and nongovernment organizations (NGOs), increasingly coordinate, collaborate, or partner to finance, produce, or provide public services. This paper attempts to identify the factors that account for the successes or failures of such public–private service delivery arrangements, with a focus on the role of monetary andnonmonetary incentives used in selected case studies in developing Asia. It finds that such arrangements are a viable service delivery mechanism where there is a state or market failure. While governments now increasingly enter into such partnerships, they appear to do so more with for-profit firms than with NGOs. A key lesson is to mobilize potential private sector partners, match the partner’s mission with the appropriate type or level of service provision, and then motivate them with the right incentives but also monitor them for performance accordingly. |
| Keywords: | public–private partnerships; NGOs; incentives; public service delivery; Asia |
| JEL: | H39 H49 L31 L33 |
| Date: | 2014–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbewp:0387&r=ppm |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Oil Refining and Gas Industry Energy - Energy and Environment Energy - Energy Trade Water Resources - Water and Industry Energy - Energy Production and Transportation Industry |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:17366&r=ppm |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Urban Development - Street Children Population and Development Social Development - Children and Youth Education - Educational Sciences Education - Primary Education Health, Nutrition and Population |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:16983&r=ppm |
| By: | World Bank |
| Keywords: | Finance and Financial Sector Development - Access to Finance Banks and Banking Reform Urban Development - Municipal Financial Management Finance and Financial Sector Development - Debt Markets Public Sector Economics Public Sector Development |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:17568&r=ppm |